Louis J. Crowley

The court determined costs for motions brought by the defendants and a cross-motion by the plaintiffs.

The defendants sought orders compelling the plaintiff Mr. Smith to attend medical examinations and discovery, while the plaintiffs sought orders compelling the defendants to provide documents and satisfy undertakings.

The court found the defendants largely successful on the argued issues and awarded them net costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $9,000.

The plaintiffs' request to delay payment due to impecuniosity was denied due to lack of substantiation and the need to incentivize timely litigation conduct.

The plaintiff in a personal injury action moved to strike the defendants' jury notice, arguing complexity due to chronic pain claims and potential injustice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the case was not unusually complex and that juries are capable of assessing credibility in chronic pain cases, especially with proper judicial instruction on the reality of chronic pain as established by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments that recent jury verdicts in chronic pain cases demonstrated inherent injustice or that the civil jury system was being inappropriately used by insurers.

A personal injury trial, which had been estimated to last 5-6 weeks, was declared a mistrial after 4.5 weeks due to grossly inaccurate trial duration estimates provided by counsel.

The court emphasized the critical importance of accurate estimates for the efficient administration of justice, juror experience, and access to justice for other litigants.

Despite repeated warnings and attempts to manage the schedule, the trial could not be completed within the confirmed timeframe.

The judge found that the pace of the trial, coupled with counsel's shifting strategies and "desperation" to conclude, made a fair and just completion impossible, necessitating the regrettable decision to declare a mistrial to prevent further waste and uphold the integrity of the justice system.

In this personal injury action, the plaintiff objected to the admissibility of defence surveillance video as substantive evidence during an ongoing civil jury trial.

The plaintiff argued that the video had low probative value, was potentially prejudicial, and that some portions were not disclosed in a timely manner under Rule 30.09.

The court dismissed the objection, finding the surveillance video prima facie relevant to the plaintiff's condition and abilities, and that its probative value was not outweighed by prejudicial effect.

The court granted leave for late disclosure under Rule 30.09, noting ample opportunity for review.

The ruling allowed the defendants to tender the video as substantive evidence, subject to specific qualifications regarding the exclusion of overly intrusive or misleading segments and directions on presentation to the jury.

The plaintiff in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident brought a preliminary motion to exclude photographs of vehicle damage at trial.

The plaintiff argued the photographs were irrelevant since liability was admitted, and that admitting them without expert biomechanical evidence would invite unguided speculation by the jury that minor vehicle damage equates to minor injury.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the photographs were relevant to causation and admissible without expert evidence, as causation is a matter of common sense.

The court noted that a jury instruction would be given to clarify that serious injuries can still result from low-impact collisions.

In a personal injury action, the plaintiff objected to the defendants' attempt to introduce evidence and arguments suggesting that the plaintiff's receipt of collateral benefits was relevant to her motivation to work and her actual disability.

The court sustained the plaintiff's objection, ruling that such considerations were speculative and lacked relevance to the determination of disability.

The decision emphasized that while collateral benefits are relevant for calculating offsets, they should not be used to imply a lack of motivation to work or to undermine claims of disability.

In a personal injury action, the defendants objected to the plaintiff's proposed witness sequence, which intended to call a physiotherapist, Gloria Gilbert, as the first witness, followed by the plaintiff.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff should testify first to provide context for her subjective chronic pain claims.

The court dismissed the defendants' objection, allowing the plaintiff to call Ms. Gilbert first, provided the plaintiff excluded herself from the courtroom during Ms. Gilbert's testimony.

The court emphasized a litigant's right to present their case as counsel deems advisable, finding no compelling reason to interfere with the modest deviation from usual practice, especially since Ms. Gilbert was presented as a "participating expert" whose testimony would not inherently depend on the plaintiff's prior evidence.

The defendants brought a motion seeking orders to compel the plaintiff, Mr. Smith, to attend a defence vocational assessment and a further oral discovery examination.

The plaintiffs opposed these requests and brought a cross-motion for document disclosure and undertakings.

The court granted the defendants' requests, finding that a vocational assessment was necessary for a fair comparison with the plaintiff's expert, and a further discovery was warranted due to the plaintiffs' belatedly disclosed theory of causation linking a second hand injury to the first.

The court also addressed the application of Rule 48.04, granting leave for the motion to proceed, and reserved on costs.

The appellant, a lawyer, sought payment of a 15 percent referral fee from the respondent lawyer in relation to a personal injury judgment obtained for a client whom the appellant had referred.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the appellant's action.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the respondent breached contractual obligations of good faith by failing to obtain the client's consent to the referral fee at the time of retainer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the referral fee arrangement did not comply with Rule 2.08(7) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires that referral fees be reasonable, not increase the total fee to the client, and that the client be informed and consent.

The client did not consent to the amount claimed and would only consent to a lesser amount, which was paid and found reasonable.