M. Hargadon

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought an application to sever his trial from his co-accused, who was charged with second-degree murder arising from the same incident.

The applicant argued that severance would allow for a shorter judge-alone trial and avoid potential delay issues.

The Crown opposed the application, citing the joint enterprise nature of the allegations and the need to avoid duplicating testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were factually and legally connected, and the applicant failed to establish that a joint trial would work an injustice.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual assault causing bodily harm, uttering a death threat, and unlawful confinement following a violent, random attack on a stranger in a public place.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 8 to 10 years, while the defence sought 4 years, citing the accused's Indigenous background and Gladue factors.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors of the unprovoked, prolonged attack against the mitigating factors of the accused's guilty plea, remorse, and Indigenous background.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and kidnapping, applied for judicial interim release.

The accused surrendered to police and admitted to driving the vehicle involved but denied knowledge of the murder.

The court found that the primary and secondary grounds for detention were not met due to the accused's lack of a criminal record and the strength of the proposed sureties.

On the tertiary ground, the court held that a properly informed reasonable person would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the accused were released on a strict plan.

Bail was granted with stringent conditions, including house arrest, GPS ankle monitoring, and significant financial pledges from three sureties.

The applicant, an OSPCA officer, sought to quash an information laid by the respondent for a peace bond under s. 810 of the Criminal Code.

The respondent had sought the peace bond after the applicant and other officers executed a warrant, seized animals, and issued compliance orders, alleging the applicant threatened him with financial ruin.

The Superior Court found the Justice of the Peace committed a jurisdictional error by issuing process, as the respondent's fears arose from the lawful consequences of unlawful behaviour, not a reasonable fear of personal injury or property damage.

The application was granted, the information was quashed, and the Ontario Court of Justice was prohibited from adjudicating further proceedings.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for alleged breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

Approximately 37.5 months had elapsed between the laying of charges and the anticipated completion of trial.

The court analyzed the delay under the Morin framework, attributing portions of delay to neutral causes, defence actions, judicial delay, and Crown delay related primarily to late disclosure following a search warrant and related applications.

Although about 8.5 months of delay was attributed to the Crown and the accused had experienced some prejudice due to pre‑trial detention, the court found the prejudice limited and outweighed by the societal interest in resolving serious sexual assault charges on the merits.

The application for a stay was therefore dismissed.

The accused applied under ss. 278.1–278.5 of the Criminal Code for production of third‑party records in a historical sexual assault prosecution.

The records sought included a school social worker’s notes of the complainant’s initial disclosure, records of counselling sessions with that social worker, and records from a children’s counselling centre.

The court applied the “likely relevance” and “interests of justice” test from the Criminal Code and relevant Supreme Court authorities, balancing the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against the complainant’s privacy interests.

The court ordered production to the court for review of the school social worker’s notes of the initial disclosure, limited counselling information (dates, duration, and type), and any counselling records containing a factual account of the allegations.

The request for broader counselling information from the Children’s Centre was denied.