Robert M. Isles

Following a successful motion for summary judgment dismissing the defendants' counterclaim, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the defendants' conduct to be egregious, noting they unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings by incorporating voluminous irrelevant material and re-litigating previously decided issues.

The court awarded the plaintiff substantial indemnity costs of $23,147.35 against the personal and corporate defendants.

Claims for costs against a non-party and opposing counsel personally were dismissed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud and uttering, as well as her sentence, following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

She argued that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or misapprehension of evidence in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal seeking to delete the probation order was also dismissed, with the court noting the appellant failed to apply to the sentencing judge under s. 732.2(3) of the Criminal Code for such relief.

Corporate defendants moved under Rule 19.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a noting of default and obtain leave to deliver a statement of defence in an action for unpaid accounting services.

The court considered the discretionary factors governing relief from default, including the explanation for the failure to defend, the promptness of the motion, and potential prejudice.

The evidence showed the corporate defendants did not have actual knowledge of the action due to issues with service and acted promptly once the claim came to their attention.

The court found a plausible explanation for the delay and no prejudice to the plaintiff.

In the interests of justice, the noting of default was set aside and the defendants were granted time to deliver their defence.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to enforce a second mortgage and obtain payment of funds paid into court following a power of sale.

The defendants alleged the mortgage had been fully paid through a combination of cheque and cash payments, relying primarily on internal payment spreadsheets and hearsay evidence from a bookkeeper.

The court held that the defendants failed to provide reliable proof of payment and that their evidence consisted largely of unsupported assertions.

Applying the summary judgment framework following Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Judgment was granted for the outstanding mortgage balance with interest and the plaintiff was declared entitled to surplus sale proceeds subject to set-offs.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim against a court-appointed trustee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the allegations related to the trustee's conduct in its appointed capacity and the appellant had failed to seek leave to sue as required by section 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellant appealed a series of orders, including a receiving order, made in bankruptcy proceedings against him.

He sought to adduce fresh evidence demonstrating that the bankruptcy proceedings were initiated by the petitioning creditors for an improper purpose, specifically to eliminate him as an adversary in ongoing civil litigation.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, which revealed that the appellant was solvent, that there were no amounts owing on a mortgage on his home, and that the bankruptcy was orchestrated for an improper purpose.

The appeal was allowed and all bankruptcy orders, including the receiving order, were set aside.

Two related civil appeals by spouses were heard together from a trial judgment allowing the bank's claims against them.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge's findings of fact were fully supported by the evidence and found no error of law warranting appellate intervention.

Both appeals were dismissed with costs.