Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Catherine Reeves
Applicant
-and-
Parkbridge Lifestyle Communities Inc.
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Aida Gatfield
Indexed as: Reeves v. Parkbridge Lifestyle Communities Inc.
APPEARANCES
Catherine Reeves, Applicant
Christine Lundy, Representative
Parkbridge Lifestyle Communities Inc., Respondent
Kristin A. Ley, Counsel
Introduction
1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination in the area of accommodation because of disability.
2The purpose of this decision is to address two issues:
should the Application be dismissed on the basis that the applicant signed a full and final release;
should the Application be dismissed because it was filed outside the one-year statutory time limit set out in section 34 of the Code.
BACKGROUND
3The respondent requested the early dismissal of the Application on the basis that the applicant signed a full and final release with respect to the same subject-matter of the Application.
4Upon review of the Application, the Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction, dated April 23, 2012, directing the parties to make submissions to the Tribunal regarding the timeliness of the allegations contained in the Application. Both parties filed written submissions.
5The Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction dated May 22, 2012 noting that the nature of the applicant’s submissions on the timeliness issue and the nature of the respondent’s submissions on the mutual release issue were such that they may require oral evidence prior to a determination of those issues. Both parties had indicated a willingness to participate in mediation. Accordingly, the matter was referred to mediation. The Tribunal noted that should the mediation not prove to be successful, the Tribunal would issue further directions at that time.
6Mediation took place on November 21, 2012, and was not successful. Upon conclusion of the mediation, the Tribunal issued a further Case Assessment Direction dated December 7, 2012 directing that a preliminary hearing be held during which the Tribunal will hear evidence and argument on the two preliminary issues: dismissal of the Application on the grounds of timeliness and the existence of a signed mutual release.
7The preliminary hearing took place on February 21, 2013. At the outset of the hearing I made an exclusion of witnesses order on consent of the parties. I heard evidence from the applicant; Susan Irvine, Legal Assistant of the respondent; and Jenny Barabash, Community Resort Manager of the respondent. The parties also made submissions on the issues to be determined.
EVIDENCE
8The following facts are based on the materials filed by the parties, the oral evidence and submissions made at the preliminary hearing.
9The respondent is the owner and operator of Oakridge Resort. On or about December 30, 2009, the applicant purchased a mobile home at Oakridge Resort. The applicant leased the site for the home from the respondent; the applicant was the owner of the home. The applicant did some renovations to the home and moved into the home on January 28, 2010. She was resident in the community until November 30, 2010.
10The applicant identifies as having Complex/Chronic PTSD. She filed this application on December 13, 2011, alleging that the respondent subjected her to discrimination and harassment in the area of accommodation because of her disability.
11In essence, she alleges that the respondent and its employees engaged in discriminatory and harassing behaviour by treating her as someone who was violent and abusive and was not competent to look after herself all on the basis of stereotyping of how a person with a mental health illness would behave.
12As a resident in the community, the applicant raised concerns about certain events occurring in the community and also made complaints to the respondent about the conduct of some residents. Residents of the community also complained about the applicant’s conduct. The applicant was no longer happy living in the community and put her home for sale in August 2010. She approached the respondent about buying her home. The respondent declined.
13On or about September 22, 2010, the respondent instituted eviction proceedings against the applicant pursuant to the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17, specifically for the applicant’s interference with the reasonable enjoyment of the residential complex by the landlord and other tenants. A hearing was scheduled before the Landlord and Tenant Board for October 14, 2010. The applicant obtained legal representation with respect to this matter from Andrew Bolter, Community Legal Assistance Sarnia. Given that the applicant no longer wished to live in the community and had put her home for sale, the parties indicated that a sale of the applicant’s home, either to the respondent or, with the respondent’s assistance to a third party, would settle the matters between them.
14The hearing scheduled for October 14, 2010 was adjourned on consent of the parties pending the possible sale of the respondent’s home. A new hearing date was set for November 18, 2010. The November 18, 2010 hearing date was also adjourned on consent of the parties. A new hearing date of December 2, 2010 was set.
