Raywatie Baldeo v. Securitas Canada Limited and Sean Logan, 2014 HRTO 1453

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Raywatie Baldeo

Applicant

-and-

Securitas Canada Limited and Sean Logan

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Mark Hart Date: October 1, 2014 Citation: 2014 HRTO 1453 Indexed as: Baldeo v. Securitas Canada Limited

APPEARANCES

Raywatie Baldeo, Applicant

Bay Ryley, Counsel

Securitas Canada Limited, Respondent

Daniel McDonald, Counsel

Sean Logan, Respondent

Shaheen Hirani, Counsel

1This is an Application filed on April 26, 2013 alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of disability, age and association with persons identified by a prohibited ground contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

2By Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated January 22, 2014, the Tribunal directed that a teleconference hearing be held to address the following issues:

a. Whether the Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis of delay;

b. Whether the Application should be dismissed in whole or in part pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code; and

c. Whether the Application should be dismissed in whole or in part as against the personal respondent on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that it will succeed against him.

3The teleconference hearing was held on June 13, 2014 at which I heard oral submissions from all parties. I also have considered the Application, Responses and Replies and the materials filed by the parties in response to the CAD and for the purpose of the teleconference hearing. At the teleconference hearing, an issue arose regarding the late submission by the applicant of a medical report, and I established a process for the parties to make written submissions on whether or not I should consider this report and regarding the contents of the report. The last submissions were received on July 4, 2014.

4I will proceed to address the issues in the order set out above.

Should all or part of the Application be dismissed for delay?

a) The nature of the allegations

5As stated above, the Application was filed on April 26, 2013. The first issue to consider is the nature of the allegations of violations of the Code as raised in the Application, in order to determine which allegations raise “incidents” that occurred within one year of when the Application was made. The nature of the allegations I will address all relate to the corporate respondent (“Securitas”). The allegation raised as against the personal respondent relates to the handling and the settlement of a grievance by the union, which did occur within the one year period.

6The first allegation raised by the applicant in her Application is that she was denied flexibility in taking breaks which were required because of her disability. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the applicant provided a doctor’s note regarding her need for flexibility in taking breaks. For the purpose of this Interim Decision, I am prepared to accept that the applicant provided a note from her doctor dated December 17, 2009, in which her doctor states that she is diabetic and needs to have flexibility in her scheduled and personal breaks. As stated by the applicant, this is required due to her more frequent need to use the washroom.

7It is clear from the material provided by the applicant that the issue of her taking her scheduled breaks was an issue from time to time with her supervisors and co-workers. However, the issue as documented by the applicant is not that she was being denied breaks required because of her disability, but that she was being required to take her scheduled breaks or was placed on breaks when she did not feel that this was required. While there may have been a workplace issue between the parties about whether the applicant should have been required to take breaks at the times documented, it is hard for me to understand how this could possibly constitute discrimination because of disability under the Code. Just because her doctor had recommended flexibility in taking breaks does not in my view authorize the applicant to refuse to take a break when directed to do so. Accordingly, I do not regard the issues about the applicant being required to take breaks as constituting an “incident” of discrimination within the meaning of s. 34(1) of the Code.

8Rather, an issue of discrimination because of disability may arise in circumstances where the applicant was denied a personal break which she required because of her disability. There is little concrete information in the material and submissions provided by the applicant to indicate that this occurred. The applicant does document an incident from December 28, 2009 when she states that she was denied a break by her supervisor, but states that she was told to get a doctor’s note and that this remedied the issue for a period of time. The only other specific occasion when the applicant’s documentation indicates that she was refused a break was on March 12, 2012, when she states that she called for a personal break at 6:30 a.m. and never got relieved. In this regard, I note that the applicant’s shift that day ended when she was relieved at 7:01 a.m. It also is unclear to me the extent to which the applicant’s need to be relieved that particular day is related to her diabetes, as opposed to being a normal need to have a bowel movement.

9The only other related information in the documentation filed by the applicant pertains to a discussion with a Securitas supervisor on May 28, 2011, during which the applicant states that she spoke to this supervisor about issues she was encountering in taking her breaks (which related to an issue from the previous day when the applicant states she had been “forced” to take a break as opposed to being denied a break required due to disability). In this context, the applicant states that the Securitas supervisor told her that himself, some of his family workers and another supervisor are all diabetic and asked, “what makes you do special?”, in the context of saying that the applicant would need to take her breaks as scheduled.

