J. Costain

The offender pleaded guilty to the second-degree murder and dismemberment of his business partner following a dispute over a $1.3 million debt.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 14 years for the murder, and 5 years concurrent for the indignity to a human body.

The court accepted the joint submission, noting the horrific nature of the crime, the offender's lack of a prior record, and his guilty plea.

The offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for the domestic homicide of his wife.

The court considered the mandatory life sentence and had to determine the period of parole ineligibility under section 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

Accepting a joint submission from the Crown and defence, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 12 years, noting the brutal nature of the attack, the profound impact on the victim's family, and the offender's lack of a prior criminal record and early guilty plea.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and attempted murder following a stabbing at a social event.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment for second degree murder with no parole eligibility for 13 years, and a concurrent 8-year sentence for attempted murder.

The court considered the unprovoked nature of the attack and the severe impact on the victims as aggravating factors, balanced against the offender's lack of a prior criminal record and positive employment history.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains by dismemberment, relating to the death of his common-law partner.

The victim's body was discovered three years later in plastic pails hidden under a cottage where the accused worked.

The court considered the egregious nature of the murder, the subsequent dismemberment, and the domestic context as significant aggravating factors.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 17 years for the murder, and a concurrent 5-year sentence for the indignity to human remains.

The accused brought a defence motion seeking to exclude proposed Crown evidence relating to a necklace fragment and a mark on a carport floor at a property where the accused had previously worked.

The Crown argued the evidence could support an inference connecting the homicide victim to the property and thereby implicate the accused.

The court held that there was no evidentiary foundation linking the necklace fragment or the unidentified mark to the victim.

Without proof connecting the items to the victim or the alleged crime scene, the evidence lacked relevance and probative value.

The court further held that allowing the jury to speculate about ownership of the necklace or the nature of the mark would be unfairly prejudicial to the accused.

The proposed evidence was therefore excluded.

The Crown applied to introduce several pre-death statements made by the deceased victim in a homicide trial.

The statements were sought to be admitted for their truth, as part of the narrative, or to demonstrate the deceased's state of mind.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, assessing the necessity and reliability of each statement.

Necessity was established due to the declarant's death.

The court admitted statements that were specific, reliable, and relevant to the deceased's state of mind, while excluding others that lacked detail, were too remote in time, or carried prejudicial effects outweighing their probative value.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault after punching the complainant in the face during a late-night street altercation, causing the complainant to fall and suffer a head injury.

The accused testified that the complainant and his group were aggressive, took off their shirts, and that the complainant flinched first.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and found the accused's evidence credible.

The court concluded that both parties consented to a physical fight and that the accused did not intend to cause serious bodily harm.

As the fight was consensual, the application of force was not unlawful, and the accused was acquitted.