J. Miglin

The accused was arrested for drug trafficking and subjected to a strip search at the police station.

The accused brought an application to exclude the cocaine seized from his residence, arguing the strip search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the police failed to follow the Golden framework and their own policies, conducting the search in a non-private area and leaving the accused completely naked.

The court concluded this was a serious breach of s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, finding that the deliberate and cavalier police conduct outweighed the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The Crown applied for a review of a bail order releasing the respondent, who was charged with 22 offences including firearms offences and dangerous driving following a shooting and police chase.

The reviewing judge admitted new evidence consisting of the respondent's parole officer's notes, which showed a history of non-compliance.

The judge revoked bail, finding that the respondent's detention was necessary on both the secondary ground (public safety) and the tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice), given the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, and the respondent's history of breaching court orders.

The applicant was stopped by police in a park while they were investigating a robbery.

The police claimed the applicant acted nervously and had a heavy pocket, leading them to believe he had a gun.

A struggle ensued, during which the applicant was beaten by multiple officers, and a handgun was found in his pocket.

The court found the officers' evidence to be contradictory and unreliable, concluding they had no reasonable grounds for the arrest or search.

The court held that the applicant's rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the firearm from evidence under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on the applicant's rights.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of statements made by the accused to Canada Border Services Agency officers during a secondary inspection at an airport following his return from abroad.

The defence argued that the statements were obtained in breach of Charter rights and should be excluded due to delayed rights warnings and the absence of audio or video recordings.

The court found that the accused was not constitutionally detained until contraband was discovered in concealed compartments of containers in his luggage, at which point he was immediately arrested and properly cautioned.

Several incriminating statements were spontaneous utterances and others were made in response to brief investigative questions rather than interrogation.

The court held the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and that the lack of recordings did not undermine admissibility in the circumstances.

The accused brought a Charter application under ss. 8 and 24(2) seeking to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant for a residence and motor vehicle in a cocaine trafficking investigation.

The accused alleged misrepresentations, omissions, and insufficient grounds in the information to obtain (ITO), including issues relating to confidential informants and the accused’s connection to the searched residence.

Applying the Garofoli framework and the principles governing confidential informant information in Debot, the court reviewed the amplified record including cross-examination of the affiant.

Although certain information about the accused’s possible alternate address and “no fixed address” status had been omitted from the ITO, the court found the omissions were not made in bad faith and that sufficient grounds remained.

The court concluded there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused was trafficking cocaine and that evidence would be found at the residence and vehicle.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application seeking to set aside a search warrant executed at her apartment and to exclude evidence seized during the search, including significant quantities of cocaine and cash.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain relied on confidential informants whose reliability and corroboration were insufficient under the Debot framework, and that the search violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the adapted step‑six Garofoli procedure, the court reviewed redacted and unredacted materials and permitted limited cross‑examination of the affiant while protecting informer privilege.

The court found the informants’ information credible, reliable, and corroborated by police investigation, including surveillance and other evidence.

The search warrant was therefore properly authorized and no Charter breach occurred; in the alternative, the evidence would have been admitted under s. 24(2).