Robert K. Brown

The appellants hired the respondents for a backyard renovation project with milestone payments.

After disputes and delays, the appellants terminated the contract and sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' claims, finding no fundamental breach, but awarded damages to the respondents for the balance of the contract despite the lack of a valid counterclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, noting the contract provided a juristic reason for the payments made.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the damages awarded to the respondents, as the proper party had not filed a counterclaim.

The defendants were successful in having the plaintiff's Statement of Claim struck without leave to amend.

The two groups of defendants sought costs totaling over $41,000.

The court found that the plaintiff could not reasonably have anticipated such a high costs award at the pleadings stage.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no conduct by the plaintiff to justify it.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $10,000 for each group of defendants, for a total of $20,000.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's discretionary decision refusing to set aside a noting of default.

The motion judge had considered the appellant's failure to comply with an outstanding production order, which could prejudice the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

Furthermore, the Court held that Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply because the respondents had obtained an order to proceed under section 69 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought a determination that amendments to the Planning Act enacted through the Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009 exempted a temporary turbine component storage site from municipal planning controls.

The renewable energy developer had obtained a Renewable Energy Approval from the Ministry of the Environment for a wind power project and leased nearby land zoned for aggregate extraction to store turbine components during construction.

The municipality argued that the temporary storage property was not part of a renewable energy project and therefore required zoning and official plan amendments.

The court interpreted the statutory definitions of “renewable energy undertaking” and “renewable energy project” broadly and concluded that temporary component storage integral to construction formed part of the renewable energy undertaking.

As a result, municipal official plans and zoning bylaws did not apply under s. 62.0.2 of the Planning Act.

Following a property dispute between rural neighbours concerning the scope of a registered right-of-way, the successful applicants sought partial indemnity costs after obtaining a declaration confirming they could access their lands at any point along the right-of-way.

The respondents argued there was divided success because the applicants failed to prove a prescriptive right and contended the case was close.

The court rejected the respondents’ characterization of the dispute and found that both parties, particularly the respondents, had taken intransigent positions that prolonged the litigation.

Although the applicants were entitled to costs, the court found the time spent by counsel excessive given the narrow issues and limited attendances.

Costs were reduced and fixed at a lower amount.

The applicant property owners brought an application seeking a declaration that a 1911 right-of-way over the respondents' land permitted them vehicular access to the rear of their property.

The respondents had barricaded the access point, arguing the right-of-way was strictly for accessing the abutting railway lands.

The court found that the reference to the railway lands in the deeds was merely a boundary descriptor, not a limitation on the easement's purpose.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicants' use of the right-of-way to access their property was a reasonably necessary ancillary right to the easement.

A declaration was issued permitting the applicants' vehicular ingress and egress.