Allison MacPherson

Following conviction for sexual assault, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence.

The court held that the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence and that the offender had demonstrated a failure to control sexual impulses, a pattern of repetitive and aggressive conduct, and a likelihood of causing future injury, pain, or other evil to women and children.

Relying heavily on forensic psychiatric evidence, extensive prior offending, deviant writings, and failed prior treatment and supervision, the court found the risk of violent and sexually violent recidivism to be unmanageable.

The court further concluded there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community under the long-term offender regime, because any effective conditions would virtually replicate incarceration.

A dangerous offender designation was therefore made and an indeterminate sentence imposed.

At the close of the Crown's case in a jury trial for conspiracy to commit murder and related firearms offences, the accused moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the conspiracy count.

The accused argued there was no evidence they participated in a conspiracy to murder the complainant.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including a prior bank fraud involving the parties, cell phone communications, video surveillance of the accused acting in concert, and the coordinated ambush of the complainant.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found there was some admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could infer an agreement to murder the complainant.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

In a criminal prosecution for sexual offences against a child, the accused brought a third-party records application after the Crown inadvertently disclosed a DVD of the complainant's therapy session.

The court held that, because the disclosure was illegal and directly engaged Parliament's concern with protecting the confidential patient-therapist relationship, the DVD had to be returned and any future access determined under ss. 278.1 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the likely relevance threshold, the court found that differences between the complainant's police interviews and preliminary inquiry evidence, together with the fact of multiple therapy sessions, amounted only to speculation.

The application was dismissed and all copies of the therapy session were ordered returned to the court for sealing.

Sentencing for two counts of possession of child pornography, criminal harassment, and breach of probation arising from sexually explicit materials involving children and persistent unwanted communications causing the complainant to fear for her safety.

The court emphasized denunciation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence, particularly given the offender's prior conviction for a sexual offence against a child, the disturbing content of a lengthy journal advocating sexual activity with children, and compelling psychiatric evidence of entrenched paraphilic interests and risk.

Applying proportionality, the court held the offender could not be sentenced on the basis of future dangerousness alone, but required a substantial penitentiary-equivalent sanction.

A global effective sentence of five years was imposed, realized through ten months' imprisonment after enhanced pre-sentence credit, followed by three years' probation and multiple ancillary orders.

The accused applied to sever a five-count indictment involving sexual assault, criminal harassment, breach of probation, and two child pornography possession charges.

Applying the balancing framework from R. v. Last, the court considered prejudice to the accused, factual nexus between counts, strategic decisions about testifying, and trial efficiency.

The court found that the historical sexual assault allegation, involving a different complainant and events more than a decade earlier, lacked a legal or factual nexus to the other charges and risked significant moral prejudice if tried together.

The remaining four charges arising from events in 2012 were also severed into two separate trials to preserve the accused’s ability to testify selectively.

The court ordered three separate trials, with the sexual assault charge to be heard by a different judge.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of child pornography arising from photographs and a three‑volume journal containing images and written commentary seized during search warrants.

The accused conceded possession but argued that some materials were not child pornography and that the journal fell within the judicially created private-use exception recognized in R. v. Sharpe.

The court held that several images clearly met the definition of child pornography under s. 163.1(1) of the Criminal Code and that significant portions of the journal advocated or counselled sexual activity with persons under eighteen.

The Sharpe private-use exception did not apply because the journal incorporated pornographic images sourced from outside materials rather than being created solely by the accused.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment and breach of probation after leaving a series of unwanted, obsessive voicemails for the complainant at her workplace in 2012.

The accused and the complainant had no contact for 12 years following a previous criminal harassment charge and peace bond in 2001.

The court found that the accused's conduct constituted repeated communication that caused the complainant to reasonably fear for her safety.

The court also found the accused possessed the requisite mens rea of recklessness, as he subjectively appreciated the risk his conduct posed but persisted anyway.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The offender, a repeat firearms offender with an extensive criminal record, was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a lifetime weapons prohibition order for the fifth time.

The Crown sought a 20-year sentence, while the defence argued for 7 to 8 years.

The court found that the offender's repeated failure to abide by firearms laws and prior lenient sentences meant rehabilitation was not a significant factor, prioritizing specific deterrence and public protection.

The court imposed a total sentence of 11.5 years, consisting of 9 years for the firearms possession and a consecutive 2.5 years for breaching the prohibition order, reduced to 7.5 years net after granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was sentenced after jury convictions for making child pornography available, counselling a fourteen-year-old complainant to make child pornography, and communicating with the complainant for that purpose; the possession count was stayed under the rule against multiple convictions.

The sentencing judge emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives in child pornography cases, while also considering the offender's lack of record, family support, remorse, delayed treatment engagement, and rehabilitative prospects.

Aggravating features included the volume of child pornography, distribution of material, and online counselling of a vulnerable child to sexually exploit a four-year-old sibling.

A global penitentiary sentence of three years was imposed, less four months' credit for restrictive bail, together with SOIRA, DNA, forfeiture, prohibition, and no-contact orders.