Cadarette v. Peel Regional Police Services Board, 2011 HRTO 1660

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Kimberly Cadarette

Applicant

-and-

The Regional Municipality of Peel Regional Police Services Board and

Peel Regional Police Association

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Alison Renton

Date: September 7, 2011

Citation: 2011 HRTO 1660

Indexed as: Cadarette v. Peel Regional Police Services Board

1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19 as amended (the “Code”), on February 1, 2010 alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, sex (including sexual harassment), sexual solicitation and reprisal. The applicant worked with the respondent Ottawa Police Service (“OPS”) from August 14, 2006 until February 2008 when she resigned and started working with the respondent The Regional Municipality of Peel Regional Police Service Board (“Peel”). While working with OPS, she was a member of the respondent Ottawa Police Association (“OPA”) and while working with Peel, she is a member of the respondent Peel Regional Police Association (“PRPA”). At the time of filing her Application, the applicant was self-represented. In August 2010, the applicant retained counsel.

2OPA filed a Response and a Request For Order During Proceedings (“RFOP”) requesting that the Application against it be dismissed because it is untimely and the allegations raised do not establish a prima facie case against it. Subsequent to these filings, OPA filed a Request for Summary Hearing, requesting that the Application against it be dismissed for the reasons set out in the RFOP.

3OPS filed a Response requesting that the Application be dismissed against it because it is untimely and the allegations raised do not establish a prima facie case against it.

4PRPA filed a Response and a RFOP requesting that the Application be dismissed against it as the allegations raised do not establish a prima facie case. Subsequent to these filings, PRPA filed a Request for Summary Hearing, requesting that the Application against it be dismissed for the reasons set out in the RFOP.

5Peel filed a Response submitting that the Application fails to raise a prima facie allegation against it. Although it filed a Response, it noted that the allegations, which are set out in various documents, are vague, rambling, and difficult to determine which allegations are about Peel. Peel also filed a Request for Summary Hearing in which it submits that the Application ought to be dismissed because it does not establish any reasonable prospect of success.

6On July 23, 2010 the applicant filed a Response to a RFOP responding to the respondents’ requests to summarily dismiss her Application. In it, the applicant alleges that she was subjected to sexual harassment while working with OPS, which included unsolicited emails, text messages, and an unsolicited and unwanted visit to her home. She did not name the alleged harasser(s) and did not provide any dates. She alleges that OPA failed to pursue her allegations of harassment and encouraged her to leave OPS. The applicant alleges that while working with Peel she has also been subjected to sexual harassment and believes that it is related to the sexual harassment and discrimination that she allegedly received while in Ottawa. The applicant does not name the alleged harasser(s) and does not provide any dates about this experience with Peel.

7On August 10, 2010, counsel for the applicant wrote to the Tribunal, copying the respondents, advising that he had been retained and the applicant would be seeking to amend her Application. He requested that the Tribunal put the issues raised in the respondents’ RFOPs and Requests for Summary Hearing in abeyance while the Tribunal first consider if the applicant could amend her Application. That same day, counsel for the applicant filed a RFOP requesting to amend the Application and providing some details about allegations of sexual harassment, but not specific particulars, and identifying some issues upon which the Application would be amended. Counsel for each of the respondents objected to the applicant’s counsel’s suggestion that the respondents’ issues be held in abeyance pending the Application being amended.

8An Interim Decision, 2010 HRTO 2399 (“the Interim Decision”), was issued and noted that the allegations against OPS and OPA appeared to end in 2008 when the applicant resigned from OPS and started working with Peel. The Tribunal sought submissions from the applicant addressing the issue of apparent delay as against OPS and OPA and the reasons for the delay. The Tribunal provided an opportunity for the respondents to file submissions in response to the applicant’s submissions and gave the applicant a further period to respond to any submissions filed by any respondent.

9The Tribunal subsequently received submissions from the applicant, OPS, OPA, and Peel, and reply submissions from the applicant. The Tribunal did not receive any submissions from PRPA. All of these have been carefully considered by the Tribunal as well as the material previously filed by the parties.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES RE: DELAY

The Applicant’s Submissions

10The applicant submits that at the time of filing her Application she was a “lay litigant”, inexperienced and unsophisticated in pursuing human rights issues. The allegations regarding OPS and OPA, and the allegations against the other respondents, are a continuum, or a series of incidents, arising from an original dispute that commenced in Amherstberg with the applicant’s “ex” and which has followed the applicant further in her policing career, first in Ottawa and then in Peel. The applicant alleges that a similar pattern of differential and discriminatory treatment towards her has occurred between the two locations.