15On November 25, 2010, Ms. Barabash, on behalf of the respondent, offered to purchase the applicant’s home for $80,000. This was lower than her asking price of $110,000. The applicant accepted the offer immediately on the condition that a deposit cheque was given to her within 24 hours. She also wanted the sale to close quickly.
16On November 26, 2010, the applicant signed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale and a Mutual Release. Upon the closing of the sale on November 30, 2010, she signed an Indenture. On November 30, 2010, the respondent withdrew its eviction application before the Landlord and Tenant Board. The sale was initially to close on November 29, 2010, but closed on November 30, 2010. According to Ms. Barabash, it was to give the applicant time to arrange movers. The applicant testified that she did not know why the sale closed a day late but that the delay did not help her, rather it hurt her.
17The respondent’s evidence is that the documents, which the applicant signed, were prepared by Ms. Irvine and sent to Ms. Barabash for signature by the applicant. The Agreement of Purchase and Sale was a blank template that Ms. Barabash completed by hand. Ms. Barabash testified that she showed both the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Mutual Release to the applicant and that she told the applicant that she could call her lawyer. She did not explain the documents. It was her evidence that the applicant called her lawyer and then said that she did not want the lawyer to see the documents. Next, the applicant called her ex-partner about the sale and price. Ms. Barabash testified that the Agreement of Purchase and Sale was signed by the applicant on November 26, 2010, and witnessed by her. As noted above, the applicant wanted the deposit cheque this same day. Bill Wells, Senior Vice-President, COO of the respondent agreed to deliver the cheque that day. He had to drive from a different location some two and a half hours away. Ms. Barabash testified that the Mutual Release was signed when Mr. Wells arrived and gave the applicant the deposit cheque. She was not present when the applicant signed the Mutual Release. She stated that Barb Boer, Manager of the respondent, advised her that she and Mr. Wells took the Mutual Release and cheque to the applicant’s home and that is when the applicant signed the Mutual Release. Ms. Barabash drove the applicant to the bank on November 26, 2010, as she was eager to cash the deposit cheque. On November 30, 2010, Ms. Barabash gave the applicant a cheque for the balance of the money owing and the applicant signed the Indenture.
18It was Ms. Irvine’s evidence that the applicant signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale on November 26, 2010, whereas the Mutual Release, although dated November 26, 2010 was signed on November 30, 2010. Ms. Irvine was not present at the time either document was signed.
19It was the applicant’s evidence that she needed the money and wanted to be out of the community. She felt that the respondent should purchase her home. The applicant testified that her legal counsel had advised her that Mr. Wells was coming to look at her home on November 24, 2010 with a view to the respondent purchasing it. He did not, however, show up on that day. The next day, she asked that information about the home be faxed to him, which Ms. Boer did. Ms. Barabash made the respondent’s offer to purchase the applicant’s home on November 25, 2010; she accepted on the condition that she be provided with the deposit cheque within 24 hours. She stated that she was presented with both the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Mutual Release for her signature the following day, November 26, 2010. She stated that she read the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and understood it. She signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale in the presence of Ms. Barabash. It was her evidence that she signed the Mutual Release in front of Ms. Barabash. The Mutual Release was not explained to her. Ms. Barabash then left the office and Mr. Wells entered, signed the Mutual Release and gave the applicant the deposit cheque. The applicant stated that she read “bits and pieces” of the Mutual Release but that she was experiencing symptoms of her disability and was in a dissociated state such that it was like a five year old reading it. She testified that she believed she was signing something releasing her from the eviction proceedings. It was the applicant’s evidence that she did not receive copies of the documents she signed. She telephoned the respondent in January 2011 and requested the documents. Despite being assured that the documents would be sent to her, she did not actually receive a copy until she again contacted the respondent in September 2011.
20When moving, the applicant decided not to take all of her personal belongings. She contacted Goodwill with respect to donating the items left behind and believed that she would receive a charitable donation tax receipt. She asked that the respondent deliver the belongings to Goodwill. It was the applicant’s evidence that the respondent agreed to do so but did not. Ms. Barabash testified that she and her husband delivered some of the items but not all, as Goodwill did not take certain items. Ms. Barabash testified that Goodwill did not issue charitable donation tax receipts for such a donation. It was the applicant’s evidence that she telephoned the respondent on December 21, 2010 and spoke to Ms. Boer about this issue and that this was the last incident of discrimination.
