Brian Parnega

The appellant was injured in a 1991 car accident and commenced an action in 2004.

He argued the discoverability principle postponed the limitation period until May 2002, when he realized his injuries met the threshold.

The trial judge rejected this, finding the appellant ought to have known his injuries were serious and permanent well before 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting the appellant's constant pain and inability to work, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants' farm property was destroyed by fire.

They sued the respondent volunteer firefighters and township for negligence.

The trial judge found the respondents breached a professional standard by failing to conduct an adequate size-up of the fire scene, but dismissed the action, concluding their fire attack plan was reasonable and the destruction was inevitable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's conclusions on breach and reasonableness were contradictory, and his causation analysis was materially incomplete because it relied on a theory of inevitability whose factual foundation was disproven at trial.

The appellants, operators of a group home, appealed a civil jury verdict that found them 80% liable and the Children's Aid Society 20% liable for severe frostbite injuries suffered by a developmentally challenged student who went absent without leave from his high school.

The jury found the school board 0% liable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's finding of no negligence by the school board was supported by the evidence, particularly the appellants' failure to communicate prior runaway incidents to the school.

The court found no palpable and overriding error to justify interfering with the jury's apportionment of liability.