Matthew Latella

The moving parties (respondents in the main application) brought a motion to dismiss an application to set aside an arbitral award for lack of jurisdiction.

The responding parties (applicants in the main application) sought to set aside the award on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the arbitrator had been retained by the moving parties' counsel in an unrelated matter.

The moving parties argued that under Articles 12 and 13 of the Model Law, the responding parties were required to submit their challenge to the arbitrator first, since the arbitration was still extant regarding costs and interest.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the arbitrator was functus officio regarding the final award on the merits, and the responding parties were entitled to seek recourse under Article 34 of the Model Law.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order striking out an affidavit filed in opposition to an application to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award.

The motion judge had struck the affidavit on the basis that it was clearly irrelevant and scandalous.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions on matters of principle and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

Following a successful motion by the respondent to set aside a Mareva injunction, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $138,144.10, while the applicant argued for partial indemnity costs of $55,000.

The court found no conduct justifying substantial indemnity costs and awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $75,000 for fees plus disbursements, considering the complexity and the large amount at stake.

The applicant brought a motion to strike an affidavit filed by a respondent in an application to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award under the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

The affidavit alleged that the applicant had engaged in money laundering and other criminal activity relating to the investment that was the subject of the arbitration.

The court held that the affidavit attempted to relitigate issues already determined by the arbitral tribunal and would improperly create a “trial within a trial” on the merits of the award.

Because recognition and enforcement proceedings under the UNCITRAL Model Law permit only narrow defences, the affidavit was clearly irrelevant and scandalous.

The affidavit was struck, though it could remain in the record solely as part of the Paris annulment proceedings.

A state-owned corporation moved to set aside or vary a Mareva injunction freezing shares and dividends of a Canadian mining company in aid of enforcing a foreign arbitral award against a sovereign state.

The moving party argued the injunction should be set aside for lack of full and frank disclosure and because subsequent appellate decisions undermined the factual basis relied upon to establish that the state beneficially owned the frozen shares.

The court held the applicant had exercised reasonable diligence and did not breach the duty of full and frank disclosure.

However, later appellate decisions overturning related rulings significantly weakened the evidentiary basis supporting the injunction.

The court ordered the Mareva injunction set aside at a future date, varied it immediately to reduce the amount of frozen assets, and permitted the award creditor time to bring a new motion on notice.

The plaintiff, a former executive who resigned and claimed constructive dismissal, brought a motion for summary judgment for his unpaid 2011 bonus.

The parties agreed on the bonus amount, and the bank paid two-thirds in cash prior to the motion.

The issue was whether the bank could pay the remaining one-third in restricted share units (RSUs) as per its past practice and the governing plan, or if the plaintiff was entitled to cash.

The court held that the plan did not prohibit the bank from granting RSUs to a former employee, and the plaintiff was not entitled to demand the remaining balance in cash.