10At the teleconference hearing, the applicant stated that there were other occasions when she was denied personal breaks, but she did not make notes of these occasions and could not say when or in what context they had occurred.

11The second allegation raised in the Application is an allegation that the applicant was harassed because of her need for flexibility in taking breaks. Once again, this could only amount to an allegation of a violation of the Code if the applicant was harassed because of disability or her needs relating to a disability, as opposed to being required to take her scheduled breaks even if she did not feel that a break was needed by her at that particular time. Apart from the conversation with a Securitas supervisor alleged to have taken place on May 28, 2011, there is no specific information in the documentation provided by the applicant about the applicant being harassed about her need to take more frequent breaks due to her diabetes. As a result, the only specific alleged “incident” of harassment I am prepared to consider is the alleged comments made on May 28, 2011.

12The third allegation raised in the Application relates to an allegation that the applicant needed a new chair, because the metal on her existing chair was exposed and was uncomfortable and painful due to her injured hand. There is very little information in the documentation filed by the applicant regarding this issue. In particular, no information is provided in this documentation or in the applicant’s submissions at the teleconference hearing as to specifically when this is alleged to have occurred, whether and when she raised any such issue with Securitas, what accommodation she required, what if any steps were taken by Securitas in response to any accommodation request she made, or what medical documentation supports her need for such an accommodation due to disability. In my view, it is the applicant’s obligation, especially in response to a request to dismiss all or part of her Application due to delay, to at least provide sufficient particulars in order to identify the approximate time when an alleged incident of discrimination occurred. In the absence of any such particulars, I decline to consider the chair issue as an alleged incident of discrimination.

13The fourth allegation raised by the Application is an allegation that the applicant experienced discrimination either because of her age or because of her association with persons identified by a prohibited ground, which the applicant identifies as age and place of origin. As I understand it, the Application alleges that the applicant was removed from her posting at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (“CBC”) site either because of her age or because she advocated on behalf of other older security guards or security guards who had an accent. With regard to the latter allegation, there is precious little in the Application or any of the voluminous documentation filed by the applicant to support that she engaged in any such advocacy. No specifics appear in any of the documentation to indicate when the applicant alleges she spoke up for other security guards, with whom, or in relation to what issue. Indeed, in a 7 page draft letter prepared by the applicant and intended to be sent to a Securitas official and which bears the date of November 25, 2012 (well after she was removed from the CBC site), the applicant reviews a number of other security guards who were removed from that site and, while she is at pains to point out that their removal was unfair and unwarranted, does not anywhere indicate that she advocated on behalf of any of these individuals.

14No further clarity was provided in the applicant’s oral submissions at the teleconference hearing. At that time, she stated that the last time she stood up for these other security guards was at a time when Securitas was doing a schedule change, and the extent of her advocacy was to ask that the schedule not be changed due to its impact on an older African-Canadian woman. On the basis of the documentation filed by the applicant, this issue appears to have arisen in early April 2011.

15The circumstances surrounding the applicant’s removal from the CBC site are well-documented and indisputable. The applicant was working her shift as a security guard late in the evening on May 2, 2012, when two individuals arrived to drain the grease in a restaurant in the building. It appears undisputed that there was no authorization on file for these individuals to do the work. The applicant checked with her supervisor and he confirmed the lack of authorization. The applicant states that her supervisor offered to call the restaurant owner, but the two individuals said that they would come back another day. This led to a complaint being lodged against the applicant alleging that she had refused entry to these individuals. The applicant and her union representative were called to a meeting on May 8, 2012 at which the applicant was first presented with a disciplinary removal from site. After hearing her side of the story, Securitas spoke with the client representative, explained the situation, and asked that the request for removal from the CBC site be rescinded. The client representative declined to do so, and confirmed this in writing. As a result, under the collective agreement, the applicant’s situation was transformed into a non-disciplinary removal from site and she was re-located to another work site.

