3 total
Judicial review of National Capital Commission's calculation of payments in lieu of taxes dismissed.
The Municipality of Chelsea applied for judicial review of a decision by the National Capital Commission regarding payments in lieu of taxes for federal properties in Gatineau Park.
The municipality argued the Commission created a legitimate expectation it would follow an advisory panel's recommendation and that the Commission's calculation of property values was unreasonable.
The Federal Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness and concluding the Commission's decision was reasonable, transparent, and defensible in fact and law.
Motion for supplementary disclosure under section 317 dismissed as disclosure is limited to materials before the decision-maker.
In a statutory appeal under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act against administrative monetary penalties imposed by FINTRAC, the appellant moved to compel supplementary disclosure under section 317 of the Federal Courts Rules.
The appellant argued that the Director delegated her decision-making authority to staff, meaning the material before the staff should also be disclosed.
The Court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence of improper delegation and ruling that disclosure under section 317 is limited to the relevant material that was before the actual decision-maker.
Judicial review allowed; Old Port interpretation of PILT exemptions unreasonable.
The applicant, the City of Montréal, sought judicial review of annual decisions rendered by the respondent, the Old Port of Montréal Corporation, determining the amount of payments in lieu of taxes (PILTs) owing.
The respondent argued that the Old Port site was a park and therefore excluded from the definition of "federal property" under the Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act.
The Federal Court allowed the application, finding that the respondent's interpretation of the exclusions from the concept of "federal property" was unreasonable.
The Court held that the Old Port site as a whole did not constitute a park within the meaning of the Act.
The Court also found that the respondent's parking lots were subject to the City's Parking Lot By-law and that it was unreasonable for the respondent to effect compensation for an alleged overpayment in 2013.
The matter was remitted to the respondent for redetermination.
