S. Wilson

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual touching and making child pornography involving his partner's 11-year-old child.

The Crown sought a total sentence of 30 months, while the accused argued for 12 to 18 months and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision under s. 718.3(7) of the Criminal Code, claiming it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the Charter challenge, finding that a 30-month sentence was proportionate given the serious breach of trust and harm caused to the child.

The accused was sentenced to 18 months for sexual touching and 12 months consecutive for making child pornography.

The appellant appealed two separate convictions resulting from guilty pleas to charges including uttering death threats, criminal harassment, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

He argued that his pleas were uninformed and involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically alleging a failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his pleas and the elements of the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeals, finding the appellant's testimony lacked credibility and that he failed to establish either incompetence by his former counsel or any resulting prejudice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for committing an indecent act and mischief, arguing the trial judge erred in treating the TTC employee's identification evidence as recognition rather than eyewitness identification.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly cautioned herself on the frailties of eyewitness identification.

The court noted the witness had significant prior encounters with the appellant and that the identification was corroborated by circumstantial evidence found upon arrest.

The appellant appealed two sentences imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, arguing that the sentencing judges should have imposed nominal fines to reduce the mandatory Victim Fine Surcharge (VFS).

In one case, the judge imposed a sentence of custody, probation, and a nominal fine, which the Crown conceded was an illegal sentence under s. 731(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the use of nominal fines solely to circumvent the mandatory VFS is impermissible and distorts the sentencing process.

The appeal against the first sentence was allowed to the extent that the nominal fines were quashed, leaving the custody and probation intact.

The appeal against the second sentence, where the judge declined to impose a nominal fine, was dismissed.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to assist with an appeal of a criminal harassment conviction after Legal Aid declined coverage.

The court considered whether the interests of justice required appointment of counsel and whether the applicant lacked sufficient means to retain counsel.

Although the applicant was a trained paralegal with experience representing himself and others in court, the proposed appeal raised complex issues concerning the appointment and selection of counsel under s. 486.3 of the Criminal Code and the accused’s right to counsel of choice.

The court held that the appeal presented an arguable issue involving trial fairness and due process that warranted appellate consideration.

Given the complexity and significance of the issue, appointment of counsel was found desirable in the interests of justice.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from a stabbing during a fistfight, the defence sought to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified he did not bring the knife and did not intentionally stab the victim.

The trial judge ruled there was no air of reality to self-defence under s. 34(2) or s. 37 of the Criminal Code, as the accused's evidence of an accidental stabbing negated the requirement of an intentional act committed for self-preservation.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits.

The insurer later sought to vary or revoke the benefits, alleging the applicant fraudulently misrepresented his employment.

The applicant brought a motion to dismiss the variation application or exclude evidence, arguing the insurer breached its duty of good faith and the applicant's privacy by sharing information between its tort and accident benefits departments.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding that the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act permitted the collection of information and that the applicant had authorized the insurer to verify his employment information.

No breach of privacy was established.