Jessica Lubrick

The applicants sought a review of the respondent children's aid society's decision to refuse their application to adopt a two-year-old child who had been in their foster care.

The society had removed the child and refused the adoption after the child suffered an unexplained elbow fracture while in the applicants' care, relying on the 'unexplained injury principle'.

The Child and Family Services Review Board rescinded the society's decision, finding that the unexplained injury principle was distinguishable because the injury was less severe than in precedent cases, there was evidence of potential third-party intervention by the child's siblings, and the society had no other concerns with the applicants' care.

The Board concluded it was in the child's best interests to proceed with the adoption application given the strong sibling bonds and the applicants' ability to meet the child's needs.

The applicant filed a complaint under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 against the respondent Children's Aid Society.

The respondent sought to dismiss the application on the basis of res judicata and because the issues were before the court in a child protection proceeding.

The Child and Family Services Review Board found that the applicant was not barred from raising complaints from a previous application because they had not been decided on their merits.

However, the Board dismissed complaints requiring factual determinations on caregiving as they were not separate and different from issues before the court.

The application was permitted to proceed solely on issues relating to the respondent's communication with the applicant.

The applicant, the maternal grandmother of a child in interim society care, filed an application with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging the respondent society denied her the opportunity to be heard and failed to provide reasons for decisions affecting the child and the child's mother.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was not a 'service recipient' within the meaning of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The right to be heard under section 15(2) is limited to children, young persons, and their parents, and the decisions for which reasons were sought affected the interests of the child and mother, not the applicant.

The applicants, maternal grandparents of the children, filed an application to review complaints against the respondent children's aid society.

The respondent argued the CFSRB lacked jurisdiction because the issues were before the court in an ongoing child protection proceeding.

The CFSRB found that complaints relating to the children's placement and access frequency were substantive issues before the court and dismissed them.

However, complaints regarding how the respondent exercised its discretion in facilitating access and communicating with the applicants were not before the court and were permitted to proceed.

The applicant parent filed an application with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding complaints about the respondent children's aid society's communication restrictions and affidavit materials.

The respondent argued the Board lacked jurisdiction under section 120(8)(a) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 because the issues were currently before the court in an ongoing child protection proceeding.

The Board agreed, finding that the applicant's complaints regarding communication, affidavit corrections, and care providers were not separate and different from the substantive issues before the court.

The application was dismissed.

The respondent Children's Aid Society brought a motion to dismiss the applicant parent's complaint on the basis that the Child and Family Services Review Board lacked jurisdiction.

The respondent argued that the issues raised in the complaint were not separate and different from the substantive issues currently before the court in ongoing child protection proceedings.

The Board found that complaints regarding the suitability of the kinship caregiver and the placement of the children were currently before the court and must be dismissed pursuant to s. 120(8)(a) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

However, the Board allowed the application to proceed on the remaining issues, including the respondent's alleged failure to hear the applicant regarding her strengths as a parent, her request for a change of worker, and the lack of reasons for refusing to assess an alternate kin plan.

The applicant filed an application with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding complaints about the respondent children's aid society.

The respondent sought to dismiss the application on jurisdictional grounds.

The Board found that while the applicant did receive services from the respondent, some of the complaints were barred by res judicata as they had been resolved in a previous application.

The remaining new complaints were dismissed because the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to confirm that they were separate and different from substantive issues that were before the court in concurrent child protection and family court proceedings.

The applicant filed an application under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 regarding the respondent's actions concerning a child's medical care, including the withdrawal of life support and administration of a vaccine.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed because the applicant had commenced a civil action in the Superior Court of Justice raising identical issues.

The Child and Family Services Review Board found that the complaints were not separate and different from the substantive issues before the court.

Pursuant to section 120(8)(a) of the Act, the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the complaints and dismissed the application.

The applicant mother filed an application under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, raising complaints against the respondent children's aid society regarding her deceased child and her niece.

The respondent sought to dismiss the application, arguing the issues were already determined in a previous application.

The Board found that complaints regarding placements, access, and return of belongings were barred by issue estoppel and dismissed them.

However, the Board allowed new complaints regarding the removal of life support, notification of illness, and vaccination to proceed, noting the self-represented applicant's grief reasonably delayed these claims.

The complaint regarding the niece was dismissed as premature.