Patrick E. Hurley

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring valid a continuing power of attorney for property executed by his father in favour of the respondent, and the dismissal of a motion to consolidate the respondent's application with pending proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by treating the respondent's application as separate from the pending proceedings, which involved the same parties and raised identical issues of undue influence and suspicious circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, the application judge's decision was set aside, and the application was converted to an action and consolidated with the pending proceedings.

Following a finding of misconduct against Greg Oliver, a member and former Chair of the Stirling-Rawdon Police Services Board, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission held a penalty hearing.

The Commission found that Oliver engaged in a deliberate and persistent course of conduct that discredited and compromised the integrity of the Board and the police service, particularly through his antagonistic and disrespectful treatment of the Chief of Police.

Applying the Gardner penalty assessment factors, the Commission concluded that Oliver's lack of remorse, failure to heed advice, and fundamental misunderstanding of his role as a public steward warranted the most severe penalty.

Oliver was ordered removed from the Board.

The plaintiff moved under r. 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing its action for delay under r. 48.14.

The court reviewed the contextual approach articulated by the Court of Appeal in Scaini v. Prochnicki and considered the four Reid criteria: explanation for delay, intention to proceed to trial, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the plaintiff failed to provide a fully satisfactory explanation for lengthy litigation delay largely attributable to counsel’s inattention, the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff intended to pursue the action and brought the motion promptly once the dismissal was discovered.

The court found no significant litigation prejudice to the defendants arising from the delay.

Balancing the interests of the parties, the registrar’s dismissal order was set aside subject to a timetable and a costs award to the defendants.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission brought a motion seeking the return of allegedly privileged handwritten notes that were disclosed to the respondent, a member of a Police Services Board, in advance of a disciplinary hearing.

The Commission argued the disclosure was inadvertent.

The panel found that while it had jurisdiction to order the return of improperly disclosed documents under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, the notes in question were not protected by solicitor-client privilege.

Furthermore, even if they were privileged, the disclosure was not inadvertent because the Commission admitted it did not have a practice of vetting documents for privilege prior to disclosure.

The motion was dismissed.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission brought a motion seeking the return of allegedly privileged handwritten notes that were disclosed to the respondent, a member of a Police Services Board, in advance of a disciplinary hearing.

The Commission argued the disclosure was inadvertent.

The respondent argued the Commission lacked jurisdiction to order the return, the notes were not privileged, and any privilege was waived.

The panel found that while it had jurisdiction under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act to order the return of improperly disclosed documents, the notes in question were not privileged.

Furthermore, even if they were privileged, the disclosure was not inadvertent because the Commission had no practice of vetting documents for privilege prior to disclosure.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, a member of a police services board, brought a motion seeking the recusal of a panel member from his disciplinary hearing.

The applicant argued that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed because the panel member had previously adjudicated a disciplinary matter involving the Chief of Police, whose conduct the applicant claimed was factually connected to his own charges.

The Commission dismissed the motion, finding no material connection between the two cases that would lead a reasonable person to conclude the panel member lacked an open mind.

The prior decision involved a penalty following a guilty plea and made no findings regarding the applicant.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent landlords $29,661.70 for property damage and $3,395.70 for lost rent.

The appellants argued that the damage was caused by a tenant's disability and that the Human Rights Code protected them from liability.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the Human Rights Code does not obviate a disabled person's responsibility to pay for damage extending beyond reasonable wear and tear.

The Court upheld the property damage award but allowed the appeal regarding the loss of rent, finding that the tenant's overholding was lawful under the Tenant Protection Act.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant, a long-term employee of an insurance brokerage, was constructively dismissed when her new employer unilaterally transferred her to an office an hour away and impugned her work quality when she objected.

The trial judge awarded damages for constructive dismissal, finding an implied term that she would work in her original location.

The Divisional Court overturned this decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's decision, holding that it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the location of the workplace was an essential term of the employment contract.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly considered the conflicting evidence, inconsistencies in the complainant's statements, and adequately explained his preference for the complainant's version of events.

The appeal was dismissed.

The union filed an application for certification before the Ontario Labour Relations Board relating to employees at the appellant's chicken hatchery.

The appellant argued the employees were agricultural workers excluded from the Labour Relations Act under s. 2(b).

The union gave notice it would challenge s. 2(b) under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an administrative tribunal with the power to decide questions of law has the concomitant power to determine whether that law is constitutionally valid under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Board therefore had jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of s. 2(b) of its enabling statute.