Robin D. Linley

The plaintiff commenced a 468-page statement of claim against 38 defendants, alleging that her children's autism was caused by environmental toxins and acetaminophen, and seeking billions of dollars to fund a fecal microbiota transplant program.

A motion judge dismissed the claim against most defendants under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous and vexatious, but allowed the claims against the Bayer and Johnson defendants to proceed.

The Bayer and Johnson defendants appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the plaintiff's lack of standing, the court's inability to order the requested research funding, and the numerous hallmarks of querulous litigation present in the claim.

The action was dismissed against the remaining defendants.

The defendants appealed a decision certifying an Ontario national class action and dismissing a motion to stay the action as an abuse of process due to a parallel, certified Quebec class action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The motion judge properly considered the history of the proceedings, including the defendants' failure to oppose the Quebec authorization after last-minute amendments, and reasonably concluded the Ontario action was not an abuse of process and was the preferable procedure.

The defendant manufacturer brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss claims of negligent manufacturing, failure to warn, and breach of implied warranty arising from an incident where a police officer was accidentally struck in the head by a TASER electrical weapon fired by his partner.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues were inextricably linked to the conceded trial issue of negligent design.

The court also declined to strike an affidavit sworn by plaintiffs' counsel, ruling it was admissible as 'evidence about evidence' to demonstrate the record that would be available at trial.

The appellant sought an easement over Crown lands subject to unpatented mining claims held by the respondent to build a road to a proposed mine.

The respondent refused consent, intending to build a railway on the same corridor.

The Mining and Lands Commissioner (MLC) dismissed the appellant's application to dispense with consent.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the MLC's decision unreasonable, as it misinterpreted the Mining Act by failing to apply the limitations on surface rights to unpatented claims on Crown land and improperly required the appellant to prove a public interest.

The Court substituted its own decision, dispensing with the respondent's consent, finding no evidence that the road would significantly interfere with actual or proposed mining activities on the claims.