M.

The plaintiff, Sayed Hoq, brought a motion to correct the names of "John Doe" and "Jane Doe" defendants to Lakhwant Singh and CWH Distribution Services Inc. o/a CW Henderson Distribution, respectively, in a multi-vehicle automobile accident claim.

The motion was brought under Rule 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for correction of incorrectly named parties if there is no non-compensable prejudice.

The court applied the "litigation finger" test, finding the original pleading sufficiently particular for the proposed defendants to know they were the intended targets.

Despite a six-year delay, the court found no non-compensable prejudice, dismissing arguments regarding lost records as speculative and not prejudicial to the defendants.

The motion to correct names was granted.

The parties brought a consent motion (Form 14B) seeking an order to set a six-day trial date for the week of September 21, 2020.

The court declined to grant the order, finding the issue not urgent under the Chief Justice's Notice regarding COVID-19 suspensions.

The judge emphasized the need to avoid queue-jumping for trial dates given the ongoing suspension of court matters and the court's process for re-scheduling trials, citing the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to deal with cases justly, including appropriate resource allocation.

The parties brought a consent motion (Form 14B) seeking an order to set a six-day trial date for the week of September 21, 2020.

The court declined to grant the order, finding the issue not urgent under the Chief Justice's Notice regarding COVID-19 suspensions.

The judge emphasized the need to avoid queue-jumping for trial dates given the ongoing suspension of court matters and the court's process for re-scheduling trials, citing the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to deal with cases justly, including appropriate resource allocation.

A motion brought by the respondent father to reinstate unsupervised access to two younger subject children following the suspension of such access by the child protection agency.

The court determined that while the agency had authority under the discretionary terms of the prior order to suspend access without a further court order, it would have been preferable for the agency to bring a motion.

The court found serious concerns regarding the adequacy of the father's supervision of the children, including evidence that the oldest child was caring for younger siblings while the father remained in his locked room, insufficient food in the home, and the apprehension of another child in the father's care.

The father failed to comply with multiple terms of the court order and provided no evidence of a plan to address the supervision concerns.

The motion for unsupervised access was dismissed.

The defendants, Medi-Promotions Inc. and PrintPad (2009) Inc., moved to stay the action for want of territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction and to strike the claim as an abuse of process.

Defendant Marktech Services Inc. also moved to strike portions of the Statement of Claim.

The court dismissed the motions to stay and to strike for abuse of process, finding a real and substantial connection to Ontario and that Ontario was the convenient forum.

However, the court granted the motion to strike specific portions of the Statement of Claim, including the tracing claim against Marktech and the fraudulent activities and bad faith allegations against all moving defendants, due to insufficient material facts and lack of specificity, but granted the plaintiffs leave to amend.

The defendants, Medi-Promotions Inc. and PrintPad (2009) Inc., moved to stay the action for want of territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction and to strike the claim as an abuse of process.

Defendant Marktech Services Inc. also moved to strike portions of the Statement of Claim.

The court dismissed the motions to stay and to strike for abuse of process, finding a real and substantial connection to Ontario and that Ontario was the convenient forum.

However, the court granted the motion to strike specific portions of the Statement of Claim, including the tracing claim against Marktech and the fraudulent activities and bad faith allegations against all moving defendants, due to insufficient material facts and lack of specificity, but granted the plaintiffs leave to amend.

This motion concerned the scope of documentary discovery in a defamation action.

The defendant sought to compel the plaintiff to produce documents related to prior arrests, hospitalizations, a diversion program, communications with Columbia University, and employment/health records, arguing relevance to justification and mitigation of damages.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, holding that the requested documents went beyond the narrow scope of documentary discovery permitted in defamation cases, particularly when justification is pleaded.

The court emphasized that a defendant cannot embark on a "fishing expedition" to buttress general allegations or to impugn the plaintiff's character and credibility through unrelated past incidents, especially when such incidents were not known to the defendant at the time of the alleged defamation or properly pleaded for mitigation.

This is a costs ruling following the dismissal of recusal motions brought by the Moving Parties (Sam Cosentino, Concetta Cosentino, and Cesare Cosentino).

The court rejected the Moving Parties' request to refer costs to an assessment officer, affirming that judges typically fix costs to avoid delay.

It found that the Moving Parties should have reasonably anticipated the responding defendants' participation and associated legal costs.

While the recusal motion was ill-conceived and involved a substantial record, the court determined that the Moving Parties' conduct was not egregious enough to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The court adjusted some cost claims for duplication of counsel and excluded time spent on non-party witnesses, ultimately awarding partial indemnity costs to the successful defendants.

The moving parties (Sam, Concetta, and Cesare Cosentino) sought the recusal of the case management judge, Daley RSJ, in seven related high-conflict family litigation actions, alleging bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.

They also sought a transfer of the actions from Brampton to Toronto.

The court dismissed both the recusal motions and the transfer request, finding no cogent evidence to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

The judge emphasized the higher threshold for recusal in a case management context, where close interaction and familiarity with the case are expected.

A motion was brought to set aside a registrar's order dismissing an action for delay, which was prematurely issued due to a court staff error.

The court found the registrar lacked authority to issue the dismissal order, rendering it a nullity.

Despite some delay attributable to former counsel's inadvertence and the plaintiffs' initial inaction, the court emphasized the policy bias towards hearing cases on their merits.

The defendant's claims of prejudice were not substantiated or causally linked to the plaintiffs' delay, and their passivity in addressing the dismissal order undermined their position.

The motion was granted, setting aside the dismissal order and reinstating the action with new deadlines for mediation and setting down for trial.

The defendants brought motions for security for costs against the plaintiffs in a 12-year-old action regarding water damage to commercial premises.

The court previously found the plaintiffs failed to prove impecuniosity.

The plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence demonstrating a good chance of success against any of the defendants on liability or damages, particularly given a $250,000 advance payment already made.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to post security for costs in tranches for each of the moving defendants, totaling $530,000 for the first tranche.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The court applied the four-part test from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. and found that the plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the litigation delay, failed to establish inadvertence in missing the deadline, failed to bring the motion promptly, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendants.

The motion was dismissed.