16The applicant firmly believes that it was unfair for her to be removed from the CBC site when she had not done anything wrong but instead had followed proper procedure. That may be so. But the Code is not intended to address all manifestations of unfairness. Rather, this Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Code is limited only to protecting against discrimination or harassment because of one of the identified grounds set out in that legislation. The applicant alleges discrimination because of age (she was 52 years old at the time she was removed from the CBC site) and has provided a long list of persons she says are older security guards who were removed from that site. Be that as it may, the applicant’s removal from the CBC site was initiated by the client representative and not Securitas, and there is no basis beyond the applicant’s bare allegation to indicate that this removal had anything to do with the applicant’s age or any advocacy the applicant may have engaged in on behalf of other security guards.

17In my view, the circumstances surrounding the applicant’s removal from the CBC site do not reasonably give rise to an alleged incident of discrimination contrary to the Code, and so cannot properly be regarded as an “incident” to which the Application relates within the meaning of s. 34(1) of the Code.

18Finally, it is alleged that the applicant has continued to experience discrimination because of disability following her transfer to work as a security guard at a new site (the “Coca-Cola site”). The applicant appended to her Application a two page document about what she states she has experienced following her transfer to the Coca-Cola site. Many of the concerns raised in this document have nothing to do with rights protected under the Code. The applicant submits that at least one concern engages the Code, namely an allegation that in her new position, she was “doing things which were not in keeping with [her] restrictions, like pulling and pushing doors and gates”. While reference also was made to the applicant having to use the men’s washroom at this site, discrimination because of sex has not been alleged in the Application. In any event, this washroom was located in an abandoned warehouse, such that it does not appear to give rise to any allegation that the applicant was required to use this washroom at the same time as any men, and the applicant’s stated concern is that she got rashes on her “bum” and upper legs from using this facility and not that she experienced gender discrimination.

19There is no dispute that the applicant was transferred to the Coca-Cola site within the one year period preceding the filing of her Application, such that any alleged incident of discrimination would have occurred within that period. I do take note of, and agree with, the submissions by counsel for Securitas that this allegation relating to the Coca-Cola site is lacking in specifics, such as: what specific restrictions the applicant had at the relevant time; whether, when and how any such restrictions were communicated to Securitas; what specific duties or responsibilities the applicant alleges she was required to perform that were contrary to any such restrictions; who required her to perform any such duties and when; whether the applicant raised any issue about this with anyone at Securitas, and if so, with whom and when. For this reason, while this allegation will not be dismissed for delay, I will require the applicant to file a fresh Application setting out the specifics in support of this allegation.

b) Is there a series of incidents?

20So what we are left with are the following allegations: an allegation that the applicant was denied a break on December 28, 2009, which appears to have occurred prior to her providing her doctor’s note; an allegation that comments were made about her diabetes and questioning her need for flexibility in taking breaks by a Securitas supervisor on May 28, 2011; and a failure to be relieved when she asked for a personal break to have a bowel movement near the end of her shift on March 12, 2012, which may or may not relate to her disability. All of these allegations are untimely, in the sense that they are beyond the one year period prior to the filing of the Application. While the applicant also alleges that there were other occasions when she was denied a break to use the washroom, there is no documentation to support when or in what circumstances this occurred and the applicant could not provide any further specifics during the teleconference hearing. As a result, I place no weight on these unspecified allegations as alleged “incidents” of discrimination.

21And then there is the timely allegation that at the Coca-Cola site, the applicant was required to perform work beyond her physical restrictions. The question is whether the untimely allegations can be regarded as forming part of a “series of incidents” within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b) of the Code that extends to and encompasses the timely allegations. In my view, they cannot properly be so regarded.

22When assessing whether allegations relate to a “series of incidents”, the Tribunal will generally consider the nature of the events and whether they may reasonably be viewed as a pattern of conduct or are comprised of incidents relating to discrete and separate issues without some connection or nexus: see, for example, Baisa v. Skills for Change, 2010 HRTO 1621. In Pakarian v. Chen, 2010 HRTO 457 the Tribunal defined the word “series” as “a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial or temporal succession”. A “series of incidents” may be considered to exist where the incidents share a common theme, similar parties and/or circumstances: see Twyne v. Dominion Colour Corporation, 2013 HRTO 1769.

23While it may be said that the untimely and timely allegations raised by the applicant in the instant case all raise allegations of discrimination or harassment because of disability, in my view that alone is not sufficient to constitute a series of incidents. Here the untimely allegations occurred at a different site, relate to different supervisors, and pertain to different needs arising from different disabilities. Given those facts, it is my view that the untimely allegations cannot properly be regarded as a series of incidents that extends to and encompasses the timely allegations arising from the Coca-Cola site.

c) Was the delay in raising the untimely allegations incurred in good faith?