11Further, the applicant submits that she suffers from “the disabling effect of police culture, where … speaking out or snitching is forbidden”. She refers to a decision, R. v. Bonds, 2010 ONCJ 561, in which a judge from the Ontario Court of Justice commented about the OPS in relation to a strip search of a female suspect. The judge stated, “It is quite evident that none of these officers have received gender training, and that they do give only lip service to female dignity and privacy”. The applicant submits that other females have alleged that members of OPS have harassed and assaulted them and that the systemic nature of abuses on the part of OPS has been so exposed that “even the most sympathetic can no longer excuse it as ‘a few bad apples’”.

12The applicant submits that her Application speaks to similar issues as those raised by other females. She was advised by members of OPS to keep silent about issues, and encouraged by OPA to apply for a position with another police board. She further alleges OPA failed to assist her with respect to the discriminatory treatment and harassment to which she was allegedly subjected.

13The culture of harassment, discrimination, gendered violence and code of silence are circumstances, the applicant submits, why she, as a female police constable, would have significant difficulties in filing an application if she wants to continue to work in policing. Such officers, the applicant submits, as classified as “rats”, not trusted, ostracized and in danger from other officers, who may not back them up in dangerous situations.

14The applicant submits that there is no actual prejudice to OPS or OPA with respect to any delay in filing her Application. The passage of time does not prevent these respondents from filing a full Response or deprive them of the right to a fair hearing. Delay, without more, will not warrant a stay of proceedings. See Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.C. 44 at para. 101. Further, there is a strong societal interest in proceeding with the merits of the Application given that the allegations are against police forces and their associations.

The Respondent Ottawa Police Service’s Submissions

15OPS submits that the Application as against it ought to be dismissed because the allegations against it are outside the one year limitation period established pursuant to section 34(1) of the Code. Neither the allegations in the Application nor the supplementary narrative filed March 16, 2010 support the applicant’s assertion that her allegations involve “common threads” that amount to a continuation of the original dispute that commenced in Amherstberg with an ex-boyfriend whom, the applicant asserts, followed the applicant throughout her policing career.

16OPS submits that the allegations against it do not particularize conduct by OPS that is contrary to the Code. The Application does not allege any instances of discrimination by OPS on the basis of disability, sex (including sexual harassment) or sexual advances or reprisal, the grounds upon which the applicant has based her Application.

17The allegations over the passage of time are against different respondents, not the same respondent. OPS submits that any discrimination the applicant alleges against it, which it denies, is separate from the applicant’s allegations against her current employer and association. There are no allegations that OPS acted in conspiracy or in concert with Peel or PRPA to discriminate against or harass the applicant.

18Further, OPS submits that the applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for her delay by establishing that her delay was incurred in good faith. The fact that the applicant is a lay person is not a sufficient reason for her delay in filing her Application. The delay, OPS submits, is two years.

19With respect to the applicant’s suggestion that the “disabling effect of police culture inhibited the applicant from coming forward with her concerns”, OPS points out that this suggests contradicts the allegations in the Application. In the Application, the applicant herself claims to have raised her concerns with the respondent police associations, as well as different ranking officers, from sergeant to chief, as well as members of the Ontario Provincial Police and retired officers from Windsor and Toronto. Further, OPS notes that the applicant was at all times represented by an association, sought legal advice in January 2008, raised her concerns with a number of police services, and has advised the Attorney General of her concerns. The applicant’s actions, OPS submits, demonstrate that the applicant was knowledgeable, and able to inform herself of her rights and to pursue remedies.

20OPS submits that it is prejudiced because of the delay because its opportunity to interview witnesses and persons involved, who are not particularized in the Application, in a timely fashion has been lost.

The Respondent Ottawa Police Association’s Submissions

21OPA submits that the Application should be dismissed against it for delay. The allegations against it do not form a “series of events”, as required by section 34(1) of the Code, as the timely allegations relate to different respondents. “Series of events” should relate to the same respondents, not different ones. The OPA had no involvement with the applicant after she left the OPS in February 2008 and no involvement in the allegedly discriminatory conduct which occurred in Peel. Further, the allegations about the applicant’s experience in Peel have no connection to the allegations made against the OPA.

