P. Tamara Sugunasiri

The applicant sought to enforce a separation agreement signed in March 2016 and fix the date of separation as the date of the agreement.

The respondent challenged the validity of the agreement and argued the date of separation was July 31, 2018.

The court set aside the separation agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act because the applicant failed to disclose significant assets, specifically an impending $4 million investment in his company.

The court also found that the parties' conduct after March 2016, including living together, travelling, and attending therapy, indicated a reasonable prospect of reconciliation.

The court fixed the date of separation as July 31, 2018.

The defendants brought a motion to exclude a SPECT scan from being shown to the jury by the plaintiff's expert neurologist, arguing it was novel science and unreliable for diagnosing a mild traumatic brain injury.

The court dismissed the motion, distinguishing this case from previous decisions where SPECT scans were used as the sole diagnostic tool by a nuclear medicine specialist.

The court permitted the clinical neurologist to refer to the SPECT scan because it was used as one of many diagnostic tools to confirm a clinical diagnosis, and the nuclear medicine specialist's opinions were redacted to prevent undue influence on the jury.

The plaintiff moved to correct a misnomer in his Statement of Claim by substituting 2090990 Ontario Inc. (Cezanne Homes) for the unnamed defendant 'XYZ Contracting Corporation'.

The plaintiff alleged that renovations at his neighbours' property caused structural damage to his own property.

The court found that the plaintiff intended to sue the contractor responsible for the renovations and that Cezanne Homes, upon reading the claim, would know it was the intended defendant.

The court allowed the substitution, finding no non-compensable prejudice to the proposed defendant.

At a pre-trial for a motor vehicle accident case, the parties sought direction on how to proceed given the defendant had delivered a jury notice prior to the January 1, 2020 amendments to Rule 76.

The Master held that the new Rule 76 and section 108 of the Courts of Justice Act prohibit jury trials in simplified procedure actions.

Consequently, actions with pre-2020 jury notices must be converted to the ordinary procedure to preserve the right to a jury trial.

The defendant moved for security for costs against the plaintiff, a Quebec holding company that acquired the claim via assignment from a bankrupt subcontractor.

Although the plaintiff demonstrated it had sufficient cash assets in Quebec (a reciprocating jurisdiction), the court ordered it to post $30,000 in security.

The court found that the overall justice of the case favoured an order because the plaintiff's assets were contingent on litigation success, the funds were essentially treated as the principal's personal property, and the plaintiff would suffer no prejudice from posting security.

The plaintiff grandmother sued her defendant grandson to recover funds she allegedly loaned him to pay estate debts and repair a home.

She brought a motion to amend her Statement of Claim to add allegations of undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages, as well as to plead evidence obtained during discovery.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it plain and obvious that the proposed amendments could not succeed because undue influence is not a stand-alone cause of action, the material facts for breach of fiduciary duty were not pleaded, and there was no independent actionable wrong to support punitive damages.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to register a certificate of pending litigation against a matrimonial home transferred by the defendant to his wife prior to a loan agreement.

The plaintiff alleged the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat creditors.

Applying the Grefford test, the court found the plaintiff established a high probability of recovering judgment on the loan, but failed to introduce sufficient evidence that the transfer was made with intent to defeat creditors, especially given the defendant's uncontroverted explanation that the transfer was for remortgaging purposes following a bankruptcy.

The balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the cross-examination of a law clerk who swore an affidavit in support of the defendants' pending motion.

The defendants raised a preliminary objection that the plaintiff's motion was unsupported by an affidavit.

The court held that the plaintiff could rely on uncontentious documents in her motion record without an affidavit.

The court also granted the motion to compel cross-examination, finding that the plaintiff had a prima facie right to cross-examine and there was no basis to interfere with it.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defence of the Hamilton Police Services Board and Chief Glenn DeCaire due to their repeated failure to comply with court orders and the Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically regarding documentary production and answering undertakings.

The Master found the defendants' conduct sufficiently egregious to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, noting potential non-compensable prejudice due to the purging of relevant documents.

The motion was granted, the defence was struck, and the defendants were given 30 days to move before a judge to reinstate it.

Substantial indemnity costs of $39,462.16 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The moving party, Toronto Hydro, sought to set aside an ex parte order extending the time for the plaintiffs to serve their statement of claim.

Toronto Hydro argued that the plaintiffs failed to disclose material facts on the ex parte motion, including the expiration of the limitation period and the lack of notice to Toronto Hydro, and failed to address prejudice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that no material facts were omitted that would have impacted the original decision.

The court also held that the failure to address prejudice in the supporting affidavit was a matter for appeal, not a ground for setting aside the order under Rule 39.01(6), and that Toronto Hydro suffered no material prejudice as it had recycled the evidence itself prior to the deadline for service.

The plaintiff brought an unsuccessful motion to examine non-parties for discovery.

The non-parties sought substantial indemnity costs for successfully resisting the motion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $52,126.09, finding that the plaintiff's unyielding pursuit of the non-parties over a low-value issue was disproportionate and unnecessary.

The court held that forcing non-parties to incur significant legal costs to defend their private financial affairs justifies substantial indemnity costs in some cases, and that a total disregard for proportionality can be regarded as reprehensible conduct.

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident tort action brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend orthopaedic and neurological defence medical examinations.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the defendants were issue estopped because the Licence Appeal Tribunal had already found her to be catastrophically impaired under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The court rejected the issue estoppel argument, noting the different thresholds between SABS and tort actions and the 'firewall' between the two processes.

The court granted the orthopaedic examination as the plaintiff had put her physical condition in issue, but denied the neurological examination because the plaintiff had not claimed neurological impairment.

The defendant, The Walt Disney Company, previously brought a motion to seal excerpted provisions of agreements it intended to rely on in a stay motion.

The plaintiff successfully opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion regarding redactions.

In this endorsement, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs for the motion.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs, finding no improper conduct by the defendant to warrant a higher scale, but affirming the plaintiff's right to costs for successfully defending the open court principle and adding value to the hearing.