D. John Kirby

This standalone costs decision followed reasons continuing an interim injunction and certificate of pending litigation until trial.

The successful moving parties sought partial indemnity costs and disbursements, while the responding parties argued costs should be in the cause or reduced.

Applying the ordinary rule that costs follow the result and the discretion applicable to interlocutory injunction proceedings, the court fixed costs itself rather than reserving all costs to trial.

The court found the moving parties were largely successful and awarded reduced partial indemnity costs plus limited disbursements, while reserving transcript-cost issues to the trial judge.

The applicant brought a motion to increase interim spousal support, seeking to impute over $1.8 million in corporate income to the respondent following a corporate reorganization.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to compel the applicant to approve the valuation reports of a jointly retained expert.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no material change in circumstances and preferring the joint expert's preliminary view that a promissory note from the reorganization was not available income.

The court also dismissed the respondent's motion to compel approval but provided directions for finalizing the expert reports.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an unreported order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As neither party filed costs outlines, no costs were ordered.

The respondent husband brought a motion to sever the divorce from corollary relief.

The applicant wife opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion requiring the respondent to pay the upfront costs of an updated joint expert income report.

The court dismissed the motion to sever, finding the respondent failed to prove the applicant would not be prejudiced regarding health benefits and noting the respondent's failure to comply with financial disclosure orders.

The court granted the applicant's cross-motion, ordering the respondent to fund the expert report upfront, subject to equalization.

No costs were awarded due to the applicant's counsel failing to follow court directions regarding written submissions.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Desotti J. dated July 30, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As agreed by the parties, costs were awarded to the responding party in the amount of $2,200.

In a family property trial arising from a short second marriage, the court addressed equalization and the applicant's claimed interest in a jointly held matrimonial home.

The central dispute concerned large insurance and sale proceeds received by the applicant shortly before marriage, most of which were unexplained by valuation day.

Applying the unconscionability analysis under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act, the court imputed $96,000 in cash assets to the applicant, adjusted the valuation approach to the matrimonial home, and reduced the amount otherwise payable to her.

The respondent was ordered to pay $27,011 within 45 days to satisfy the applicant's interest, failing which the home would be sold, and the respondent received $5,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision confirming the validity of a Trust Agreement.

She argued the agreement defeated her interests in the matrimonial home under the Family Law Act, lacked certainty of subject matter, was signed under duress, and that the trial judge was functus officio when issuing supplementary reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the property was not a matrimonial home when the agreement was executed, the trust subject matter was certain, the trial judge was not functus officio as no order had been entered, and there was no basis to interfere with the finding that duress was not established.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion by considering all relevant factors.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to provide any evidence of what his defence would have been had the adjournment been granted.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant could not enforce rights from a protocol after a collective agreement commenced, rendering his claim for a declaration for that period hypothetical.

However, the Court found that any individual contractual rights existing prior to the collective agreement were not erased.

The appeal was dismissed, but the appellant was granted leave to amend his statement of claim to confine it to the period before the collective agreement commenced.