John Rosolak

The plaintiff was previously successful on a motion to restore her action to the trial list.

In these supplementary reasons on costs, both parties sought costs of the motion.

The Master found that the plaintiff was not entitled to costs because she had received an indulgence after waiting many months to bring the motion, and the defendants reasonably opposed it given the history of administrative dismissals.

However, the Master also declined to award costs to the unsuccessful defendants, noting that the plaintiff had satisfied the factors of delay and prejudice without deliberate misconduct.

Ultimately, no costs were awarded to either party.

The appellant brought a motion to vary a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dated June 11, 2019.

The court found that the narrow grounds upon which such a decision may be varied were not present and dismissed the motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to restore her personal injury action to the trial list after it was struck for failure to file a trial certification form.

The court found that the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, which included a change of counsel and the defendants' failure to respond to the certification form.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, as the action was largely ready for trial and the defendants had fully investigated the claim.

The motion was granted and the action was restored to the trial list.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court decision.

Due to mixed success of the parties in both the lower court and on appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the costs order from the lower court and ordered that no costs be awarded for either the proceedings in the lower court or the appeal.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order striking his statement of claim in its entirety without leave to amend.

The appellant had been charged with careless driving following a motor vehicle collision, but the charge was withdrawn.

He subsequently sued for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy.

The motion judge struck the claim as frivolous, vexatious, and disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had adequately pleaded the elements of negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy, albeit with significant scandalous and irrelevant material.

The court varied the order, striking only the scandalous portions without leave to amend while permitting the remainder to proceed with leave to amend.

The plaintiff was injured while running to board a Toronto Transit Commission bus.

Following a jury trial, the jury found the defendants were not negligent and that the plaintiff's injuries were entirely caused by his own negligence in running to catch the bus and failing to anticipate the doors closing.

The court dismissed the action in accordance with the jury verdict and awarded the successful defendants partial indemnity costs fixed at $66,556.24, reducing the claimed hours to reflect a fair and reasonable amount.

The plaintiff brought motions under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside registrar’s dismissal orders in a tort action and a related accident benefits action arising from a bus incident.

The dismissals occurred after court-imposed deadlines were missed due to oversight within the plaintiff’s law firm, including inadequate supervision of an articling student and administrative issues following counsel’s departure.

The court applied the contextual analysis governing motions to set aside administrative dismissals, focusing on the Reid factors: explanation of delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice.

Although the motion was not brought promptly, the court accepted that the litigation delay was adequately explained, the missed deadlines resulted from inadvertence rather than intentional abandonment, and the defendants suffered no significant prejudice.

Balancing the competing principles of timely litigation and adjudication on the merits, the court concluded that justice favoured reinstating the actions.

The Service Employees International Union applied to the Ontario Labour Relations Board for a determination of whether the Motherhouse of the Sisters of St. Joseph is a 'hospital' within the meaning of the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act (HLDAA).

The Motherhouse contains an infirmary that receives government funding and provides care to sick and elderly sisters.

The Board, following its previous decision in Maison Mere, found that the Motherhouse is not operated for the purpose of providing a home for the aged or a hospital, but rather serves as the communal home and nerve centre for the religious order.

The Board advised the Minister that the HLDAA does not apply to the Motherhouse.

A dissenting Board member would have found the facility to be a hospital.