22With respect to the applicant’s assertion that she is a lay litigant who is inexperienced and unsophisticated in human rights matters, the OPA submits that ignorance of the law, by itself, is not an excuse and cannot be relied upon to demonstrate that the delay was incurred in good faith. The applicant has not submitted that she made inquiries about her rights as against the OPA.

23In response to what the OPA describes as the applicant’s “vague submissions” that she suffered from the disabling effect of police culture which prevented her from speaking out to protect her rights, OPA denies the existence of such a culture at OPS or in policing generally. Vague explanations are not sufficient to satisfy an applicant’s onus in demonstrating good faith. Further, OPA points out, it is apparent that the applicant had no difficulty in raising her concerns with her Ottawa and Peel employers and respective police Associations, and cites a number of examples from the Application in which the applicant alleges that she raised various concerns with her employers, two police associations and a lawyer in January 2008. Her own Application, OPA submits, undermines her assertion now that she was afraid to speak out due to the police culture. She has not submitted any medical documentation in support of this position.

24OPA submits that it has suffered prejudice as a result of the applicant’s delay in filing the Application. It submits that the test the Tribunal has used in considering delay is “substantial prejudice”, not “the most unusual and egregious circumstances” and the “strong societal interest that the Application be heard on its merits” factors which the applicant submits should be used. In any event, OPA submits, where the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the delay was incurred in good faith, the Tribunal can dismiss the application even where the respondent has not suffered prejudice resulting from the delay.

The Respondent Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board’s Submissions

25Peel submitted a letter stating that it did not oppose OPS’s and OPA’s requests that the Application be dismissed against them for delay.

The Applicant’s Reply to OPS’s and OPA’s Submissions

26In response to OPS’s and OPA’s position that the allegations against it do not form a “series of incidents” because the later allegations pertain to different respondents, the applicant submits that these positions attempt to narrow the scope and interpretation of the Code. The Code, the applicant submits, is to be given a large and liberal interpretation. Further, the applicant is alleging that the Ottawa respondents were involved in the discriminatory conduct that occurred with the Peel respondents. This includes the applicant being labelled as paranoid and having her firearm removed from her. It is premature, the applicant submits, to dismiss the allegations against OPS and OPA at this preliminary stage and a hearing on the merits of all the allegations in the Application ought to take place.

27The applicant submits, in response to OPA’s assertion that the Application sets out facts which demonstrate the applicant raised her issues with OPA, that what is important to note is that neither OPA nor OPS have provided evidence or submissions on what, if anything, they did or did not do to respond to the applicant’s internal complaints. The applicant submits that “[i]n the face of failing to act on internal complaints of discrimination and harassment, the Respondents cannot now attempt to enfeeble the Applicant’s rights and remedies under the Code”. The applicant’s allegations are credible, made in good faith, and justify an in-depth investigation.

28With respect to OPA’s position that there is no evidence of a culture of silence at OPS, the applicant submits that this “stark denial” about this “blue wall of silence” is “simply disingenuous and weak given the avalanche of literature that exists on this subject”. The applicant provided a chapter from a book written by John Sewell, called “Police in Canada: The Real Story”, and a couple of pages from reports about policing, including “Police Use of Force in Ontario” a report prepared for submission to the Ipperwash Inquiry and “Police Investigating Police: A Critical Analysis of the Literature” by the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP. Further, the applicant referenced other police reports and articles, but did not provide copies of those, and referred to several court decisions, Gentles v. Gentles Inquest (Coroner of), (1998), 1998 CanLII 19472 (ON CTGDDC), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 652 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and Bond, supra. The applicant submits that no medical evidence is necessary to consider the disabling effects of the subculture of a workplace, particularly a paramilitary or police work environment, and refers to a number of Tribunal decisions in McKinnon v. Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services) in support of this position.