21Emails were also entered into evidence which indicate that in late October 2010 and early November 2010 the applicant’s behaviour was such that it caused the respondent concern. The respondent suspected that the applicant had a mental health issue and contacted her legal representative who advised that he would contact the applicant’s mental health worker. Also, the applicant had been hospitalized August 17-23 in the mental health unit.
22In her written submissions, the applicant states that she commenced working on the Application in September 2011. She did not feel she was able to do so earlier as she did not have copies of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, the Mutual Release and Indenture before September 2011. She worked on it herself for a couple months, but found it difficult to prepare a coherent narrative being so close emotionally to the events. She first contacted a legal representative on November 17, 2011 and they met on November 23, 2011. They met three more times over the following week until November 29, 2011. The representative believed that the December 21, 2010 incident was part of a series of events and advised that it was not necessary to rush to complete and fax the Application to the Tribunal. The applicant did not provide further evidence in her oral evidence.
RELEASE
23The respondent submits that it would be an abuse of process to permit the applicant to proceed with the Application in light of the fact that she signed a Mutual Release in respect of the subject matter of the Application. The respondent argued that the plain and ordinary meaning of the Mutual Release indicates that the applicant released the respondent from all claims.
24The applicant submits that the Mutual Release should not bind her because she signed it under psychological and economic duress, because she did not understand the nature of the Mutual Release and that there was no consideration paid to her on account of human rights issues. Further, the Mutual Release is defective in that there is no way to ensure that the document provided to the applicant and entered into evidence is in fact the same document the applicant signed. In the alternative, should the Mutual Release be found to be valid, the applicant contends that it is limited to claims related to the purchase of her home by the respondent and does not bar all human rights claims.
25Section 23(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, as amended, provides that a tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes. This Tribunal has held that filing a human rights application after signing a full and final release can constitute an abuse of the Tribunal’s process: see, for example, Sinnett v. Orlick Industries, 2009 HRTO 916; Kailani v. Securitas Canada, 2009 HRTO 1183; Rivard v. George Brown College, 2009 HRTO 2212; Perricone v. Fabco Plastics Wholesale, 2010 HRTO 1655; and Douse v. Hallmark Canada, 2009 HRTO 1254.
26The first issue to be determined is whether the language of the Mutual Release prohibits the applicant from making an application at the Tribunal.
27The Mutual Release, in relevant part, states:
The undersigned hereby finally and irrevocably mutually release each other from all liability to each other, and settle all actions and causes of action against each other, for damages, loss or injury sustained by either of them, however arising, present and future, known and unknown at this time, relating to the purchase of the residence of Cathy Reeves at A5, 9910 Northville Crescent, Thedford, Ontario by Parkbridge Communities Inc.
If either party has instituted legal proceedings against the other settled by this release, that party covenants to have them dismissed at the party’s cost with express prejudice to bringing further proceedings against the other arising out of the same matter.
28The Mutual Release was signed in the context of the respondent purchasing the applicant’s home as a way of settling the Landlord and Tenant Board matter. Ms. Irvine testified that the reasons for the Mutual Release were: so that there would no longer be the need for the hearing at the Landlord and Tenant Board; to ensure the parties all knew that the sale of the home ends the lease of the land and the relationship between the parties; and to release each other from anything that could arise after the closing. It was Ms. Irvine’s evidence that the applicant had not identified that she had a disability nor did she request any accommodation because of disability. Ms. Barabash testified that the respondent suspected that the applicant had a mental health issue. Based on the evidence put forward by the parties, human rights issues were not raised in the Landlord and Tenant Board proceeding.
29The Release states that the parties release each other from “all actions and causes of action” but subsequently states “relating to the purchase of the residence of Cathy Reeves”. In Better Beef Ltd. v. MacLean (2006), 80 O.R. (3d) 689, 2006 CanLII 17930 (ON S.C.D.C.) held that the literal and ordinary meaning of the release should be given effect.