24The onus is on an applicant under s. 34(2) of the Code to satisfy this Tribunal that the delay in raising untimely allegations was incurred in good faith. This requires that the applicant provide some reasonable explanation for the delay: Imrie-Howlett v. Peel District School Board, 2009 HRTO 1339. In Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241, this Tribunal held that an applicant is required to show something more than simply an absence of bad faith. In Miller, above, it was held that the one-year time limit is consistent with the policy objective that human rights claims should be dealt with expeditiously, and requires an applicant to act with due diligence when they seek to pursue a human rights claim.

25In the context of determining whether delay in raising alleged incidents of discrimination has been incurred in good faith, this Tribunal has held that persons who feel their rights have been violated are expected to raise these allegations within the one-year time limit specified in the Code, even if this means that they are seeking redress from two different entities or waiting for the result of an internal investigation: see Agyei-Abankwa v. University of Windsor, 2012 HRTO 92; Cartier v. Northeast Mental Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 1670; Poole v. Trent University, 2011 HRTO 2086; Foley v. CAW-Canada Local 222, 2011 HRTO 1224; SB v. Toronto (City), 2012 HRTO 2018. In the instant case, the fact that the applicant had filed and was pursuing a grievance and asked the union to “re-open” her grievance after it had been settled would not provide a reasonable explanation for delay in filing her Application.

26While the Tribunal accepts that a delay may be in good faith because of an applicant’s disability, it has consistently ruled that it requires medical evidence that disability was so debilitating as to prevent an applicant from pursuing his or her legal rights under the Code: see, for example Reid v. Ontario March of Dimes, 2009 HRTO 2207; Downer v. Little & Jarrett, 2010 HRTO 992; Savage v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2010 HRTO 1360; Dionne v. Toronto (City), 2011 HRTO 317.

27In the instant case, the applicant in her Application stated that raising these allegations was delayed for fear of losing her job. In Oakley v. Lanark (County), 2013 HRTO 1305, this was found not to be a sufficient justification for failing to raise allegations at an earlier time in the absence of any explanation as to why pursuing these allegations caused the applicant to fear retribution, especially when she had taken other legal steps to enforce her rights. Similarly, in the instant case, the applicant has not provided any specifics as to why she feared losing her job, particularly when she already had filed and pursued a grievance regarding her removal from the CBC site.

28As stated above, the applicant filed with the Tribunal a letter from her family doctor dated June 11, 2014, which had not been provided to the other parties as of the time of the teleconference hearing. While the respondents both object to my considering this letter, I am nonetheless prepared to do so for the purpose of this Interim Decision. In this letter, the doctor reviews the applicant’s medical history and offers the opinion that “due to all the above situations she was unable to file the application with the human rights tribunal”. The gist of the doctor’s letter is that, while the applicant was able to cope with her position at the CBC site, despite flare-ups from time to time, her health deteriorated following her transfer to the Coca-Cola site such that she has been unable to carry on in that position since November 2012. Even accepting the doctor’s letter at face value, this does not explain the delay from the last untimely incident, which is arguably in March 2012 but more reasonably in May 2011, until November 2012. During this period, as shown in the documentation filed by the applicant, she was able to file and pursue a grievance and write quite detailed and elaborate letters to her union and a draft letter to a Securitas official setting out her concerns. I further do not find the doctor’s letter to be a sufficient basis to explain the delay from and after November 2012, as there is an insufficient objective medical basis to support that any disability or health issue the applicant may have had during that period prevented her from filing an Application in a timely manner.

29Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I find that the applicant has failed to provide an adequate explanation for her delay in raising the untimely allegations. Accordingly, the untimely allegations are dismissed for delay. Given this conclusion, it is not necessary for me to address the issue of whether any substantial prejudice has been caused to the respondents as a result of the delay.

Should all or part of the Application be dismissed pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code?

30The respondents take the position that, with the exception of the allegations relating to the Coca-Cola site, all other allegations should be dismissed on the basis that they already have been appropriately addressed through the grievance process. While not strictly necessary for me to address this issue given my finding on delay, I will address it briefly as I have heard full argument on the point.

