Leiper

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and drug and firearm offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to a 51-month delay.

The Crown argued that the delay was mitigated by defence delay and exceptional circumstances arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court deducted periods for defence delay and pandemic-related jury trial blackouts, but found the Crown failed to act reasonably promptly in seeking a direct indictment.

The net delay of 34 months and 12 days exceeded the 30-month ceiling, resulting in a stay of proceedings.

The applicants, who were arrested for robbery and firearms offences, brought a motion to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of their s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The police delayed the applicants' access to counsel for over five and a half hours without justification, and questioned one applicant before he could speak to a lawyer.

The court found serious violations of s. 10(b) that were aggravated by poor note-taking, failure to inform the applicants of the delay, and leaving one applicant partially undressed on the street.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences, brought a Charter motion under s. 8 and s. 24(2) to exclude evidence obtained from a general warrant and a subsequent search warrant.

The general warrant authorized covert entries into a condominium unit suspected to be a fentanyl stash house.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained unconstitutionally obtained video surveillance evidence and misleading exaggerations about the accused's pattern of behaviour.

After excising the problematic portions, the court concluded there were insufficient grounds to issue the general warrant.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the police conduct was serious and the impact on the accused's privacy was high, warranting the exclusion of the seized evidence under s. 24(2).

The applicant applied to quash his committal to stand trial on drug possession and trafficking charges relating to drugs found in the second bedroom of a short-term rental unit.

He argued there was no evidence he had knowledge or control over those specific drugs.

The reviewing judge dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in concluding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence—including the applicant's access to the unit, drugs on his person, and drug paraphernalia in common areas—to support an inference of joint possession and control.

The applicant mother brought a motion to strike tort claims and requests for declaratory relief from the respondent father's answer, and sought an advance for interim disbursements.

The father had claimed damages for alienation of affection and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court granted the motion to strike, applying Supreme Court precedent that such tort claims are not viable in the family law context.

The court also ordered the father to advance $40,000 in interim legal fees to the mother, noting the significant disparity in the parties' financial resources and the complexity introduced by the father's shifting litigation positions.

The plaintiffs, two portfolio managers, sued their former employer, an investment firm, claiming entitlement to $1.38 million in performance fees earned by the fund they managed.

The plaintiffs argued their employment agreements implicitly included these fees based on industry standards, or alternatively, that they were entitled to them under quantum meruit or an oral agreement.

The court dismissed the claims, finding the employment agreements unambiguously excluded performance fees, which were instead governed by a separate arrangement with a senior portfolio manager.

The court also rejected the quantum meruit claim as the plaintiffs were fully compensated under their contracts, and found the oral agreement was conditional on improved behaviour that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate.

A late claim for discretionary bonuses was also dismissed as it was not properly pleaded.

The plaintiff real estate agent and brokerage sued the defendant homeowners and their neighbour for unpaid commission on the sale of a multimillion-dollar property.

The homeowners had signed multiple listing agreements but ultimately sold the property privately to a buyer introduced by the neighbour.

The court found that the buyer was introduced to the property during the term of the second listing agreement, triggering the holdover clause, and that a valid offer was made during the term of the third listing agreement.

The court also found that the neighbour induced the homeowners to breach their contract with the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs were awarded the full commission amount.

The applicant sought an accounting of estate assets, including a commercial property and a joint trading account, from his brother and co-estate trustee.

The respondent claimed the trading account was gifted to him by their late mother and resisted accounting for the property.

Applying the presumption of resulting trust, the court found the trading account belonged to the estate and ordered a full accounting.

Due to the breakdown in the brothers' relationship and inherent conflicts of interest, the court ordered the appointment of an Estate Trustee During Litigation (ETDL) and made declarations regarding several disputed inter vivos transfers.

The plaintiff brought an action for specific performance or damages following the failed purchase of shares in a Volkswagen auto dealership and its land.

The parties had signed a non-binding Letter of Intent and later negotiated a revised offer via text and telephone, culminating in a Term Sheet.

Before formal Share Purchase Agreements were signed, the defendants accepted a higher offer from a third party.

The court found that the parties had reached a binding agreement on the essential terms of the revised offer.

However, the court declined to order specific performance due to the requirement for third-party consent from Volkswagen Canada, instead awarding the plaintiff $5,000,000 in damages for lost opportunity and the return of his $1,000,000 deposit.

The applicant excess insurers sought a declaration that claims against a lawyer and his firm for negligent tax advice did not constitute a 'single claim' or 'related claims' under the respondent primary insurer's professional liability policy.