29The applicant submits that OPS and OPA are not prejudiced by any delay in filing her Application. OPA, the applicant notes, confirmed that it has notes of its conversation with the applicant as well as an independent recollection of their discussion. The applicant submits that:

Human Rights Applications particularly when they involve police investigations has a public interest component and allegations of discrimination and harassment in employment in a police service does nothing for maintaining confidence in public institutions.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS RE: Delay as against OPS and OPA

Series of Incidents or Continuing Contravention

30Section 34 of the Code allows applications alleging infringements of rights under the Code to be made within a one-year time limit. It also gives the Tribunal discretion to accept late applications in certain circumstances:

34(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under subsection 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under subsection (1) if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

31In Visic v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2008 CanLII 20993 (Ont. Div. Ct.), the Divisional Court accepted a definition of “continuing contravention” from the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Manitoba v. Manitoba (Human Rights Commission) (184), 1983 CanLII 2967 (MB CA), 25 Man. R. (2d) 117. In Manitoba, the Court of Appeal stated:

To be a ‘continuing contravention’, there must a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character. There must be present acts of discrimination which could be considered as separate contraventions of the Act, and not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences.

32While Visic, supra, was considering section 34(1)(d) under the former Code, that former language contained the same good faith explanation as required under the current section 34(2) as well as the “no substantial prejudice” component in addressing delay. Accordingly, I have applied the interpretation of the Divisional Court in Visic in determining whether or not the applicant’s allegations in this Application amount to a “continuing contravention” within the meaning of section 34(1).

33More recent Tribunal decisions have stated that to constitute a “series of incidents” within the meaning of section 34(1) of the Code, there must at least be some connection or nexus between the incidents that are alleged to form the series. Further, recent Tribunal decisions have held that a series cannot be comprised of incidents relating to discrete and separate issues. And finally, a gap of more than one year between incidents in a series would interrupt the series. (See DeFreitas v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 2010 HRTO 2049 at para. 11; Baisa v. Skills for Change, 2010 HRTO 1621 at para. 22; Savage v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2010 HRTO 1360 at para. 9; and Dupuis v. Religious Hospitallers of St. Joseph of Cornwall, 2010 HRTO 1079 at para. 14.)

34I find in this Application that I do not have to determine whether a “series of incidents” can arise with different respondents. Instead, I find that based upon the Application and other material submitted by the applicant that her allegations do not make out a “series of incidents” within the meaning of section 34(1) of the Code.

The Application and accompanying materials

35The applicant’s Application consists of the completed Application form, and accompanying documentation including typed notes of a December 16, 2009 interview apparently taken by a PRPA representative (“the notes”), the applicant’s “corrections” and further information in relation to the notes (“the corrections”), as well as letters dated February 25, 2010 and March 16, 2010 and an undated letter received by the Tribunal May 7, 2010. The Application form itself does not provide a lot of information, but, rather says “See Attached” in response to many of the questions on the Application form, including “what happened?”. The notes and corrections are disjointed, not in chronological order, and provide some background information about the applicant’s childhood and relatives. The applicant’s dating history from before she commenced working with OPS is set out, as is information about her dating history while working with Peel. Issues about the applicant’s credit rating and ability to secure loans by herself, is also identified in the notes and corrections.

36Reviewed together, while the applicant’s materials allege that she has been “financially, sexually, mentally and criminally harassed” as well as been “alienated” and had her job threatened, the material does not provide the when, where, how and who details that one would normally expect to see in a Tribunal application and as the Application form at question 8 requires. There are no particulars provided about how she was sexually harassed or solicited.

37The applicant alleges that when she started in Ottawa, which she identifies as being August 2006, she had telephone hang ups and unknown text messages and told the OPS. In her materials she suggests that the hang ups and text messages were from an Amherstburg officer whom she had previously dated and “dumped” when she moved to Ottawa. She also asserts that while working in Peel she also received text messages and telephone hang ups, as well as undefined “MDU” and alleges that her telephone was “triangulated”. It appears from the applicant’s materials that these issues started after she stopped dating several officers within Peel. The applicant indicates that she has told officers within Peel, and others, about the harassment she is experiencing in Peel.

38It is difficult to ascertain from the applicant’s materials whether she attributes all the text messages, and telephone hang ups to the Amherstburg officer. It is also difficult to ascertain, because of the lack of specific particulars in her materials, that the applicant is alleging that the alleged harassment is coming from the same individual. Because of the lack of particulars I do not find that the allegations constitute a “series of incidents” as required by section 34(1) of the Code.

