Larry Douglas

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment seeking rectification of two mortgages registered against the defendants' abutting properties to comply with the Planning Act, as well as possession of the properties.

The defendants had defaulted on the loan and entered bankruptcy.

The court found that the parties had a common continuing intention to mortgage both properties as security for the loan, and that the failure to cross-reference the mortgages was a mistake.

The court granted rectification, deemed the notices of sale sufficient, and granted judgment for possession.

The plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendants' counterclaim was dismissed without prejudice as the counterclaim remained stayed under Rule 11 due to the bankruptcy.

The accused applied for release following a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code after remaining in custody following a denied bail hearing.

The Crown argued that the court could only conduct a detention review under s. 515(10) where unreasonable delay in the proceedings had first been established.

The court rejected that interpretation and held that s. 525 allows the reviewing judge to consider whether continued detention is justified even absent proven delay.

The accused presented a new release plan involving supervision by her parents and participation in treatment for substance abuse.

The court concluded that continued detention was not justified and ordered release on strict conditions.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while disqualified under s. 259(4) of the Criminal Code after riding an electric power‑assisted bicycle while subject to a court‑ordered driving prohibition.

The court considered whether an e‑bike constitutes a “motor vehicle” within the Criminal Code definition and whether the accused could rely on officially induced error or lack of mens rea based on police encounters, advice from a salesperson, and his own research.

The court held that an e‑bike propelled by battery power is a vehicle propelled by means other than muscular power and therefore qualifies as a motor vehicle under the Criminal Code.

The evidence did not establish that police conduct induced the accused to believe his conduct was lawful, nor that he lacked the requisite intent.

The accused was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while disqualified.

The applicants brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of cocaine evidence following a traffic stop and subsequent searches.

The court found that the passenger was psychologically detained when police requested identification and that using the passenger’s health card to conduct a CPIC check breached s. 8 of the Charter.

Although a protective pat‑down search was justified for officer safety, opening a cigarette package discovered during the search exceeded the lawful scope and constituted an unreasonable search.

The court also found there were no reasonable grounds to arrest the driver for possession based solely on cocaine found on the passenger.

However, the vehicle search that uncovered a larger quantity of cocaine was justified as a lawful inventory search following mandatory vehicle impoundment under the Highway Traffic Act, and the evidence was therefore admissible.

The accused, a husband and wife, were charged with defrauding Human Resources Development Canada of over $70,000 in Canada Pension Plan disability benefits.

The Crown alleged they failed to report the husband's return to self-employment and subsequent employment after he suffered a catastrophic injury in 1998.

The court found that the wife, who signed the initial application while under severe stress, did not have the requisite intent to commit fraud.

The court also found that the husband, whose business operated at a loss and who had limited understanding of the reporting requirements, lacked the subjective awareness required for the mens rea of fraud.

Both accused were acquitted.