30Having considered the evidence and the wording of the Mutual Release, I find that the Mutual Release excludes any claims related to the purchase of the applicant’s home by the respondent. It does not bar all human rights claims.
31The applicant relies on Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Comm.), 1999 CanLII 15058 (ON S.C.) in support of her position that she should not be bound by the Mutual Release. Pritchard was decided under section 34 of the old Code, which invoked bad faith rather than abuse of process, and concerned access to the since repealed investigative procedure of the Ontario Human Rights Commission rather than the right to an oral hearing before the Tribunal.
32However, the Pritchard factors can be useful in determining whether it would be an abuse of process to proceed with a hearing on the merits: Douse v. Hallmark Canada, 2009 HRTO 1254. The Pritchard factors look to (1) whether the party fully understood the significance of the release; (2) whether the party received sufficient and fair consideration for signing the release; (3) evidence of economic pressure; and (4) evidence of psychological or emotional pressure amounting to duress.
33In the case at hand, the applicant raised all of the factors set out in Pritchard. Specifically, she alleged that at the time of signing of the Mutual Release: she was having difficulty focusing with a tendency to dissociation as a result of her disability and that she was not able to understand complicated concepts; she did not receive sufficient consideration for signing the Mutual Release as the money paid to her was only for the purchase of her home; she was under economic pressure as she was under serious financial distress at the time; she was under psychological duress as the respondent delayed the delivery of the deposit cheque and made her sign the Mutual Release in a highly stressful situation.
34The applicant testified that she was in a dissociated state due to her disability at the time that she signed the sale documents, including the Mutual Release. She did not provide medical evidence of her condition at the time she signed the Release. The only medical evidence provided was a letter dated February 6, 2013 from her psychotherapist. The psychotherapist did not testify. The letter sets out the applicant’s diagnosis and possible symptoms the applicant may experience if “something in her current life is unsafe, confusing and overwhelming”. The only reference to the time the Mutual Release was signed is a general statement that “her symptoms were exacerbated and she was destabilized during the problems with the land lease community in 2010. She required further treatment in our program to regain stability after the triggering incidents that occurred”.
35The applicant testified that she understood that the Agreement of Purchase and Sale was a legal document and that she understood that the Mutual Release was something releasing her from the eviction proceeding. She stated that she read “bits and pieces” of the Mutual Release. She acknowledged calling her ex-partner. I accept her evidence that she did not call her lawyer about the Mutual Release. Her evidence is consistent with a letter from Andrew Bolter, entered into evidence on consent of the parties, where he states that he did not represent her in the purchase and sale and that the applicant contacted him on November 29, 2010 to advise him that the respondent had purchased her home. I also accept her evidence that she signed the Mutual Release on November 26, 2010 when Mr. Wells delivered the deposit cheque. I prefer the applicant’s evidence on this point to the hearsay evidence of the respondent’s witnesses. The evidence also shows that the applicant was eager to sell her home and obtain the deposit funds. On her own evidence she indicated that she accepted the offer on the condition that she be given a deposit within 24 hours. She also cashed the deposit cheque immediately. I also note that around this time, she was also instructing her legal counsel with respect to the Landlord and Tenant Board matter.
36Having regard to the totality of the evidence, I find that the applicant understood that the Mutual Release was a legal document related to the sale of her home and that it would end the proceedings before the Landlord and Tenant Board.
37The applicant’s argument that she did not receive sufficient consideration is based on the fact that the purchase of her home was a commercial transaction, the purchase price was significantly lower than her asking price and that no additional consideration was paid to the applicant on account of human rights issues. The applicant draws a parallel to employment cases where the Tribunal has found consideration to be insufficient because it did not exceed the statutory minimum. I do not find this case to be akin to an employment situation where legislation mandates minimum payments. Ms. Irvine testified that in arriving at the offer price, she had looked at sale prices of comparable homes and that the respondent’s purchase price was in the range of what comparable homes had sold for. Further, the respondent subsequently sold the home for the same price it had paid for it. Accordingly, I find that there was sufficient consideration for the Mutual Release.
38The applicant contends that she was under economic and psychological duress at the time as she was in serious financial distress and needed the money.
