Aaron S. Murray

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a decision finding she was not an insured person under the Schedule and therefore ineligible for benefits.

She argued the Tribunal violated procedural fairness and made errors of fact and law by relying on medical records and a Statement of Claim that did not mention a vehicle's involvement, rather than her sworn testimony.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding no breach of procedural fairness as the medical records were properly before it, and no errors of fact or law, concluding the applicant was attempting to relitigate the case.

On a motion for partial summary judgment, a defendant sought dismissal of the action against it as statute-barred under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the limitation issue was a discrete issue suitable for partial summary judgment under the governing appellate framework.

The court found that the material facts supporting a negligence claim against the moving party were known, or ought reasonably to have been known, when counsel received and reviewed the police materials, not when a later witness interview was obtained.

As the claim against the moving party was deemed commenced more than two years after that discovery date, the action against that defendant was dismissed.

The respondent insurer requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision which found that the applicant mail carrier was involved in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant was struck by a cyclist on a sidewalk while standing near her parked delivery vehicle.

The respondent argued the Tribunal made errors of fact regarding whether the applicant struck the vehicle and her location, and an error of law regarding whether a cyclist on a sidewalk was an intervening act.

The Vice-Chair dismissed the request, finding no significant errors of law or fact that would have changed the outcome of the original decision.

The applicants sought a declaration that their motor vehicle insurance policy with the respondent was valid, or alternatively, relief from forfeiture, after the respondent denied coverage following an accident involving the applicants' son.

The respondent had voided the policy because the applicants failed to disclose upon renewal that their son had obtained his G2 license and was living in the household.

The court found that the failure to disclose the son's G2 license was a material change in risk that breached the Insurance Act and Statutory Conditions, rendering the policy void.

The court also denied relief from forfeiture, holding that the failure to advise of a material change in risk constitutes non-compliance with a condition precedent, not imperfect compliance with a policy term.

The applicant, a letter carrier, was struck in the head by a cyclist while standing on the sidewalk retrieving mail from her parked work vehicle.

She applied for statutory accident benefits, which the insurer denied on the basis that the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under section 3(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's body made contact with the vehicle after being struck by the cyclist.

Applying the Amos and Greenhalgh tests, the Tribunal concluded that the purpose test was met as the applicant was engaged in an ordinary activity attached to a vehicle.

The causation test was also met because the use and operation of the vehicle was a direct cause of the injuries, and the cyclist was not an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The Tribunal ordered that the incident was an accident.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing a motor vehicle personal injury action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that discoverability could not be fairly determined on the paper record because the issue was intertwined with the plaintiff's actual pain, dysfunction, medical advice, and when a reasonable person would have known a tort action was an appropriate means to seek a remedy.

Applying the summary judgment framework and discoverability principles in the motor vehicle threshold context, the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and suffered a brain impairment.

His initial Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) was 3 out of 15, but improved to 14 out of 15 shortly after arriving at the hospital.

The trial judge ruled that the appellant did not suffer a catastrophic impairment because his GCS scores improved.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of catastrophic impairment under O. Reg. 461/96 only requires a single GCS score of 9 or less within a reasonable time following the accident, provided there is a brain impairment.

The fact that subsequent scores were higher is irrelevant.

The parties reached a settlement prior to the disposition of the appeal.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as abandoned.