B. Vandebeek

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 25 years, brought a faint hope application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code seeking a reduction in his parole ineligibility period.

The court conducted a judicial screening to determine if there was a reasonable prospect that a unanimous jury would reduce the period.

While acknowledging the applicant's positive institutional conduct, including education and employment, the court found that the applicant lacked true remorse and insight, minimizing his role in the callous murder over a $30 drug debt.

The court also noted recent concerning institutional misconduct and the fact that the applicant would be deported upon release without Parole Board supervision.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of two counts of aggravated assault as a party to a planned shooting in downtown St. Catharines that injured the intended target and five innocent bystanders.

The Crown sought a 15-year sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, finding the offender's moral blameworthiness high despite his non-shooter status.

After applying the Bellissimo range, considering mitigating factors, and applying credits for totality, Duncan, and Summers, the court imposed a net sentence of 5 years in a federal penitentiary.

During a trial for first degree murder, the defence applied to exclude utterances made by one co-accused to a friend, arguing they were more prejudicial than probative to the other co-accused.

The Crown also sought to admit text messages extracted from the co-accused's phone.

The court ruled that the utterances were admissible, as their probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, and juries are presumed to follow instructions limiting the use of such evidence against a co-accused.

The court also ruled that the text messages were admissible, finding that the Crown had met the modest threshold for authentication under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act through direct and circumstantial evidence.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit several ante mortem statements made by the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The statements primarily concerned the accused's anger towards the deceased and the accused allegedly stealing the deceased's apartment keys.

The court applied the framework from Bradshaw and Khelawon to assess substantive reliability, using corroborative evidence where appropriate.

The court admitted the statements made to the deceased's sister, a close friend, the building superintendent, and the property manager, finding them reliable.

However, statements made to the deceased's boyfriend and another friend were excluded due to reliability concerns and unclear declarant identity.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder, the applicant co-accused brought a pre-trial motion to adduce evidence of the respondent co-accused's prior discreditable conduct through Crown witnesses.

The applicant sought to introduce this evidence to support a cutthroat defence and explain her state of mind.

The court reviewed various proposed items of evidence, ruling some admissible (such as prior violence towards the applicant and possession of a firearm) and others inadmissible (such as drug use, out-of-court statements, and speculative intimidation) based on relevance and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The Crown applied to adduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct against the accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included the accused's prior possession of a firearm, threats made against the deceased, and participation in a prior shooting incident.

The court found that the evidence was relevant and material to the issues of identity, animus, and motive.

Applying the framework for prior discreditable conduct, the court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the evidence admissible with certain edits.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, which allegedly occurred on a commercial flight while the complainant was sleeping.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately address the reliability of the complainant's evidence, improperly discounting the appellant's good character evidence, and engaging in impermissible speculation by taking judicial notice of the aircraft's seat configuration without evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of assaulting his former domestic partner.

At trial, the judge restricted the defence's cross-examination of the complainant regarding her prior sexual history and the duration of the alleged assault, citing section 276 of the Criminal Code and the twin myths.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that section 276 does not apply to common assault prosecutions and that the trial judge's restrictions materially impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after an improper question was asked of the Crown's expert, by admitting a statement he made at the hospital about having swallowed cocaine before, and by refusing an adjournment to call a defence expert on cocaine toxicity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's discretionary rulings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The trial judge's remedial instruction cured the improper expert question, the hospital statement was highly probative to the issue of duress, and the need for a defence expert should have been foreseen.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge placed undue weight on the complainant's emotional state shortly after the incident to corroborate her testimony.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court reviewed the trial judge's credibility findings and application of the W.D. framework.

The court held that the trial judge reasonably concluded the complainant's deep distress was circumstantial evidence confirming her account of the assault.

Finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for child luring involving prolonged sexually explicit internet communications with a 12-year-old victim, including inducement to create and transmit child pornography.

The court held the sentencing judge erred by discounting the impact on the victim and by failing to treat the production of child pornography and grooming conduct as significant aggravating factors.

Distinguishing prior authorities where conditional sentences were imposed in police sting operations, the court found denunciation and deterrence required incarceration in a case involving an actual child victim over many months.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and a custodial sentence of two years less a day was imposed.

The appellant appealed convictions for refusal to provide a breath sample, impaired driving, and mischief under $5,000 arising from a single‑vehicle accident and subsequent conduct in a police cruiser and breath room.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s findings regarding whether the appellant intentionally refused a breath demand and whether her emotional state constituted a reasonable excuse.

The appeal court held that insufficient consideration had been given to the brevity of the officer’s questioning and the failure to warn the appellant of the legal consequences of refusal while she was crying uncontrollably.

The conviction for refusal to provide a breath sample was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The convictions for impaired driving and mischief and the sentence imposed were affirmed.

The Crown applied for certiorari to review a preliminary hearing judge's decision discharging the accused on firearm charges.

The preliminary hearing judge found there was 'no evidence' the object used in the robbery was a firearm because it was not recovered or fired.

The Superior Court granted the application, finding the judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider circumstantial evidence, such as the complainant's testimony about the object's appearance and use, which could allow a reasonable jury to infer it was a firearm.

The matter was remitted with an order of mandamus directing committal for trial on the firearm offences.

The appellant appealed his firearm convictions, arguing that his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated.

Police officers in an unmarked van called out to the appellant on the street; he initially paused but then fled.

He was pursued, arrested, and searched, revealing a loaded handgun.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no psychological detention prior to his flight, as he did not submit to police authority.

The court further held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain him based on the totality of the circumstances, and the subsequent pat-down search was justified for officer safety.

The appeal was dismissed.