39In Kailani, supra, the Tribunal noted that Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.) gives the following definition of duress:
Any unlawful threat or coercion used by a person to induce another to act (or to refrain from acting) in a manner he or she otherwise would not (or would). Subjecting person to improper pressure which overcomes his will and coerces him to comply with demand to which he would not yield if acting as a free agent.
40The test for whether a person has signed a settlement under duress is high. The test for economic duress is high. Financial difficulty alone cannot be sufficient (see Kailani, supra).
41I accept the applicant’s evidence that she was in financial difficulty. However, I do not find that the evidence supports that the applicant was coerced in any way into signing the Mutual Release without her will.
42The applicant also states that she was under psychological stress to sign the Mutual Release. She contends that the respondent knew that she needed the money and was waiting for Mr. Wells to deliver the deposit cheque. Mr. Wells arrived late giving her barely sufficient time to go to the bank and deposit the cheque. The evidence shows that the applicant was shown the Release earlier in the day on November 26, 2010 but signed it later in the day when Mr. Wells brought the cheque. The applicant insisted that the deposit cheque be brought that day. Ms. Barabash drove the applicant to her bank so that she could cash the cheque immediately. The evidence shows that the applicant was eager to get the purchase money and close the deal as quickly as possible.
43I have considered the totality of the evidence and, in my view, the evidence does not show that the applicant had no realistic alternative but to sign the Mutual Release because of emotional or psychological pressure. The applicant contacted her lawyer on November 29, 2010 to let him know that the respondent had purchased her home. She did not raise any concerns about the sale or documents signed.
44Counsel for the applicant also suggested that the Mutual Release is defective because the contents could have fit on one page but two pages were used. Further, the signatures appeared on the second page and the first page was not signed or initialled such that there is no way of being sure that the first page was in fact the one put in front of the applicant. I do not find any merit in this argument. Ms. Irvine testified that she created the document and it is the one she sent for signature by the applicant. The evidence does not support a finding that the Mutual Release document tendered into evidence is not the same document signed by the applicant.
45I find that the Mutual Release is valid and that the applicant is bound by it. As such, any portion of the Application related to the purchase of the applicant’s home by the respondent is barred by the Mutual Release. It would be an abuse of process for the applicant to accept the consideration and then refuse to comply with the plain and simple language of the Mutual Release which clearly released the respondent from any claims related to its purchase of the home. However, the Application contains allegations unrelated to the sale of the home; these allegations may stand, provided they are timely.
TIMELINESS
46The applicant ceased being a resident at Oakridge effective November 30, 2010. The Application was filed December 13, 2011. The last incident referred to in the Application is dated December 21, 2010. The applicant submits that this was the last incident in a series of incidents. The respondent disputes this and states that the last incident was November 30, 2010. The December 21 incident is a phone call the applicant made to Ms. Boer inquiring about the delivery of her household items to Goodwill. As noted above, this was a request that the applicant made at the time of the sale of her home. The incident is related to the purchase of the residence by the respondent and is barred by the Mutual Release. Given my finding, I do not need to determine whether it was the last incident in a series of incidents.
47In reviewing the Application, the date of the last incident that is not related to the purchase and sale of the applicant’s home is November 4, 2010. The applicant also raises another incident which occurred “sometime in November 2010” but does not specify an exact date. I find that the last alleged incident of discrimination occurred on November 4, 2010. The applicant had one year from this date, to November 4, 2011, to file an application with the Tribunal. She did not do so until December 13, 2011. Accordingly, the Application was filed outside the statutory one year period.
48Section 34 of the Code states:
34.(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2:
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
49The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. See for example, Klein v. Toronto Zionist Council, 2009 HRTO 241. The Tribunal has repeatedly expressed the view that the mandatory one-year limitation period is consistent with the Code’s objective that human rights claims should be dealt with fairly and expeditiously.
