HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

William Reid

Applicant

-and-

Rehabilitation Foundation for the Disabled o/a Ontario March of Dimes, VON Canada (Middlesex, Elgin), Brian Dunbar, Lyn Leclair,

Nancy Leslie and Connie Milliken

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: David A. Wright

Date: December 17, 2009

Citation: 2009 HRTO 2207

Indexed as: Reid v. Ontario March of Dimes

APPEARANCES

William Reid, Applicant ) On His Own Behalf

Ontario March of Dimes, Brian Dunbar and ) Christina Hall, Counsel

Nancy Leslie, Respondents )

VON Canada (Middlesex, Elgin), Lyn Leclair, ) Lynne Poirier, Counsel

and Connie Milliken, Respondents )

1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended. It alleges discrimination while the applicant was participating in a vocational rehabilitation program provided by the respondent Ontario March of Dimes (“OMOD”), in an unpaid work placement through the respondent Victorian Order of Nurses (“VON”). The individual respondents are employees of the organization respondents.

2The Tribunal has issued three previous Interim Decisions in this matter: one determining that the Application would not be dismissed as a preliminary matter, 2009 HRTO 747; a second directing a conference call on the issue of timelines and seeking submissions on the issue of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the Government of Canada, 2009 HRTO 1280; and a third dismissing the Application against the Government of Canada and one of its employees, 2009 HRTO 1649.

3This Decision addresses the respondents’ Request that the Application be dismissed as outside the statutory time limit in s. 34 of the Code, the relevant portions of which read as follows:

(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

I heard the parties’ submissions on this issue during a conference call hearing on November 26, 2009.

4The Application was filed on April 22, 2009. The events alleged occurred more than one year earlier, in October to November of 2007. There is no dispute that the Application was filed more than one year following the events in question. The issue I must determine is whether the applicant has established that the delay was incurred in good faith and if necessary, whether substantial prejudice would result to the respondents.

5The applicant makes two submissions in support of his argument that the delay was incurred in good faith. First, he argues, he was not aware of the extent of the discrimination until he received documents under Freedom of Information legislation on May 20, 2008. Second, he says that receiving these reports exacerbated his mental health condition, making him feel quite depressed, and he wanted to be sure he was doing the right thing before moving forward.

6Having considered the applicant’s submissions, I find that they do not establish good faith within the meaning of s. 34(2) of the Code. As noted by the Tribunal in Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241 at para. 24, the applicant must show something more than simply an absence of bad faith; the applicant must show that he or she acted with all due diligence.

7In my view, the applicant has not done so. Even assuming that the receipt of the documents might have justified some delay, the applicant received them in May of 2008, well within the limitation period and nearly a year before he filed the Application. This, in my view, cannot justify the failure to file the Application in a timely manner. I understand and accept that the symptoms of mental health conditions such as depression may make it extremely difficult or impossible to file a human rights Application. However, the applicant’s subjective description of his symptoms does not reach that level and he has provided no medical evidence in support of his illness-based claim. Accordingly, I find that he has not met his onus to establish that the delay was incurred in good faith.

8Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.