J.A. Desotti

The accused was charged with attempted murder, arson causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, failing to stop for police, and arson of a dwelling after dousing individuals with gasoline during a violent altercation.

The court rejected the accused’s testimony under the R. v. W. (D.) credibility framework and accepted the eyewitness evidence that the accused intentionally poured gasoline on the complainant and another individual.

However, the court held the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally ignited the complainant, noting multiple possible ignition sources and uncertainty about how the fire began.

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of arson causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, failing to stop for police, and arson of a dwelling, as well as the included offence of simple assault relating to the second complainant.

During a criminal trial involving allegations of attempted murder, arson causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and flight from police, the Crown sought to admit a statement made by the complainant identifying the accused shortly after being burned in a house fire.

The statement was relayed through a neighbour and tendered under the res gestae or spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

The defence challenged admissibility based on the complainant’s intoxication, inconsistencies in witness recollection, and the Crown’s failure to comply with procedural rules governing pre-trial applications.

The court held the statement was sufficiently reliable and contemporaneous with the traumatic event to meet the res gestae exception, and that the procedural non-compliance caused no prejudice to the defence.

Leave was granted to hear the late application and the hearsay statement was admitted, though the court cautioned that its weight might be reduced due to the complainant’s intoxication.

The plaintiff successfully obtained an interim injunction against the defendants during a labour strike that was causing significant delays to the plaintiff's operations.

The only remaining issue was the quantum of costs.

The plaintiff sought over $205,000, including significant disbursements for private investigators, while the defendants suggested $15,000.

The court found the plaintiff's claimed costs excessive and punitive, noting the legal and factual issues were straightforward.

The court awarded the plaintiff a total of $37,083.80, which included a significantly reduced allowance for the investigator disbursements and legal fees.

The accused was convicted of multiple counts of drug trafficking (heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine) and simple possession after concealing the drugs in his anal cavity.

The accused had a significant prior criminal record for drug trafficking and showed no remorse or effort toward rehabilitation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the accused to a global term of 10 years' incarceration, reduced to 7 years, 3 months, and 24 days after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court also ordered a lifetime weapons prohibition, forfeiture of seized property, and a DNA sample.

The accused was stopped for a traffic violation.

The investigating officer, noting the accused's nervous demeanour, evasive answers, and the presence of a baseball bat and knife in the vehicle, detained the accused for officer safety.

During a pat-down search, the officer discovered cocaine in the accused's pocket.

The accused brought an application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the investigative detention and pat-down search were justified based on the totality of the circumstances and officer safety concerns.

During a drug raid, the accused was arrested and given his right to counsel multiple times.

He initially nodded his head indicating a desire to speak to counsel, but later told the booking officer 'not really' when asked if he wished to contact a lawyer now.

He subsequently made spontaneous statements to an investigating officer before being cautioned again.

The Crown applied to admit the statements as voluntary, while the defence applied to exclude them under ss. 7, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the statements were voluntary.

The court also found a technical breach of s. 10(b) because the police failed to clarify the accused's change of mind regarding counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), concluding the breach was minor and the accused clearly understood his rights but chose not to exercise them.