50In order to satisfy the Tribunal that the delay was incurred in good faith, the applicant must provide a reasonable explanation as to why he or she did not pursue his or her rights under the Code in a timely manner: Corrigan v. Peterborough Victoria Northumberland and Clarington Catholic District School Board, 2008 HRTO 424; Cartier v. Northeast Mental Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 1670. Good faith is more than just the absence of bad faith. To succeed under s. 34(2) the applicant has to show she acted with all due diligence: Reid v. Ontario March of Dimes, 2009 HRTO 2207.
51The applicant’s evidence is that she did not have a copy of the documents signed at the time of the sale of her home (the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, the Mutual Release and Indenture). She contacted the respondent in January 2011 requesting that copies be sent to her. She was told that the documents would be sent; however, she did not in fact receive the documents until September 2011, when she again contacted the respondent. The applicant did not provide evidence as to what efforts, if any, she made to obtain the documents between the conversation in January and September 2011. Nor did she provide any explanation as to why she could not file an application without having these documents. Once she received the documents she felt able to begin preparing the Application. She worked on it herself for a couple months, but found it difficult being so close emotionally to the events. She sought assistance from a legal representative, whom she first contacted on November 17, 2011; they met on November 23, 2011. They met three more times over the following week until November 29, 2011. The representative believed that the December 21, 2010 incident was part of a series of events and advised that it was not necessary to rush to complete and fax the Application to the Tribunal.
52The applicant states that the delay was incurred in good faith because it was due to her disability. While the Tribunal accepts that a delay may be in good faith because of an applicant’s disability, it has consistently ruled that it requires medical evidence that the disability was so debilitating that it prevented an applicant from pursuing his or her legal rights under the Code: Dionne v. Toronto (City), 2011 HRTO 317; Reid v. Ontario March of Dimes, 2009 HRTO 2207; Downer v. Little & Jarrett, 2010 HRTO 992; and Savage v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2010 HRTO 1360.
53The applicant has not provided medical evidence that her disability was so debilitating that it prevented her from filing the Application. The only medical evidence provided was the letter dated February 6, 2013. It makes no specific reference to the applicant’s condition in 2011. It does state that the applicant’s symptoms were exacerbated and she was destabilized during problems with the land lease community in 2010. It further states that the applicant has gained stability but that she will have a permanent disability. The applicant testified that her symptoms were completely triggered between January 2011 and December 2011. Once she moved, she needed to be assigned to a new social worker which took approximately a month. She was assigned a CMHA worker some six months later. In the interim, she was under the care of her family doctor. None of these health care professionals testified nor was there any evidence from them as to the applicant’s medical state in 2011.
54The evidence does not demonstrate that the delay was incurred in good faith because of disability.
55The applicant also submitted that the delay was incurred in good faith because she relied on her legal representative’s advice that the application filing deadline was one year from the December 21, 2010 incident. I have found that the December 21, 2010 incident is barred by the Release and that the last incident of discrimination alleged in the Application is November 4, 2010. The Tribunal has decided that the fact that an applicant misconstrues the last incident of alleged discrimination is not a reasonable explanation for delay (Ferrari v. Chrysler Canada Inc., 2011 HRTO 227).
56The Tribunal has held that in certain circumstances reliance on legal advice may constitute good faith. See for example Patterson v. Mississauga (City), 2012 HRTO 598. In Patterson, the applicant sought legal advice 11 days after the last incident and relied on mistaken advice as to the application deadline filing date.
57In this case the applicant has not demonstrated that she acted with due diligence in pursuing her rights under the Code. She waited some 10 months before starting to work on the Application. I do not accept the applicant’s position that she could not have started to work on the Application without having copies of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, the Mutual Release and Indenture. This is not a situation where, upon receiving the documents, the applicant discovered a Code violation. She then waited a further two months before seeking legal assistance. She first contacted a legal representative 13 days prior to what she believed was the application filing deadline, and after the expiry of the one-year period running from November 4, 2010, which I have found to be the last incident of alleged discrimination not barred by the Mutual Release. The respondent points out that the applicant could have sought help from the Human Rights Legal Support Centre earlier, which she did not do.
58I find that the applicant has not demonstrated that the delay was incurred in good faith. Given my finding, I need not address whether the respondent would suffer substantial prejudice.
ORDER
59Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 12th day of April, 2013.
“Signed by”
Aida Gatfield
Member