Justine Louise Erickson

Just Energy Group Inc. and its affiliates sought an initial order for protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) due to a severe liquidity crisis.

This crisis stemmed from unprecedented and controversial price increases imposed by Texas regulators (ERCOT and PUCT) following an extreme winter storm.

The court granted a 10-day stay of proceedings, approved a $125 million debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, stayed regulatory actions in Canada and the U.S., authorized charges for essential suppliers, and stayed set-off rights.

The court also approved administrative and directors and officers charges.

However, the request for third-quarter bonus payments was denied for the initial order, to be reconsidered at a later hearing.

The accused applied to exclude statements made to police following the execution of a high-risk search warrant for firearms.

Officers entered the apartment with a forced entry and distraction device, pointed firearms at the accused, restrained him with zip ties, and questioned him within approximately one minute of entry without first administering a police caution.

The court considered whether the statements were voluntary under the common law confessions rule and the accused’s right to silence.

Given the highly coercive circumstances, the accused’s state of stress, the absence of a caution, and the fact that the answers were given in response to police questioning while the accused was detained and restrained at gunpoint, the court found a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness.

The statements were therefore excluded from evidence at trial.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis of a 38.5‑month delay between arrest and the commencement of trial on firearms possession charges.

The case arose out of a large-scale police investigation involving numerous accused, extensive disclosure, and a lengthy preliminary inquiry.

Applying the Morin framework, the court categorized most of the delay as inherent to the complexity of the prosecution and the multi‑accused preliminary inquiry, with a later portion attributable to institutional delay.

The court also considered that the accused had not sought severance or earlier trial dates and had agreed to scheduling decisions that contributed to the timeline.

Balancing the reasons for delay and the limited demonstrated prejudice, the court concluded that the delay did not amount to a breach of s. 11(b).