Duncan M. MacFarlane Q.C.

This costs decision followed a trial in which the plaintiff recovered judgment against one defendant for unpaid invoices arising from labour and materials supplied to convert industrial premises into a licensed cannabis-growing facility.

The court considered whether the plaintiff's recoverable costs against the unsuccessful defendant should include a contribution toward the costs payable to the owner defendant and related disbursements incurred when the plaintiff had also proceeded against that owner.

Applying the general principles that costs follow the event and must be fair and reasonable, the court held the plaintiff had acted reasonably in suing the owner to protect its position and that those additional costs were caused by the unsuccessful defendant's unjustified refusal to pay the invoices.

Costs were fixed at $58,035.21 payable by the unsuccessful defendant to the plaintiff, and at $14,214.48 payable by the plaintiff to the owner defendant.

The respondent acted as an agent to assist a client in collecting insurance proceeds, agreeing to a percentage fee.

To resolve issues with clearing cheques, the appellant solicitor agreed to have the insurance cheques made payable to his firm in trust and provided an undertaking to protect the respondent's fee.

The appellants argued the undertaking applied only to a single payment and was given on behalf of the client, not personally.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the undertaking extended to future payments and was a personal promise of the solicitor, dismissing the appeal.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing that the receiver conducted an improvident sale of hydrofoil vessels.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants presented no substantial evidence to support their defence and merely criticized the receiver's marketing efforts.

The court held that summary judgment was appropriate as there were no facts in dispute and the issue of an improvident sale was a question of law.