Mark G. Evans

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood on March 8, 2015, in St. Catharines.

The defence raised Charter applications alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) during the roadside investigation and arrest process, arguing that delays in making the approved screening device demand and providing right to counsel information breached the "forthwith" requirement.

The court found Charter breaches but admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a conviction.

Lenders brought a class proceeding alleging negligent misrepresentation by auditors in connection with audited financial statements relied upon when extending a large syndicated loan.

The defendants moved for partial summary judgment dismissing the negligent misrepresentation claim on the basis that no duty of care was owed to the lending syndicate.

Applying the principles from Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, the court held that auditors generally owe duties to the corporation and its shareholders but not to third-party lenders due to concerns about indeterminate liability.

Although the auditors knew lenders would likely review the statements, they did not know the identity of the lenders nor prepare the audits for the specific lending transaction.

The court concluded the circumstances did not negate indeterminate liability and no duty of care arose.

The accused was charged with seven offences arising from the discovery of a loaded prohibited handgun, two small bags of marijuana, $1,000 in cash, and three cell phones in a rental vehicle he was driving.

The Crown argued that the cumulative circumstances—including the pervasive smell of fresh marijuana, the identical packaging of two marijuana bags, the gun's positioning suggesting placement by a right-handed person, and the accused's rubber bands on his left wrist—demonstrated knowledge and possession of all items.

The defence argued that the vehicle was rented by another person, the gun was completely hidden, and there was no forensic evidence linking the accused to the firearm.

The trial judge found that the only rational inference from the totality of circumstances was that the accused knew about and possessed the gun and other items, and convicted on all counts.

The accused was charged with two counts of human trafficking offences (exercising control over movements for exploitation and receiving money from exploitation), three counts of assault with a weapon, two counts of threatening, three counts of assault, and four counts of breach of recognizance.

The trial involved a credibility assessment of the complainant, who admitted to being a con artist and fraudster, against the accused's denials.

The court found the accused guilty of assault with a weapon, simple assault, and breach of recognizance counts, but acquitted him of the trafficking offences due to insufficient evidence of control exercised for exploitative purposes.

The court applied a Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant's credibility.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a sentence of 15 months imprisonment, while defence counsel sought a conditional sentence followed by probation.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, finding it inconsistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing, particularly given the seriousness of drug trafficking offences and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The court imposed a sentence of time served (six days pre-sentence custody credited as 12 days) plus 258 additional days of imprisonment (equivalent to nine months), followed by three years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture order.