K. Normandin

The Applicant sought an order for the partition and sale of the matrimonial home and distribution of its contents.

The Respondent opposed the sale and filed a cross-motion to amend his pleadings to include a claim for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The court affirmed the Applicant's prima facie right to sale, finding that the Respondent failed to establish a prima facie case for a competing interest, such as exclusive possession, under the Family Law Act.

The Respondent's arguments regarding his health, financial vulnerability, and the stability of an adult child were not persuasive enough to defeat the sale.

The court ordered the sale of the matrimonial home and allowed the Respondent to amend his pleadings, but with costs payable to the Applicant.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking the recusal of the case management judge, alleging bias.

The judge had previously found the father engaged in severe parental alienation and ordered reintegration therapy, which the father repeatedly delayed and undermined.

Following a Divisional Court ruling that stayed other contested motions pending the recusal motion, the judge voluntarily withdrew from the case.

The judge issued a lengthy endorsement detailing the father's history of alienation, deception, and manipulation, explaining that his withdrawal was necessary to prevent the father from using the recusal motion to further delay proceedings and harm the children.

The parties separated after a 14-year marriage with four children.

The mother sought sole custody and permission to relocate the children to Mississauga, while the father sought shared parenting.

The court granted sole custody to the mother but prohibited the relocation of the twins, emphasizing the maximum contact principle and the children's established ties in Sudbury.

The court imputed additional income to the father for child and spousal support purposes.

The mother's claim for a constructive trust over the father's pension, which survived his bankruptcy, was denied because the bankruptcy statute provided a juristic reason for the enrichment.

However, the court ordered the father to pay periodic spousal support upon his retirement to account for the pension's value.