Rose Bilash

Three appeals were heard together to determine whether the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) has jurisdiction under s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act to extend the two-year limitation period for filing appeals set out in s. 56 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The Divisional Court held that s. 7 does grant the LAT jurisdiction to extend the s. 56 limitation period, as the time limit is fixed 'under an Act' (the Insurance Act).

The Court dismissed the insurers' appeals challenging the LAT's jurisdiction and its exercise of discretion to grant extensions, finding no errors of law.

In the third appeal, where the adjudicator had found no jurisdiction, the Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the LAT to consider the extension request.

Three appeals were scheduled to be heard regarding whether the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) has jurisdiction under s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act to extend the two-year limitation period for statutory accident benefits applications.

The LAT had previously made conflicting decisions on this issue and indicated it did not intend to appear.

The Divisional Court adjourned the appeals and ordered the LAT to intervene and file materials to assist the court in determining the jurisdictional issue.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.

The insurer paid income replacement benefits but denied non-earner benefits in 2004.

After income replacement benefits were terminated in 2006, the appellant sought non-earner benefits in 2009 and commenced an action in 2012.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as time-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the two-year limitation period for non-earner benefits began to run when the insurer initially refused them in 2004, even while the appellant was receiving income replacement benefits.

Following successful summary judgment in an accident benefits dispute, the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs and alternatively a personal costs order against the plaintiff's lawyer.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were warranted because the plaintiff unreasonably continued a limitation argument after binding appellate authority and advanced extreme, unfounded allegations of fraud and bad faith against the insurer.

However, the court declined to order costs against counsel personally, finding the conduct did not meet the threshold for abuse of process or comparable misconduct under the governing common law and Rule 57.07 principles.

Costs were fixed at $20,000 all inclusive on a substantial indemnity basis.