Justice S. W. Konyer

The offender was convicted of sexual interference involving a five-year-old child.

The Crown sought the maximum summary conviction sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought 12 to 15 months, citing the offender's cognitive deficits.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse, finding that the offender's breach of trust and the victim's young age were significant aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, failing to provide a suitable breath sample, failing to surrender a valid insurance card, driving with liquor readily available, and speeding.

The accused pled guilty to the liquor and speeding charges.

On the remaining charges, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused's impairment was caused by alcohol rather than fatigue and head injury; that the accused intentionally failed to provide a breath sample, as the qualified technician failed to provide proper instructions or demonstration and prematurely terminated multiple attempts; and that the accused failed to exercise due diligence regarding the insurance card, as he reasonably believed he had provided a valid card and was never given an opportunity to correct the error.

The accused was acquitted on all charges except those to which he pled guilty.

The accused applied for a Rowbotham order seeking Crown funding for legal representation, arguing that he was indigent, ineligible for legal aid, and that his right to a fair trial would be materially compromised if unrepresented.

The charge involved an indecent assault on a minor alleged to have occurred between 1979 and 1982.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the charge was serious, the central issues at trial would revolve around credibility assessments, which are within the capability of a self-represented accused of average education and intelligence.

The court noted that appointed counsel would be available to cross-examine the complainant and bring necessary pre-trial applications, and that the trial judge would provide reasonable assistance throughout the proceedings.

The Crown sought to vacate preliminary inquiries in five cases on the basis that amendments to the Criminal Code contained in Bill C-75, which came into force on September 19, 2019, retrospectively eliminated the right to a preliminary inquiry for offences punishable by less than 14 years imprisonment.

The accused had all elected to be tried by judge and jury and requested preliminary inquiries before the amendments came into force, but the inquiries had not been completed by the effective date.

The court held that the amendments do not apply retrospectively because they affect substantive rights and vested rights of the accused.

The preliminary inquiry is a substantive right that protects accused persons from exposure to unwarranted public trials.

The Crown's application was dismissed.

The defendant was sentenced for two counts of breaching a section 161 prohibition order under the Criminal Code.

The defendant had previously been convicted of sexual interference against his stepson and was subject to a prohibition order restricting contact with persons under 16 years of age.

The defendant breached this order on two occasions by being alone with children without an approved adult present.

The Crown sought consecutive jail sentences totaling 12 months, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 9 to 12 months.

The court imposed consecutive conditional sentences of 6 months each for a total of 12 months, followed by 3 years of probation, finding that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the lower end seriousness of the breaches, the defendant's rehabilitation efforts, and the low risk of reoffending when conditions were imposed.

The accused was convicted of being an occupant of a hotel room while knowingly permitting two 15-year-old females to use the room for acts of prostitution, contrary to section 171 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of 12 months imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence as violating section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment).

The court determined that a fit sentence without the mandatory minimum would be 60 days imprisonment followed by probation.

Finding that the 12-month mandatory minimum was grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the case, the court declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional as applied and imposed the alternative sentence.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of the trial was approximately 24 months.

The court analyzed various periods of delay to determine the net delay under the Jordan framework.

The court found that the delay caused by the accused's inability to accept earlier trial dates due to needing time to retain an expert witness constituted defence delay.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was calculated at 16 months, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials.

The court also noted that the Crown's failure to promptly initiate forensic analysis of seized devices did not justify delay above the ceiling, but since the net delay was below the ceiling, the application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with trafficking drugs and breaching probation after smuggling marijuana, hashish, and fentanyl into a correctional centre by secreting them inside his body.

At trial, the accused conceded the acts but raised the defence of duress, testifying that a gang-affiliated inmate threatened to harm him and his brother if he did not comply.

The court found an air of reality to the duress claim and concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had a safe avenue of escape.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.