The lawyer had advised multiple clients to participate in a charitable donation tax shelter that the Canada Revenue Agency later disallowed as a sham.

While the claims shared common elements regarding the donation plan, one client also claimed negligence regarding a separate life and disability plan.

The court applied the test from Simpson Wigle and found that the advice regarding the life and disability plan was a distinct error, different in nature and kind from the donation plan error.

Consequently, the claims were not related, and the respondent's $2 million aggregate policy limit was available.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a representation order under Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to appoint Chief Kirby Whiteduck to represent the 'Algonquins' in an action challenging Ontario's decision to grant harvesting rights to two Métis communities in a settlement area currently under treaty negotiation.

The Métis Nation opposed the motion, arguing the class was insufficiently defined and the proposed representative lacked authority.

The court found that the class of collective rights holders was sufficiently defined, the claim was collective in nature, and the balance of convenience favoured appointing the proposed representative.

The motion was granted.

The moving party brought an urgent motion to set aside a default judgment and discharge a writ of seizure and sale registered against her property.

The motion was brought during the COVID-19 suspension of Small Claims Court operations, as the property sale was scheduled to close immediately.

The Superior Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to lift the writ on the condition that sufficient funds be held in trust to protect the judgment, while adjourning the motion to set aside the default judgment to the Small Claims Court once operations resume.

The plaintiffs, former boarding students of Grenville Christian College, brought a class action against the school and the estates of its former headmasters for systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court found that the school operated as a 'total institution' and employed abusive, arbitrary, and humiliating disciplinary practices, including excessive corporal punishment and public shaming, which fell below the standard of care for educational institutions in Ontario.

The court concluded that the defendants breached their duty of care and fiduciary obligations to the students, and that their conduct merited an award of punitive damages.

The defendant employer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for wrongful dismissal and damages under the Human Rights Code.

The plaintiff alleged he was constructively dismissed and that the employer failed to accommodate his medical inability to perform door-to-door sales.

The court found no objective evidence of constructive dismissal, noting the employer reasonably requested medical information to design an accommodation plan, which the plaintiff refused to provide.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a custom-built home after the defendant purchaser failed to close.

The purchaser argued the agreement was complex, he lacked English skills, and his agent had a conflict of interest, but provided no legal basis to void the contract.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, upheld the agreement, and ordered specific performance, noting the home's customized features and the difficulty of assessing damages due to unsold inventory.

The applicants (vendors) brought an application for a declaration that the respondent (purchaser) repudiated two agreements of purchase and sale for a property to be severed.

The agreements required a second deposit upon severance approval.

The applicants obtained approval but delayed notifying the purchaser for months, then demanded the second deposit on unreasonably short notice while the purchaser was out of the country.

When the deposit was not paid by the deadline, the applicants terminated the agreements.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants failed to act in good faith and set an unreasonable deadline, and therefore could not rely on the 'time is of the essence' clause to terminate the contract.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff for unauthorized shipping charges.

The court applied the five-factor test for setting aside a default judgment.

The court found that the defendants did not bring the motion promptly, deliberately evaded service and ignored the litigation, and failed to present an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.

The defendant manufacturer brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss claims of negligent manufacturing, failure to warn, and breach of implied warranty arising from an incident where a police officer was accidentally struck in the head by a TASER electrical weapon fired by his partner.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues were inextricably linked to the conceded trial issue of negligent design.

The court also declined to strike an affidavit sworn by plaintiffs' counsel, ruling it was admissible as 'evidence about evidence' to demonstrate the record that would be available at trial.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment by the defendant owner regarding vicarious liability, the plaintiffs obtained a Sanderson order directing the unsuccessful defendant insurer to pay the owner's costs.

The owner sought partial indemnity costs of $47,712.83.

The court reduced the costs awarded due to the owner's failure to disclose a material witness statement prior to mediation and for advancing an unmeritorious abuse of process argument.

Costs were fixed at $16,687.29 payable by the insurer to the owner.

The defendant vehicle owner brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action and the co-defendant insurer's cross-claim against her, arguing she did not consent to the co-defendant driver possessing her vehicle at the time of the motor vehicle accident.

The co-defendant insurer opposed the motion, arguing implied consent.

The court first ruled that partial summary judgment was appropriate and ordered the production of the driver's statement to the owner's insurer, finding it was not protected by litigation privilege.

On the merits, the court found that the owner had explicitly forbidden the driver from using her car and that he took it without her knowledge or consent.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the owner, dismissing the claims against her.