E. Mehrabi

The plaintiff sought costs of $7,500 on a partial indemnity scale following a motion by the defendants for leave to amend their defence and a cross-motion by the plaintiff to strike paragraphs.

The defendants argued that success was divided and parties should bear their own costs.

The court found the plaintiff was substantially successful, as every disputed paragraph was struck in whole or in part, necessitating substantial amendments by the defendants.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $6,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial arising from an intimate relationship involving sex trade activity, drug use, assault allegations, and probation breaches, the court applied the W.D. framework to assess conflicting testimony from the complainant and the accused.

The court rejected the defence request for a Vetrovec caution and held that no similar fact application was required because the assault evidence formed part of the alleged pattern of control, direction or influence relevant to the prostitution-related counts.

The accused was acquitted of sexual assault, exploitation, and procuring, but convicted of receiving a material benefit from sexual services, one assault limited to the hallway incident on February 4, 2018, and three breach of probation counts based on guilty pleas.

The court held that the parties were not in a legitimate living arrangement under s. 286.2(4)(a), characterizing the relationship as parasitic for purposes of the material benefit offence.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to amend their Statement of Defence and add a Counterclaim in an action arising from an aborted real estate transaction.

The plaintiff opposed the amendments and brought a cross-motion to strike portions of the pleadings, arguing they were improperly pleaded, irrelevant, or disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court struck references to settlement privilege without leave to amend.

The court also struck the defendants' claims of bad faith and mental distress with leave to amend, finding they lacked sufficient clarity, precision, and material facts to allow the plaintiff to know the case it had to meet.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and human trafficking offences, sought disclosure of police occurrence reports and statements related to four prior incidents the Crown intended to introduce as similar-fact evidence.

The Crown argued the materials were 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code, requiring the accused to bring a production application under s. 278.3.

The court held that because the Crown intended to use the evidence as part of its case, it was constitutionally obligated under Stinchcombe to disclose the materials without requiring a production application.

The defendant brought a motion seeking to compel the plaintiff to deliver particulars, comply with a request to inspect documents, deliver a further and better affidavit of documents, re-attend an examination for discovery to answer a refusal regarding damages, and amend its statement of claim.

The court found divided success.

The demand for particulars was dismissed as procedurally improper after discoveries.

The request to inspect documents and the request for a further and better affidavit of documents were partially granted, requiring production of certain trademark and financial documents but not proprietary recipes or broad tax/banking records.

The plaintiff was ordered to re-attend discovery to answer questions on damages, deferred for 60 days.

The request to compel amendment of the statement of claim was dismissed.

No costs were awarded.

The Federal Crown and a court-appointed Receiver applied to vary a forfeiture order that required the destruction of seized electronic devices and documents, as the CRA and the Receiver sought access to them for ongoing investigations into an illegal pyramid scheme.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction to use certiorari to set aside the destruction order made under s. 490.1(1) of the Criminal Code because a statutory right of appeal to the Court of Appeal existed.

However, the court granted the Receiver's application under s. 490.5, declaring its interest unaffected and suspending the destruction order, and allowed the appeal to set aside the destruction order made under s. 490(9).