39In her materials, the applicant alleges that while she was working with OPS, she raised issues of harassment with members of the OPS and OPA and others. She also alleges that she raised issues of harassment with members of Peel and PRPA and others. It is clear that the applicant alleges that the OPS, OPA, Peel and PRPA did not take her issues seriously, investigate, or properly investigate into her allegations.

40In her Response to the RFOP and in her RFOP, the applicant provides some details about the alleged sexual harassment while she worked with OPS. In both, she alleges that she received unsolicited emails and text messages and received an unsolicited and unwanted visit to her home. She does not provide the content of the emails and text messages, the name(s) of the alleged harasser(s), and the dates that these allegedly occurred.

41However, in her RFOP, at paras. 22 and 23, she alleges:

When the Applicant complained of sexual harassment, sexual solicitation, being stalked, and other such conduct to Chief Vern White of the Ottawa Police Service, he did not lunched [sic] an investigation[;] instead what he did was sen[d] the Application for psychological evaluation by a clinical psychologist. In November 2007, a clinical psychologist found that the Applicant …

42While she asserts in her Reply to the OPS and OPA’s submissions that “the Ottawa respondents were involved in the discriminatory conduct that occurred with the Peel respondents”, I do not find that her allegations support this submission. The only connection I see between OPS and Peel is at para. 31 of the applicant’s corrections when writing about her discussions with a lawyer, Mr. Gilmour, in January 2008, she stated “… Peel Police … have a connection with Ottawa Police which I later found out that the legal representative of Peel Police is married to a ranking officer of Ottawa”. This is not enough of a connection to classify the allegations against OPS and OPA as being a “series of events” or a continuum.

43While the information in the RFOP and Response to the RFOP appears to differ from the allegations contained in the notes and corrections which accompanied the Application, it does appear that the applicant raised these issues with the OPS sometime before November 2007.

44I do not find that the applicant’s allegations from her employment with OPS to Peel as set out in her Application constitute a “series of incidents” or a “factual matrix” that followed the applicant from Ottawa to Peel and as required under section 34(1). The allegations are too vague and are lacking in any amount of detail for a series of incidents to be made out.

45Similarly, in her Response to the RFOP and her RFOP to amend her Application, because the particulars of the alleged sexual harassment have not been provided, I cannot find that these allegations constitute a “series of incidents” as required by section 34(1) of the Code as the applicant left OPS in February 2008 and commenced working with Peel.

46Accordingly, I find that the allegations as against OPS and OPA are untimely. Therefore, I turn to whether or not the applicant can demonstrate that her delay in filing the Application against OPS and OPA was made in good faith.

Was the Delay in Filing against OPS and OPA made in good faith?

47In order to satisfy the Tribunal that the delay was incurred in good faith, an applicant must provide the Tribunal with a reasonable explanation as to why he or she did not pursue his or her rights under the Code in a timely manner. The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, while recognizing that there will be legitimate circumstances that justify exercising the discretion under section 34(2). See Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241.

48A number of the delay cases referenced by the applicant are distinguishable from this Application. In Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.C. 44, Ford Motor Co. of Canada v. Ontario (Human Rights Comm.), 1995 CanLII 7431 (Ont. S.C.), and Chan v. Ontario Power Generation Inc., [2000] O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 7 (Ont. Bd. Inq.), at issue was the delay from the time that the human rights complaint was filed until the time that it was scheduled for hearing, rather than a delay occurring before a human rights complaint was initially filed. That is distinguishable from the Application here in which the delay in filing the initial Application is at issue.

49The Tribunal has stated that efforts to pursue one’s rights without filing an Application do not, without more, justify a waiver of the one-year limitation period under section 34(2): Gagne v. Maximum Mining, 2010 HRTO 689.

50In the particular circumstances of this case, I do not have to make a ruling on the existence, or not, of an alleged “culture of policing and the thin blue line or code of silence that makes complaining of discriminatory treatment or harassment of women externally, career suicide, and this acted as a barrier against the [a]pplicant coming forward to the Tribunal earlier” as is suggested by the applicant. I find, instead, that the applicant raised allegations of harassment with a number of people both within and outside OPS and OPA and that she has failed to provide a reasonable explanation for her delay in filing her Application as against OPS and OPA.

51In her materials, she states that she has raised her concerns with “senior officers ranging from Constable to Chief of Police”. She has discussed her concerns “with both Ottawa and Peel Regional Police Associations”, as well as several times with members of the Ontario Provincial Police, a “retired Windsor officer and a retired Toronto (Metro) Police officer”.