31Securitas takes the position that the applicant’s grievance was settled, and on that basis her allegations already have been appropriately dealt with: Dunn v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), 2008 HRTO 27.

32I was at great pains during the teleconference hearing to comprehend what Securitas was relying upon as a settlement of the grievance. There is no dispute between the parties that the grievance was settled as between Securitas and the union on the basis that Securitas would increase the applicant’s hourly rate at the Coca-Cola site to $12.50 per hour (there is a dispute between the parties as to how much of an increase this amounts to – the respondents say that it was an increase from the regular rate of $11.25 per hour, while the applicant states that the regular rate was increased to $11.48 per hour). Based upon the documentation before me, the applicant clearly disagreed with the union’s settlement of her grievance and takes issue with the fact that the union agreed to this settlement without consulting her beforehand. However, as the union has carriage rights in respect of any grievance, it was well within the union’s authority to settle the applicant’s grievance on this basis.

33Securitas, however, attempted to argue that the applicant herself had agreed to a “settlement” of the issues by signing letters dated May 9 and 11, 2012. The May 9, 2012 letter was the letter informing the applicant of her non-disciplinary removal from the CBC site and her rights under Article 12.20 of the collective agreement. It includes a final (and what appears to be boilerplate) paragraph which states: “Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this letter, understand and agree to its contents and acknowledge that Securitas has fulfilled its obligations to you under the collective agreement.” While the applicant and her union representative signed this letter, the union representative expressly wrote “we will may file a grievance” underneath her signature.

34The May 11, 2012 letter offered the applicant employment at the Coca-Cola site, confirmed her acceptance of this posting, and advised her of her new hourly rate of $11.25 per hour (with her current rate from the CBC site of $13.70 per hour to be maintained for 45 days in accordance with the collective agreement). This letter includes the same boilerplate language as the May 9, 2012 letter.

35As I understand it, Securitas takes the position that not only does the applicant’s signature on these letters confirm her receipt and understanding of the contents of these letters, but provides carte blanche exculpation for Securitas from any and all potential violations of the collective agreement up to and including the date of the last letter, including any alleged violation of the human rights provisions of the collective agreement. I find this to be quite a remarkable and untenable submission. If such a position were correct, there would have been no basis to even entertain a grievance regarding the applicant’s removal from the CBC site. Yet this alleged carte blanche release was never raised by Securitas in the context of dealing with the grievance. Further, in my view, there is simply no consideration provided in these letters in exchange for the carte blanche release being alleged. The first letter merely informed the applicant of her non-disciplinary removal and her rights under Article 12.20, and the second letter merely informed her of her new posting in accordance with Article 12.20. Securitas asserts that the “consideration” for the May 11, 2012 letter was that it consulted with the applicant about her new posting to the Coca-Cola site, when it was not required to do so under the collective agreement. In my view, this is no real consideration at all, let alone for the kind of carte blanche release being asserted. Further, the union representative’s note on the May 9, 2012 letter in my view constitutes an express reservation of the applicant’s right to file a grievance, which is entirely inconsistent with the allegation that she agreed that Securitas had complied with the collective agreement. In any event, I find that it would be unconscionable for an employee’s human rights to be extinguished on the basis of this kind of boilerplate language in what otherwise are standard notification letters.

36While a settlement was reached between Securitas and the union at a later stage of the grievance process (it appears this was sometime in August 2012), the documentation is clear that the applicant expressly did not agree to this settlement. While the Tribunal in some circumstances has nonetheless found that it would be an abuse of process to allow an Application to proceed where the applicant has not agreed to a grievance settlement but has nonetheless accepted the full benefit of the settlement (see Taylor v. Hamilton (City), 2013 HRTO 1591 where the applicant derived a significant benefit from the settlement), in my view the circumstances are not sufficient to justify such a conclusion in the instant case given that the terms of the settlement were unilaterally imposed on her through the increase in pay (see Melendez v. City of Toronto, 2012 HRTO 403; Calvo v. Toronto Public Library Board, 2014 HRTO 955).

37Accordingly, I find that there is no basis to dismiss any part of the Application pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code.

Is there a reasonable prospect of success as against the personal respondent?

38The personal respondent is a staff representative for the union that represents the applicant in her workplace. He was involved in negotiating the settlement of the grievance, and in communicating the union’s reasons for the settlement to the applicant. He also responded to the applicant’s objections to the settlement and refused her request to “re-open” her grievance.

