Derek Zulianello

Following a successful wrongful dismissal action under the simplified procedure, the plaintiff sought costs of over $100,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued the claimed costs were disproportionate to the $98,576 damages awarded and the simplified procedure limits.

The court found the plaintiff's counsel's hours and rates unreasonable for a straightforward wrongful dismissal action.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $55,000 for fees and $9,000 for disbursements, plus HST.

The self-represented applicant objected to the form and content of a draft order reflecting a previous panel decision, arguing that the costs were unreasonable, seeking a grace period for payment, and disputing the interest rate.

The court dismissed the objections, noting that the quantum of costs had already been decided, the panel did not grant a deferral, and the 2.0% post-judgment interest rate was correct under the Courts of Justice Act.

The draft order was approved as to form and content.

The applicant sought judicial review of three decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing her application against her former employer for alleged discrimination in denying her tenure and terminating her employment.

The Tribunal had directed the matter to a preliminary and summary hearing, ultimately dismissing the claims for delay and for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's procedures were fair and its decisions were reasonable.

The court declined to consider new Charter and negligence claims raised for the first time on judicial review.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking to vacate a scheduling order for the defendants' motion to strike, and seeking leave to amend his statement of claim.

The plaintiff had previously delivered an email abandoning an earlier motion but argued it was not abandoned because he did not file the notice.

The court held that Rule 37.09(1) only requires delivery, not filing, of a notice of abandonment, and alternatively, the motion was deemed abandoned under Rule 37.09(2) because the plaintiff failed to appear.

The plaintiff's current motion was dismissed as an abuse of process because he failed to provide a draft of the proposed amended pleading and had previously refused to attend the scheduling hearing he now sought to vacate.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent leave to examine a hostile, out-of-jurisdiction witness before trial pursuant to Rule 36.01(2).

The motions judge had ordered the examination to be videotaped but denied further conditions.

The Divisional Court agreed the examination was warranted but allowed the appeal in part, ordering that a judge be present during the examination to resolve anticipated objections and privilege issues given the witness's hostility.

The respondent was successful on appeal and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $9,458.72.

The appellant challenged the amount based on proportionality.

The Divisional Court fixed costs at $6,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, noting the appeal was not complicated and took half a day to argue.

The appellant law firm appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for unpaid forensic accounting services rendered by the respondent consulting firm.

The services were requested by a partner of the law firm who subsequently died.

The appellant argued that under s. 13 of the Evidence Act, the respondent's evidence regarding the retainer required corroboration because the partner was deceased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory protection of s. 13 applies only to heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators, or assigns, and cannot be extended to a law firm partnership.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision that allowed a former employee to pursue a pay equity complaint despite having signed a full and final release upon termination.

The Divisional Court (majority) quashed the Tribunal's decision, holding that the release was a binding contract that barred the complaint, and the Tribunal's interpretation to the contrary was incorrect.

A dissenting opinion would have dismissed the application, emphasizing the systemic and proactive nature of the Pay Equity Act and the Tribunal's specialized jurisdiction.