Jennifer Mealey

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application regarding a six-year-old child who had been apprehended at birth and placed with his paternal grandmother.

The mother and the paternal grandmother both sought custody.

The court applied the two-part test for status reviews, finding that the child would still be in need of protection if returned to the mother due to her unresolved mental health and substance abuse issues.

Applying the best interests of the child factors, the court noted the child's strong attachment to the paternal grandmother, who had cared for him throughout his treatment for leukemia, and the disruption a move to the mother's home in Alberta would cause.

The court granted a deemed custody order to the paternal grandmother.

The respondent mother in a child protection proceeding brought a motion to strike portions of the society's and paternal grandmother's trial affidavits, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay and non-expert opinion.

Before the motion was heard, the society and grandmother served revised affidavits removing some of the objectionable content.

Because the mother did not identify which parts of the revised affidavits she still objected to, the court dismissed the motion.

However, the court awarded the mother $1 in costs against the society, finding that the society acted unreasonably by including clearly inadmissible hearsay in its initial affidavits.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to strike affidavit evidence filed by the Children's Aid Society on a summary judgment motion.

The father argued that under recent appellate jurisprudence, the court was required to automatically vet and excise non-trial-worthy evidence before responding parties filed their materials.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the responsibility remains on the parties to file trial-worthy evidence and to raise specific objections via a motion to strike, rather than imposing an automatic initial vetting process on the court.

Child protection appeal from summary judgment orders making two children Crown wards and terminating access.

The appeal court found procedural unfairness only in relation to the access component, given the manner in which access had been argued and the wording of the orders, but rejected all challenges to Crown wardship, kin placement alternatives, and the refusal to direct a trial.

Applying the summary judgment framework and the statutory test under s. 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on access and that the evidence, including fresh evidence, did not establish a beneficial and meaningful relationship or show that access would not impair adoption.

The appeal was therefore allowed only to set aside the access paragraphs and replace them with an order dismissing the access claims and terminating prior access orders.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a newborn child at birth and sought a temporary care and custody order placing the child with the paternal grandmother.

The parents sought the return of the child.

The court found that while the society met the test under s. 51(3) of the Child and Family Services Act with respect to the mother due to her history of alcohol abuse and other concerns, it failed to meet the test with respect to the father.

The court ordered the child returned to the father's care and custody, subject to a supervision order with conditions, including that the mother not have unsupervised access.