Unknown

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The court considered an application by Basil Basnandan for a declaration that the purchasers, Michael A. Jones and Delphina Mervin Leblanc, were in breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a commercial property, and for an order directing the broker, RE/MAX Hallmark Eyking Group Realty, to release the $200,000 deposit to him.

The purchasers failed to complete the transaction due to inability to secure financing.

The court found an anticipatory breach, held that Basnandan was entitled to terminate the agreement, and ordered the deposit released to him.

The court also addressed the commissioning of affidavit exhibits, the law of forfeiture and relief from forfeiture, and awarded partial indemnity costs to Basnandan.

The court considered an application by Basil Basnandan for a declaration that the purchasers, Michael A. Jones and Delphina Mervin Leblanc, were in breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a commercial property, and for an order directing the broker, RE/MAX Hallmark Eyking Group Realty, to release the $200,000 deposit to him.

The purchasers failed to complete the transaction due to inability to secure financing.

The court found an anticipatory breach, held that Basnandan was entitled to terminate the agreement, and ordered the deposit released to him.

The court also addressed the commissioning of affidavit exhibits, the law of forfeiture and relief from forfeiture, and awarded partial indemnity costs to Basnandan.

This decision addresses the retroactive child support obligations of Robert Sousa for his 7-year-old son with Tiffany Maggio and O. Benjamin Vincents.

The court applied the framework from Colucci v. Colucci to determine the presumptive start date for child support, ultimately ordering support retroactive to August 1, 2019, despite the presumptive date being September 18, 2020.

The father was found to have engaged in blameworthy conduct by underreporting income, failing to provide full financial disclosure, and misrepresenting his financial situation.

The court imputed income to the father based on a detailed analysis of his business revenues and expenses, including a gross-up to account for underreported income.

The father’s arrears were fixed at $37,006, with a payment plan ordered.

The court also ordered the father to pay 74% of the child’s special expenses related to tutoring, reflecting the child’s special needs.

The applicant mother brought a motion for interim orders to change the parenting schedule, obtain sole decision-making responsibility, and order child support.

The mother argued that the father's move further from the child's school constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the requests to change the parenting schedule and decision-making responsibility, finding the current routine was in the best interests of the child, who has autism.

The court ordered the father to pay the full table amount of child support, declining to apply a set-off for shared parenting time due to the significant income disparity between the parties.

The mother was also granted leave to amend her pleadings to claim spousal support.

The self-represented plaintiff sought to note the defendant university in default and obtain default judgment, despite the defendant having counsel and a pending motion to strike the claim.

After the court deferred scheduling the plaintiff's motion, the plaintiff brought a further motion to set aside the deferral.

The court, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.02, stayed the plaintiff's motion and issued a notice considering its dismissal as frivolous or an abuse of process, noting that default judgment is inappropriate when a defendant is actively participating.

The applicants, who were arrested for robbery and firearms offences, brought a motion to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of their s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The police delayed the applicants' access to counsel for over five and a half hours without justification, and questioned one applicant before he could speak to a lawyer.

The court found serious violations of s. 10(b) that were aggravated by poor note-taking, failure to inform the applicants of the delay, and leaving one applicant partially undressed on the street.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.

The applicant father was successful at trial on a motion to change child support and sought costs of $7,500.

The self-represented respondent mother conceded entitlement but argued the quantum should be $1,000 due to her financial circumstances and the lack of complexity.

The court considered the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including the mother's limited ability to pay, and fixed costs at $2,500 payable at $100 per month.

The plaintiff, a person under disability following a motor vehicle accident, applied for approval of a combined tort and accident benefits settlement of $1,525,000.

The court reviewed the proposed legal fees and disbursements under a contingency agreement, approving the fees but reducing the payable disbursements to only those recovered from the insurer, as per the agreement's terms.

The court declined to approve the proposed structured settlement, ordering plaintiff's counsel to file a case manager report demonstrating how the structure would meet the plaintiff's future needs.

The applicant scheduled a motion as a 59-minute short motion, despite filing voluminous materials that clearly indicated it was a long motion.

The parties settled the motion before it was heard.

The court issued an endorsement reprimanding the practice of 'jumping the queue' by improperly scheduling long motions as short ones, noting it wastes scarce judicial resources and harms other litigants.

The court warned that future instances of this practice may result in costs consequences under the Family Law Rules.

The court, on its own motion under Rule 2.1.03, stayed the plaintiff's action because it was instituted without leave, contrary to a prior vexatious litigant order.

The court directed that the action will be dismissed if the plaintiff does not commence an application for leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act within 60 days.

The court, on its own motion under Rule 2.1.03, stayed the plaintiff's action because it was instituted without leave, contrary to a prior vexatious litigant order.

The court directed that the action will be dismissed if the plaintiff does not commence an application for leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act within 60 days.

The defendant by counterclaim, Hon. Doug Downey, requested the court to dismiss the counterclaim against him under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the counterclaim contained no allegations of fact against several defendants by counterclaim, including Hon. Doug Downey, the Ministry of the Attorney General, and others.

The court issued a notice to the plaintiff by counterclaim to provide written submissions explaining why the claims against these parties should not be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and stayed the counterclaim against them pending the outcome.

The applicants brought a motion for a Norwich Order to compel Teva Canada Limited to produce relevant insurance policies.

The motion was withdrawn on consent after Teva agreed to produce the policies.

Teva brought a cross-motion for a protective order regarding a contract fabrication agreement and a QBE policy, arguing they contained highly sensitive confidential information.

The court granted the protective order, allowing redacted documents to be filed in the court record while unredacted versions are provided to the parties and the presiding judge.

The applicants brought a motion for a Norwich Order to compel Teva Canada Limited to produce relevant insurance policies.

The motion was withdrawn on consent after Teva agreed to produce the policies.

Teva brought a cross-motion for a protective order regarding a contract fabrication agreement and a QBE policy, arguing they contained highly sensitive confidential information.

The court granted the protective order, allowing redacted documents to be filed in the court record while unredacted versions are provided to the parties and the presiding judge.