Mary Anne Ducharme

The applicant father sought the return of his child to Ukraine under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful removal by the respondent mother.

The court found the removal was wrongful but dismissed the application, determining that the child was now settled in Canada (Article 12 exception) and that returning her to Ukraine posed a grave risk of physical or psychological harm due to the ongoing war (Article 13(b) exception).

The applicant father sought a step-down plan for unsupervised parenting time with his son, Jaxson, following allegations of past inappropriate conduct with another minor and his placement on the Child Abuse Register.

The respondent mother opposed, seeking fully supervised access at a centre or no access, and sole decision-making responsibility.

The court, prioritizing the child's best interests and relying on expert evidence, found the father did not pose a sexual risk to his son.

The court ordered a modified step-down plan for parenting time, contingent on the father's continued counselling, and granted the mother primary residency, deferring the decision-making responsibility issue to trial.

The applicant mother brought a motion for interim sole custody and to restrict the respondent father's access to supervised visits, citing his public anti-masking behaviour and denial of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The respondent brought a cross-motion for increased, unsupervised access.

The court found that the respondent's intentional flaunting of public health guidelines and boastful anti-masking behaviour put the children at risk.

Applying the Ribeiro framework, the court granted the applicant interim sole custody and ordered that the respondent's access be supervised to ensure compliance with COVID-19 precautions.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs after successfully compelling the respondent to close the sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent had refused to sign closing documents, citing fear of COVID-19, which the court found to be a misrepresentation and an attempt to gain litigation advantage or punish the applicant.

The court found the respondent's conduct unreasonable and in bad faith, justifying an award of full indemnity costs to the applicant.

The applicant sought an urgent motion for a temporary parenting order, alleging wrongful retention of their child by the respondent father.

The court, operating under COVID-19 emergency protocols, determined that the matter met the definition of urgency as it involved the wrongful retention of a child.

The motion was allowed to proceed, with specific procedural orders for the filing of affidavits and scheduling.

The applicant brought an urgent motion to compel the sale of the matrimonial home, allow her to sign necessary documents on the respondent's behalf, and for the respondent to vacate the property.

The respondent had refused to close the transaction, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and attempting to leverage the situation for other litigation goals.

The court found the matter urgent, rejected the respondent's arguments regarding the pandemic and his credibility, and granted all of the applicant's requested orders, including a writ of possession and police enforcement to ensure compliance and the applicant's safety.

The applicant wife sought an order extending the limitation period for an equalization claim under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

F.3, specifically regarding the respondent husband's pension.

The court granted the extension, finding that the three conditions under s. 2(8) were met: apparent grounds for relief existed, the delay was incurred in good faith despite the applicant's mental health issues and difficulties obtaining legal aid and filing documents, and the respondent did not suffer substantial prejudice beyond the mere prospect of an equalization payment.

In consolidated family-related proceedings, the court dismissed a self-represented party's attempt to overturn an earlier vexatious litigant order and, in the alternative, granted a fresh application declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The record disclosed persistent, duplicative, and abusive motions, collateral attacks on witnesses, counsel, and prior rulings, and conduct amounting to harassment and oppression.

The court held that the earlier judge had ample basis to make the order and that, in any event, the current evidentiary record independently justified the same result.

No further proceeding may be instituted or continued by the respondent without leave of a Superior Court judge.