Clay M. Powell

The appellant appealed his second degree murder conviction on the basis that the trial judge’s pre-Lifchus jury charge failed to properly distinguish proof beyond a reasonable doubt from proof on a balance of probabilities.

Applying the substantial compliance approach from post-Lifchus Supreme Court authorities, the court held that the charge, read as a whole and in the context of the full trial, adequately conveyed the very high criminal standard of proof.

The court found no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the burden or standard of proof and no serious concern about the validity of the verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, including the 12-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed a conviction for second degree murder following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on intent and on the cumulative effect of intoxication, provocation, and excessive force in self-defence.

The charge improperly compartmentalized the defences and referred to them as alternative defences, creating a risk that the jury would not appreciate their combined effect.

The court was not satisfied that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The accused was charged with the murder of his estranged wife.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal because the forensic evidence failed to establish definitively that the deceased had died from foul play, creating a gap in the evidence regarding causation.

The Court of Appeal set aside the directed verdict and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of motive, opportunity, and premature knowledge of the manner of death from which a properly instructed jury could infer guilt, and that the trial judge erred in weighing the evidence and directing an acquittal.

The respondents were charged with defrauding two sole proprietorships through a factoring scheme involving false invoices.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, finding that sole proprietorships are not 'persons' capable of being defrauded under the Criminal Code, and refused the Crown's motion to amend the indictment due to irreparable prejudice to the defence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's refusal to amend should not be interfered with and that there was no evidence the registered owner of the proprietorships suffered any actual risk of prejudice to her economic interests.