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Motion for leave to appeal granted with costs reserved to the appeal panel.
The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision of the lower court dated July 4, 2025.
The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.
The court dismissed a motion to strike a claim of misfeasance in public office against police for failing to charge a sexual assault suspect.
The court dismissed a motion by Ottawa Police Services and Keith Patrick to strike Tanya Locke’s claim for misfeasance in public office.
The defendants argued the claim was statute-barred, disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and was an abuse of process due to a prior dismissed action.
The court found the claim could fall within the exception in section 16 of the Limitations Act, 2002, and that the plaintiff had pleaded the elements of misfeasance in public office.
The court held the claim was not statute-barred, disclosed a reasonable cause of action, and was not an abuse of process.
Motion to strike granted; police owe no private law duty of care to victims for negligent investigation.
The defendants, Ottawa Police Service and Cst.
Keith Patrick, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for negligent investigation of a sexual assault complaint.
The plaintiff argued that the claim was not statute-barred due to section 16 of the Limitations Act, 2002, which removes limitation periods for proceedings based on sexual assault.
The court held that the police do not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime regarding the conduct of an investigation.
Consequently, the plaintiff could not rely on section 16, and the claim was both statute-barred and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.
The motion to strike was granted without leave to amend.
Judicial review dismissed; WSIAT reasonably concluded locked-in future economic loss benefits could not be altered.
The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision that refused to discontinue the respondent worker's Future Economic Loss benefits.
The worker had returned to full-time work 17 years after his injury, but his benefits had been locked-in after the statutory 60-month review window.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's interpretation of the legislation and policy directives—that benefits could not be reviewed after 60 months absent specific exceptions—was reasonable and respected the legislative objective of finality.