Jason Rabin

The applicant tenant brought a motion for interim relief from forfeiture after the respondent landlord purported to terminate a commercial lease for late payment of rent and other breaches.

The tenant's business, a restaurant, had recently opened following substantial leasehold improvements.

Despite chronic late rent payments and a shareholder dispute within the tenant corporation, the court granted interim relief from forfeiture, noting the severe impact of termination and the tenant's commitment to keep the lease in good standing.

The relief was granted subject to strict conditions, including the payment of $12,000 to the landlord for expenses and costs.

The defendant lawyer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of professional negligence and breach of trust arising from an unregistered mortgage.

The plaintiff alleged that it delivered a bank draft to the defendant in trust and that the defendant undertook to register a second mortgage on its behalf.

The defendant denied being retained by the plaintiff or making such an undertaking.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial due to conflicting evidence, credibility issues, and the risk of inconsistent findings with two other related actions.

The applicant commercial tenant sought a declaration that it had been overcharged for base rent and requested a retroactive rent rebate of at least $450,000.

The tenant argued that the rent charged exceeded market rates and relied on certain lease provisions referencing rentable area and market rents.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the parties had freely negotiated and agreed to the rent increases as the tenant expanded its footprint.

The court held that the lease did not contain a general right to a retroactive rent adjustment based on market rates.

Following a successful motion by the respondents declining to confirm an Assessment Officer's decision, the parties could not agree on costs.

The applicants argued costs should be in the cause as the matter was returned to a judge for determination.

The court rejected this argument, finding the respondents were presumptively entitled to costs as the successful party.

The court found the respondents' claimed costs of $30,749.59 excessive due to duplication of work by multiple timekeepers, and fixed costs at $15,000 all-inclusive.

The respondents brought a motion opposing the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's decision that reduced their legal accounts from $221,336.66 to $35,000.

The court found that the Assessment Officer failed to provide sufficient reasons for the drastic reduction, as she did not meaningfully analyze the Cohen factors or explain how she arrived at the reduced amount.

The court declined to confirm the assessment and directed that the matter be returned to the judge hearing the application.

The applicant tenant brought an urgent application to prevent the respondent landlords from terminating a commercial lease or exercising distraint after the tenant unilaterally withheld rent.

The tenant claimed the rent was calculated incorrectly by including the parking lot.

The parties agreed on consent that the tenant would pay all arrears and ongoing rent to keep the lease in good standing pending a hearing on the merits of the rent abatement.

The court fixed costs of the urgent motion at $18,000 payable by the tenant.

Following cross-motions for summary judgment where the plaintiff was successful in recovering the residual proceeds of a power of sale, the court determined costs and prejudgment interest.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs of $45,515.37, noting the plaintiff beat its Rule 49 offer and the defendants unreasonably rejected a settlement proposal.

The court also awarded prejudgment interest at 2% from the date of the power of sale.

The defendant brought a motion following a trial to seal certain exhibits to protect litigation privilege related to a separate class proceeding.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

The court noted that litigation privilege exists for the benefit of the plaintiff class in the separate proceeding, and therefore class counsel should have the opportunity to waive or defend it.

The motion was adjourned to be brought back with formal notice to class counsel.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs were awarded $328,396.82 for breach of contract, the parties made submissions on costs.

The plaintiffs sought costs of approximately $500,000, while the defendant sought costs from the date of its Rule 49 offer.

The court noted that the plaintiffs' costs were driven by multiple unmeritorious causes of action and that the defendant's offer triggered the costs consequences of Rule 49.10(2).

Balancing the plaintiffs' partial success against the defendant's offer and the plaintiffs' unreasonable litigation conduct, the court exercised its discretion to award no costs to either party.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) registered against their properties pursuant to an ex parte order.

They argued the plaintiff failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, including communications between counsel and a settlement agreement.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts that would have affected the outcome of the ex parte motion.

The CPLs were discharged, but the court ordered that the defendants not further encumber or sell the properties without consent or 45 days' notice.

The parties appealed a master’s decision concerning defence medical examinations in a personal injury action involving a minor who sustained serious injuries after falling from an apartment window.

The master granted leave for a second motion and ordered the plaintiff to attend a defence neuropsychological assessment, with the plaintiff’s mother required to participate by questionnaire and interview.

The master refused to order an in‑home future care cost assessment by a nurse practitioner.

On appeal, the court held the master made no reviewable error, finding the neuropsychological assessment was justified to respond to the plaintiff’s expert evidence and that the second motion was not barred by res judicata or abuse of process.

The refusal to order the in‑home assessment was upheld because the proposed assessor was not a statutory “health practitioner” and the evidence did not demonstrate necessity.