52In the notes, at what is numbered para. 16, she reported allegations to her then landlord. In the notes and in the paragraph before what is numbered para. 26, she claims to have told her new landlord in February 2009 about her concerns. In her corrections to para. 23 she writes that she has addressed her concerns with a civilian member, Jim Frost.

53Most importantly, in para. 31 of the notes and in the applicant’s corrections to para. 31, she states that she has “several times attempted to seek legal advice” and notes that in January 2008 “prior to being hired by Peel” she spoke with a lawyer named William Gilmour. The applicant’s consultation with a lawyer suggests to me that the applicant has not demonstrated that the delay in filing her Application against OPS and OPA was incurred in good faith. See also Boodhoo v. McMaster University, 2010 HRTO 1757 in which an application was dismissed when, amongst other things, the evidence revealed the applicant had received legal assistance.

54While the Tribunal accepts that a delay may be in good faith because of an applicant’s disability, it has consistently ruled that it requires medical evidence that disability was so debilitating as to prevent an applicant from pursuing his or her legal rights under the Code: see, for example Reid v. Ontario March of Dimes, 2009 HRTO 2207; Downer v. Little & Jarrett, 2010 HRTO 992; Savage v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2010 HRTO 1360; and Imrie-Howlett v. Peel District School Board, 2009 HRTO 1339. The applicant has not submitted any medical documentation to explain the delay in filing her Application as against the OPS and OPA. Further, she is not claiming that a medical condition contributed to any delay in filing her Application.

55The applicant asserts that there is a strong societal interest in proceeding with the merits of the Application given that the allegations are against police forces and their associations even if there was a delay in filing her Application. With respect, I do not see that this is a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not a delay in filing her Application was incurred in good faith as against OPS and OPA.

56Section 34(1) of the Code contains a mandatory one year limitation period and section 34(2) requires individuals to prove good faith in filing an application outside the mandatory one year limitation period. There would be little meaning to the statutory limitation period if factors such as the perceived merits of an application, who the parties were, and what, if any, public or societal interests were raised in the application, were considered by the Tribunal in allowing an application to proceed where the applicant had not established that his or her delay was incurred in good faith. This is in contrast to section 35(1) of the Code which allows the Ontario Human Rights Commission to file an application if it is of the opinion “it is in the public interest to make an application”. It is not open to individuals to file a “public interest” application. See Matthews v. C.A.W. Local 1285, 2010 HRTO 1116.

57The Tribunal has held that if an applicant fails to demonstrate that the delay was incurred in good faith, it is not necessary to make a determination as to whether anyone has been substantially prejudiced by the delay: see Esanu v. Georgetown Non-Contact Hockey League, 2009 HRTO 579; Dean v. Brantford Office Machines, 2010 HRTO 385; and Gagne, supra.

58The Application is dismissed as against OPS and OPA and the style of cause is amended accordingly. The Application will continue against Peel and PRPA.

Applicant’s Request to Amend her Application

59As set out in para. 6 above, after being retained, the applicant’s counsel wrote to the Tribunal, copying the other parties, advising that he planned to amend the Application and subsequently filed a RFOP to amend the Application. The RFOP contained very little particulars and details about how the applicant sought to amend her Application. The Tribunal notes that Peel and PRPA have filed submissions in response to the applicant’s request to amend her Application.

60The Tribunal directs the applicant to deliver to Peel and PRPA and file with the Tribunal within 10 days of the date of this Interim Decision a copy of her proposed amended Application as against Peel and PRPA and upon which she now seeks to rely. To be clear, this does not mean that the Tribunal will automatically be permitting the applicant to amend her Application as the Tribunal will still need to make this determination based upon the submissions of the parties. If the applicant seeks to file additional submissions about her ability to amend her Application, in addition to the RFOP she already filed, she is directed to deliver those to Peel and PRPA and file them with the Tribunal within 10 days of the date of this Interim Decision.

61If Peel and/or PRPA wish to file further submissions in response to the applicant’s RFOP to amend her Application, they are directed to deliver them to the other parties and file them with the Tribunal within 10 days after they receive the applicant’s proposed amended Application.

62The Tribunal will consider the parties’ submissions about the applicant’s request to amend her Application and may issue further case directions.

63I am not seized of this matter.