James Hill Lawson

The applicant sought judicial review of a Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) decision dismissing his appeal from a Refugee Protection Division (RPD) decision finding he was not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.

The RPD and RAD found the applicant's allegations of persecution by extortionists and corrupt police in Mongolia lacked credibility due to inconsistencies and omissions in his evidence.

The applicant argued the RAD erred in refusing to admit certain new documents and in its credibility findings.

The Federal Court held the RAD reasonably refused to admit the new evidence as it did not meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA.

The Court also found the RAD's credibility assessment was reasonable, as the applicant's evidence was inconsistent and lacked detail.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellants, a fertility doctor and her professional corporation, appealed the dismissal of their action against a former colleague for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment regarding a government funding application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings.

The court upheld the trial judge's conclusions that no fiduciary duty existed due to the absence of an undertaking to act in the beneficiary's best interests, and that there was a juristic reason for any enrichment because the funding application was made honestly and in accordance with the parties' agreement at the time.

The applicant, a citizen of Ukraine, sought judicial review of a RAD decision confirming the RPD's rejection of his refugee claim.

The claim was based on his purported Roma ethnicity and fear of persecution.

The RAD found the applicant lacked credibility regarding his ethnicity and rejected new evidence on appeal as it was intended to repair deficiencies in the record before the RPD.

The Federal Court found the RAD's refusal to accept the new evidence and its credibility findings regarding the applicant's ethnicity were reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiffs and defendants were fertility doctors who worked together at a clinic for many years.

When the Ontario government announced public funding for fertility procedures, the defendant applied for and received funding for her new clinic, using historical data from both doctors' practices.

The plaintiff, who ultimately chose not to join the new clinic, sued for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, claiming she was cut out of the funding.

The court dismissed the claims, finding no per se or ad hoc fiduciary duty existed, as the defendant did not undertake to forsake her own interests.

The court also found a juristic reason for any enrichment, as the plaintiff autonomously chose not to join the new clinic or negotiate an agreement to access the funding.

In the alternative, damages were assessed at $2,578,050.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside a master's order reinstating his action to the trial list.

The action had been dismissed for delay multiple times and reinstated on consent.

The parties agreed to a fourth timetable with a consent order under Rule 48.14(4) requiring the appellant to meet an August 18, 2016 deadline for restoration.

The appellant met the deadline and the master reinstated the action.

The appeal judge allowed the respondents' appeal, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the master correctly focused on delay subsequent to the consent order rather than the entire history of delay.

The court affirmed that the respondents' consent to the order was binding and that there was no relevant delay requiring explanation.

The appellants (defendants) appealed a Master's order that restored an action to the trial list, arguing that the Master erred by failing to find non-compensable prejudice due to the plaintiff's unexplained delay and the deaths of key defence witnesses.

The court found that the Master made a palpable and overriding error by not considering that the appellants were unaware of the witnesses' deaths when they consented to a new timetable, and by not considering the entire period of delay.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the overall delay and that the deaths of the key witnesses constituted non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, and the action was dismissed.