Lynda Trefler

The offender, a disbarred lawyer with a prior criminal record for fraud and similar offences in the United States, was convicted of four counts of providing unlicensed immigration advice and one count of counselling misrepresentation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's sophisticated, profit-driven scheme that preyed on vulnerable immigrants and undermined the integrity of Canada's immigration system.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years imprisonment, reduced to 5 years after applying credit for pre-sentence custody, along with full restitution orders for the victims.

The accused, an unlicensed immigration consultant, was charged with providing unauthorized immigration advice and counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

During her jury trial, she brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, arguing that her conduct did not meet the statutory definitions of 'advice', 'represent', or 'counsel'.

The court interpreted the relevant provisions, finding that 'advice' involves personalized recommendations rather than general information, and that 'counselling' requires active encouragement.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence on all counts for a properly instructed jury to potentially return guilty verdicts and dismissed the motion.

The self-represented accused, charged with unauthorized immigration consulting under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, brought pre-trial applications to quash a preferred indictment and challenge the constitutionality of s. 577 of the Criminal Code.

She argued the indictment was a nullity because the consent was signed by the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions rather than the Deputy Attorney General personally.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the issue was res judicata as it had been previously rejected by the Court of Appeal.

In the alternative, the court held that the Director of Public Prosecutions Act deems the DPP to be the Deputy Attorney General for this purpose, and that s. 577 is constitutional.

An application to quash the indictment for lack of particularity and duplicity was also dismissed.

The self-represented applicant, charged with unauthorized provision of immigration advice under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), brought pre-trial motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to prosecute her and the constitutional validity of several IRPA provisions.

The court found that the CBSA had statutory authority to investigate and prosecute the offences pursuant to s. 138(1) of the IRPA and a valid delegation of power.

The court also dismissed the division of powers argument, holding that s. 91(1) of the IRPA is a valid exercise of federal jurisdiction over immigration and criminal law, and does not improperly intrude on provincial regulation of legal professionals.

The applicant's section 7 Charter challenges based on vagueness were dismissed, with specific interpretive issues deferred to trial.

The Crown brought pre-trial applications to admit audio recordings made by clients of the accused and to admit the preliminary hearing transcript of a witness who refused to return to Canada for trial.

The court admitted the audio recordings, finding them highly probative and authentic, with minor edits to remove prejudicial material.

However, the court dismissed the application to admit the preliminary hearing transcript under s. 715 of the Criminal Code or the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that the accused's cross-examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing was unfairly restricted by Crown objections and judicial rulings, depriving her of a full opportunity to cross-examine.

The self-represented applicant, charged with unauthorized immigration consulting and counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, brought pre-trial Charter applications challenging her arrests, the search of her office, and the Crown's disclosure.

The court found that the CBSA officers had reasonable and probable grounds for both the initial arrest warrant and a subsequent warrantless arrest for breaching bail conditions.

The court also upheld the validity of the search warrant and found no breach of the Crown's disclosure obligations, noting that communications between Crown counsel and investigators are privileged.

All Charter applications were dismissed.

The self-represented accused brought pre-trial applications challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the Criminal Code, including Part 18, s. 523, s. 524, and s. 145(3).

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the challenges to Part 18 and the bail provisions had already been decided by another judge and were therefore res judicata, as well as moot since the preliminary inquiry had ended and the accused had been released on bail.

The challenge to s. 145(3) was also dismissed as moot because the breach of bail charges had been stayed.

The applicant, Angelina Codina, sought a stay of charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in her criminal proceedings.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial was 40 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued the applicant's motion record was deficient due to missing transcripts of prior court appearances, which are required by the province-wide Practice Direction for s. 11(b) applications.

The court found the applicant failed to discharge her obligation to file all necessary transcripts, despite being explicitly instructed by a previous judge.

Consequently, the s. 11(b) application was dismissed without prejudice, with conditions set for its renewal, including the mandatory filing of all transcripts.

The applicant, Angelina Marie Codina, sought release on bail review, arguing a material change in circumstances since her previous detention order.

The changes included the staying of her breach of recognizance charges, the Court of Appeal setting aside a habeas corpus decision for inadequate reasons, and the duration of her pre-trial custody potentially exceeding a likely sentence for her immigration offences.

The Crown opposed release, citing the seriousness of the offences, the applicant's criminal record, and the potential for consecutive sentences.

The court found that the new factors, particularly the stayed charges and the extended pre-trial custody, constituted a material change in circumstances, rendering her continued detention no longer justified.