Jennifer Briscoe

The applicant, charged with drug offences arising from an alleged internal pharmacy theft, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a warrantless search of his backpack incident to arrest and a subsequent warranted search of his home.

The applicant argued his arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating his s. 8 and s. 9 Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on information from a private investigator and police observations.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused applied for a Rowbotham order seeking state-funded counsel after Legal Aid refused to approve a change of solicitor following a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship shortly before trial.

The court considered whether the accused had been denied Legal Aid through his own conduct, whether he had exhausted available means to retain private counsel, and whether counsel was necessary for a fair trial.

The court found the accused had limited financial means, had attempted to retain counsel, and was not solely responsible for the breakdown with prior counsel.

Given the seriousness of the drug trafficking charges, the likelihood of imprisonment upon conviction, and the legal and evidentiary complexity including Charter issues and a jury trial, representation by counsel was necessary.

A conditional stay of proceedings was therefore granted until state-funded counsel is provided.

The Crown applied for a review of a justice of the peace's order granting judicial interim release to the respondent.

The respondent's original surety had applied to be relieved of his obligations, resulting in a committal order under s. 766(1) of the Criminal Code.

A justice of the peace subsequently substituted a new surety without holding a new bail hearing, relying on R. v. Alexander.

The Superior Court held that a committal order vacates the underlying release order, necessitating a new bail hearing.

Furthermore, because the original surety was specifically named in the release order, the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to amend the order to substitute a new surety.

The release order was quashed and a new bail hearing was ordered.