Martland

The respondent, a treaty Indian, was convicted of hunting deer during a closed season and at night with a light on a public road.

The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions, holding that Indians have a right of access to public roads for hunting.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding that a public road is occupied Crown land and the general right of access to roads does not include a right to hunt.

The appellant appealed a majority judgment of the Court of Appeal for Quebec that had reversed his acquittal on a charge of breaking and entering.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Montgomery J.A. at the Court of Appeal.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the appellant's acquittal was restored.

The appellant property owner paid taxes under protest after the municipality assessed its unoccupied building.

The Assessment Act was retroactively amended to remove the authority to assess unoccupied buildings.

The appellant's initial administrative appeals were dismissed for being out of time.

The appellant then brought an action for a declaration that the assessment was void and for a refund.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the municipality had no authority to retain the taxes after the retroactive amendment.

The Court found that the action was not barred by res judicata or the limitation periods in the Assessment Act, and ordered the municipality to refund the taxes with interest.

The appellant company appealed an award of damages for wrongful dismissal, arguing that deductions should be made for income tax and unemployment insurance benefits.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be illogical to allow the employer a deduction for income tax not payable, and doubting the correctness of previous decisions that damages for wrongful dismissal are not taxable.

The Court also held that unemployment insurance benefits are a consequence of the contract of employment and cannot be deducted from damages for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant was acquitted at trial on a charge of conspiracy to use forged documents after the trial judge excluded wiretap evidence following an extensive voir dire.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal regarding the proper scope of a voir dire for wiretap evidence.

The appellant trust company sought to foreclose on a mortgage given by the respondent company.

The mortgage was used to finance the purchase of the respondent company's own shares by three individuals.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mortgage was void and unenforceable because it violated s. 96(5) of the Nova Scotia Companies Act, which prohibits a company from giving financial assistance in connection with the purchase of its own shares.

The appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal allowed.

The appellant was convicted of both conspiracy to traffic in heroin and the substantive offence of trafficking in heroin.

He appealed his trafficking conviction, arguing that under the Kienapple principle, he could not be convicted of both offences since the trafficking transaction occurred during the conspiracy period and involved his co-conspirator.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Kienapple principle against multiple convictions did not apply because the two offences were not for the same cause or matter and did not involve the same elements.

The conspiracy charge depended on proof of a prior illegal agreement, which transcended the substantive trafficking transaction.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of several motor vehicle dealers charged under the Combines Investigation Act with conspiring to lessen competition unduly by adding common freight charges and surcharges to captive automobile parts.

The trial judge found that while agreements existed, they did not unduly lessen competition.

The Court of Appeal quashed the Crown's appeal on the basis that the grounds of appeal involved questions of fact rather than law alone.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's conclusions were based on factual findings and did not constitute errors of law.

The appellant, a roofing contractor, sued the respondent supplier and third-party manufacturer for damages after a newly installed roof failed due to severe blistering.

The trial judge found for the appellant, inferring a latent defect in the asphalt by eliminating other probable causes, including faulty workmanship.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the appellant failed to prove the defect existed when the asphalt left the manufacturer.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judgment.

The Court held that the trial judge was entitled to infer a defect from the elimination of other causes, and the Court of Appeal erred in requiring affirmative proof of a specific defect or credible scientific theory.

The appellant, a Treaty Indian, appealed convictions under the Manitoba Wildlife Act for hunting on privately owned, non-posted property.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the obiter statement from Myran, Meeches et al. v. The Queen that there is no right of access for such hunting, and disapproving of the Manitoba Court of Appeal's earlier decision in R. v. Prince.

The Crown appealed a judgment of the Alberta Appellate Division that dismissed an appeal from the acquittal of the accused on a charge of conspiracy to possess stolen property.

The case involved the inadmissibility of intercepted private communications between a husband and wife.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal orally, finding no reason to interfere with the rulings and conclusions of the trial judge or the appellate court.

The respondent was convicted of failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

On appeal, the Superior Court reduced his sentence and ordered the Crown to pay costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal and ordered it to pay further costs.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing that at common law and under the Interpretation Act, the Crown cannot be ordered to pay costs.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code, when read in context, implicitly bind Her Majesty and grant the courts broad discretion to award costs against the Crown in summary conviction appeals.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering and possession of stolen property after a trial by judge and jury.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in proceeding while he was unrepresented and in not offering sufficient assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the further appeal, holding that the trial judge's refusal to grant a further adjournment was a discretionary decision and no error of law was established.

The appellant's child was killed in an intersection collision.

The trial judge awarded $25,000 in damages under the Families' Compensation Act.

The Court of Appeal reduced the award to $12,500, stating the trial award was 'on the high side'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that an appellate court cannot substitute its own damages figure unless the trial judge applied a wrong principle of law or the award was a wholly erroneous estimate.

The appellant sued the respondent for breach of contract after the respondent refused to deliver 50,000 tons of sulphur.

The contract was negotiated by the respondent's agent, whose actual authority was restricted internally without notice to the appellant.

The trial judge found the respondent bound by the contract and awarded damages for loss of profits based on the rising market price of sulphur.

The Appellate Division reversed the decision on liability and reduced the damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the agent had apparent authority to bind the respondent, and restored the trial judge's assessment of damages.

The appellants claimed a sales tax exemption under s. 11(o) of the Social Services and Education Tax Act for machinery and apparatus used in their oil refinery expansion.

The Minister had never issued a definition of the exempt machinery and apparatus as contemplated by the Act.

The Court of Appeal held that no exemption could be granted without a ministerial definition.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that in the absence of a ministerial definition, the exemption applies to all machinery and apparatus coming within the class specified in the Act, as the class is sufficiently described to be ascertainable.

The appellant credit union held a fixed and floating charge over the assets of the debtor company.

A receiver was appointed and realized the assets.

The Crown claimed priority for unremitted source deductions (income tax, CPP, UI) made by the employer prior to receivership, and for deductions on wages paid by the receiver after appointment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the receiver must remit deductions on wages it paid.

For pre-receivership deductions, the Crown had priority for CPP and UI deductions due to statutory deeming provisions applying in a 'liquidation', but lacked priority for income tax deductions which were not kept separate and apart.

The appellant, a tenured university professor, was suspended for three months for improper use of university computer facilities.

He appealed his suspension to the university's Board of Governors.

During the Board's post-hearing deliberations, the university president, who had ordered the suspension, provided the Board with necessary facts relating to the suspension in the absence of the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board breached the principles of natural justice by receiving evidence ex parte without giving the appellant an opportunity to respond.

The appeal was allowed and the Board's resolution was quashed.

The respondent was charged with impaired driving.

Due to a mix-up, the case was called in the wrong courtroom, and a warrant was issued for her arrest while she and her counsel were present in the correct courtroom.

The respondent successfully applied for an order prohibiting further proceedings on the information, arguing the court lost jurisdiction by failing to proceed at the appointed time and place.

The Crown appealed, arguing that s. 440.1 of the Criminal Code cured the defect.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 440.1 only applies to procedural defects relating to adjournments or remands, not to a complete failure of the court to proceed.

The respondent was charged with failing to provide a breath sample and impaired driving.

On the scheduled court date, the informations could not be located, and no action was taken by the court.

The informations were later found with another magistrate, and the respondent was summoned to appear at a later date.

The respondent objected to the court's jurisdiction.

Following the concurrent decision in R. v. Krannenburg, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the court lost jurisdiction over the offence when nothing was done on the appointed date.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.