S. Egan

The applicants challenged the lawfulness of a search warrant and the respondent's assertion of informant privilege over redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

After reviewing sealed materials regarding Source #2, the court upheld the privilege claim.

The applicants expanded their challenge to Source #1, alleging the source may have acted as a police agent.

The court reviewed further sealed materials and ordered an in camera, ex parte hearing to hear viva voce evidence regarding Source #1.

The applicants, charged with drug and firearms offences, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of several search warrants and production orders that stemmed from a homicide investigation.

At a preliminary stage, they sought leave to cross-examine the affiants and investigating officers, arguing that the police intentionally misled the authorizing justice by elevating one applicant to a 'suspect' without new evidence to secure a wiretap authorization.

The court granted leave to cross-examine three officers regarding the change in the applicant's suspect status, finding it could assist in determining whether police conduct subverted the preauthorization process, but denied leave to cross-examine a fourth officer whose warrants were subject only to a facial validity review.

The accused was charged with four counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking after police found cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, and marijuana in a condominium she rented.

She admitted the essential actus reus but relied on duress arising from a prolonged, violent, coercive relationship marked by threats to kill her and her family, and supported by expert evidence regarding PTSD associated with ongoing domestic violence.

Applying the common law duress framework, the court held the Crown failed to prove a safe avenue of escape or a disqualifying voluntary criminal association, and failed to disprove duress on the cocaine, fentanyl, and heroin counts.

The defence failed on the marijuana count because the accused admitted she possessed it partly for personal use and resale to clients, so the threats were not the sole reason for that offence under binding appellate authority.

During her trial for drug trafficking, the accused sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence regarding battered woman syndrome to support her defence of duress.

The Crown opposed the admission, arguing the evidence was unreliable and unnecessary.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and found the evidence relevant to whether the accused had a safe avenue of escape.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, holding that the evidence was sufficiently reliable and remained necessary to dispel myths and stereotypes about domestic violence.

The expert evidence was ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with production of MDMA and possession of Methamphetamine, Ketamine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking in connection with a clandestine Ecstasy lab.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance of the accused at the lab, his possession of a key, and notebooks found in his home containing chemical names, CAS numbers, and logos matching pill press dies found at the lab.

The accused testified and denied knowledge of the drug operation, offering alternative explanations for his notebook entries.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as not credible and found that the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs and was a party to their production.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to invalidate a search warrant and exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter on the basis that the warrant failed to specify the execution date.

The accused argued the omission rendered the warrant unconstitutional and sought exclusion of both the seized evidence and later intercepted statements alleged to flow from the unlawful search.

The court held that the absence of a specified search date was a technical irregularity that did not undermine the validity of the warrant, as the Information to Obtain and execution window clearly implied the intended search date.

No bad faith or negligence by police was found.

Even if a Charter breach had occurred, the court held the evidence would not have been excluded under the Grant framework.

The applicant sought standing to challenge the constitutional validity of a vehicle stop and the subsequent search of cell phones belonging to three other individuals.

The applicant argued he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages he had exchanged with one of the individuals, relying on previous jurisprudence.

The court rejected this argument, applying the Edwards factors to find that the applicant had no indicia of ownership or control over the phones or the text messages once sent.

The court concluded the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages on the third parties' phones and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search.