Matthew Price

Following a trial regarding parenting and residency arrangements where the mother was granted custody, the court determined the issue of costs.

The mother sought $12,322.16, relying on an offer to settle that was more favourable to the father than the trial result.

The court found the mother was the successful party and her offer engaged the costs consequences of Rule 18(14).

However, the court exercised its discretion to 'order otherwise' due to the mother's unreasonable behaviour in denying access post-separation and moving without notice.

Considering the father's limited ability to pay and the mother's conduct, the court fixed costs at $5,000.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that a 13-year-old child was in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and requesting custody be granted to the father with access to the mother at the father's discretion.

The father and child supported the motion.

The unrepresented mother opposed it but did not file responding material.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, finding the society's evidence was replete with inadmissible hearsay that violated the trial-worthy evidentiary standard required on summary judgment motions in child protection cases.

The court found the evidentiary violations unjustly hindered the self-represented mother's legal interests and prevented the court from having confidence that the case could be justly resolved through summary judgment.

A mother sought disclosure of her children's therapy records in the context of a Status Review Application challenging a crown wardship order made without access.

The Children's Aid Society moved to dismiss the disclosure motion and to strike the mother's application as disclosing no reasonable claim.

The court dismissed the disclosure motion, finding that the children's therapy records were protected by case-specific privilege under the Wigmore test, that the children had significant privacy interests, and that the mother's request was speculative and lacked relevance to the issues before the court.

The court also struck the mother's application for failing to establish a prima facie case for material change of circumstances or to demonstrate steps taken to address the protection concerns that led to the crown wardship order.

A child protection trial concerning a young child apprehended at birth by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto.

The court found the child in need of protection under sections 37(2)(b) and 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act based on the mother's pattern of neglect, lack of insight, criminal involvement, and exposure to domestic violence, as well as the father's domestic violence history, lack of commitment to parenting, criminal record, and refusal to acknowledge protection concerns.

The court ordered the child to be made a Crown Ward without access, for the purpose of adoption by the father's sister who was already caring for the child's two older siblings.

A summary judgment motion under the Family Law Rules in a child protection proceeding.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order placing the child in the care of the father subject to Society supervision for six months.

The father and child's counsel supported the order; the mother opposed it, arguing there was a genuine issue requiring trial regarding the credibility of the parties regarding a crack cocaine incident and the issue of access.

The court found no genuine issue requiring trial and granted the summary judgment motion, placing the child in the father's care with access to the mother at the Society's discretion.

A motion was brought by S.T., the fiancée of the father of two children in child protection proceedings, seeking to be added as a party to the case and to have supervised access to the children.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought a society wardship order.

The court denied the motion to add S.T. as a party but granted supervised access to the children at the discretion of the Society.

The court found that S.T. was not a statutory party under the Child and Family Services Act and had not met the test under the Family Law Rules for discretionary party status.

The court emphasized the high level of conflict between the parties and the need to prioritize the children's best interests and stability.