Jessica Koper

The applicant, an elected school trustee, sought judicial review of two Board decisions finding she breached the Trustees' Code of Conduct by disclosing confidential information and imposing 90-day meeting suspensions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications to quash the decisions, finding no breach of procedural fairness, no reasonable apprehension of bias, no Charter violations, and that the decisions were reasonable.

However, the court found the 90-day sanctions unreasonable as they appeared to rely on a new statutory regime not yet applicable, and varied the sanctions to the 38 days already served.

The applicant, a former teacher, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision staying her human rights application as an abuse of process.

The applicant had previously pursued grievances through her union, which involved extensive arbitration hearings where unfavourable medical evidence was presented, before the union withdrew the grievances.

The Divisional Court found that the HRTO Vice-Chair reasonably concluded the applicant was engaged in forum shopping and that allowing the HRTO application to proceed would be an abuse of process.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The respondent, Colin Jones, moved to consolidate an estate application commenced in Toronto with a related application commenced in Guelph, and to transfer the Toronto application to Guelph.

The applicant, Brian Jones, opposed the transfer, arguing the matter should remain in Toronto to benefit from the Toronto Estates List's mandatory mediation and case management.

The court granted the motion to consolidate and transfer the proceedings to Guelph, finding that Guelph had a much stronger connection to the parties and the estate assets.

However, the court imposed a condition requiring the parties to attend mandatory mediation.

The applicant sought an order requiring the respondent school board to consent to the assignment of a 99-year parking lot licence to a prospective purchaser of the applicant's property.

The respondent refused, arguing the agreement was effectively a lease that violated the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act.

The court found the agreement was a valid licence, not a lease, and fell within the exception in s. 50(9) of the Planning Act for structures.

The application was allowed, and the respondent was ordered to consent to the assignment.