39This Tribunal has held that it is not discrimination for a union to decide not to file or pursue a grievance, unless the reason for doing so was based on one of the grounds in the Code.

40In Traversy v. Mississauga Firefighters’ Association, 2009 HRTO 996, the Tribunal stated as follows at para. 33:

Assuming that the Code also applies to this aspect of a union’s relationship with the employees it represents, a claim that the union violates the Code must be based on an assertion of differential treatment, and not simply a failure to act. The failure or refusal to take forward a human rights issue, such as accommodation of a disability in the workplace, is not, in and of itself, a breach of the Code. There may be many reasons that have no discriminatory overtones why a union might choose not to pursue a human rights claim on behalf of an employee: see Baylet v. Universal Workers Union, 2009 HRTO 700. There must be a claim, and a factual foundation for the claim, that the failure to act was based on discriminatory factors.

See also Arias v. Centre for Spanish Speaking Peoples, 2009 HRTO 1025, at paras. 16-18.

41It is not this Tribunal’s role to assess the effectiveness of how a union represents its members or even if the union acted “wrongly” in some general sense, for example by making the wrong call on whether the grievance had merit and should be pursued to arbitration: see Zhang v. Olivieri Foods Inc., 2012 HRTO 1760 at para. 9.

42The only issue within this Tribunal’s jurisdiction is to consider whether the union acted in the manner it did because of a discriminatory factor. This is the aspect of the case that the applicant needs to address, and it ultimately is the applicant’s legal burden to prove that a discriminatory factor was involved: see Zhang v. Olivieri Foods Inc., 2012 HRTO 1760 at para. 10. See also Gungor v. Canadian Auto Workers Local 88, 2011 HRTO 1760; Sollitt v. Trillium Lakelands District School Board, 2013 HRTO 1128.

43In the instant case, the applicant alleged at the teleconference hearing that the personal respondent discriminated against her because of disability and perhaps also race. In this regard, I note that race is not one of the grounds relied upon by the applicant in the Application. I asked the applicant what evidence she would present at a hearing to support this allegation against the personal respondent, and she acknowledged that she had none. While I appreciate that the applicant believes that the personal respondent should have more fully investigated her situation (there is a dispute between the parties as to whether they met or only corresponded by e-mail) and should have consulted her before agreeing to settle the grievance, I find that there is nothing beyond a bare allegation against the personal respondent unsupported by any specific evidence that he engaged in discrimination contrary to the Code.

44Accordingly, the Application is dismissed as against the personal respondent as having no reasonable prospect of success.

Next Steps

45Based on the foregoing, the only remaining allegation in this Application is the allegation as against Securitas that the applicant was doing work at the Coca-Cola site which was beyond her restrictions. If the applicant intends to proceed with this allegation, I am requiring her to file a fresh Application which raises only this one remaining allegation and which provides specifics about this allegation, including: what specific restrictions the applicant had at the relevant time; whether, when and how any such restrictions were communicated to Securitas; what specific duties or responsibilities the applicant alleges she was required to perform that were contrary to any such restrictions; who required her to perform any such duties and when; whether the applicant raised any issue about this with anyone at Securitas, and if so, with whom and when.

46The applicant is hereby directed to file any such fresh Application within 35 calendar days of the date of this Interim Decision, failing which her file will be closed as abandoned. If the applicant files such a fresh Application, it will proceed under the existing HRTO file number and will be deemed to have been filed on April 26, 2013. Once any such fresh Application is filed and found to be complete, it will be served on Securitas and will proceed in the normal course under the Rules, with Securitas having an opportunity to file a fresh Response and the applicant an opportunity to file a fresh Reply.

ORDER

47For all of the foregoing reasons, I hereby make the following order:

a. All allegations against Securitas are dismissed for delay with the exception of the one remaining allegation that the applicant was doing work at the Coca-Cola site which was beyond her restrictions;

b. The request for all or part of the Application to be dismissed pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code is denied;

c. The Application is dismissed in its entirety as against the personal respondent as having no reasonable prospect of success; and

d. If the applicant intends to proceed with the one remaining allegation, she shall file a fresh Application which raises only this one remaining allegation and which provides specifics about this allegation as set out in para. 45 above within 35 calendar days of the date of this Interim Decision.