IPCO 1992

The appellant appealed a decision by the Metropolitan Toronto Police to deny access to parts of a record concerning an investigation of allegations of criminal conduct against the appellant.

The Inquiry Officer found that the severed parts of the record contained personal information of both the appellant and an affected person.

The Inquiry Officer concluded that disclosure of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of the affected person's personal privacy under section 38(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, as the information was compiled as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law.

The Police's decision to deny access was upheld, though some pages were ordered disclosed as agreed during mediation.

The appellant requested access to police records concerning himself and his family.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police disclosed some records but withheld others under various exemptions, including section 38(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Assistant Commissioner found that the police's search for records was reasonable and that the withheld information qualified as personal information compiled as part of a law enforcement investigation.

Disclosure of the remaining records was found to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 38(b), and the police's decision to deny access was upheld, with the exception of one minor severance.

The requester appealed the Espanola Board of Education's decision to deny access to minutes of 'in camera' meetings regarding the departure of a former employee.

The Assistant Commissioner found that parts of the records containing personal or financial information of an employee were exempt under section 6(1)(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The remaining parts of the records, consisting of administrative details and names of individuals in their professional capacities, did not qualify as personal information and were ordered to be disclosed.

The appellant requested information from the City of Mississauga regarding its use of private investigators, specifically concerning an investigation into the appellant.

The City refused to confirm or deny the existence of the records under section 8(3) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, claiming they would be exempt under law enforcement provisions.

The Commissioner found that the records related to an employment disciplinary matter, not 'law enforcement' as defined in the Act.

Therefore, the exemptions did not apply, and the City could not rely on section 8(3).

The Commissioner ordered the City to disclose the non-identifying portions of the records.

The appellant submitted a freedom of information request to the Walkerton Board of Commissioners of Police for records relating to a perjury charge against a certain individual.

The Police responded that no responsive records existed.

The appellant appealed, claiming the records did exist.

The Inquiry Officer found that the Police had conducted a reasonable search, including questioning all officers and searching all likely areas, and upheld the institution's decision.

The requester appealed a decision by the City of North York regarding a freedom of information request for records of donations to a community centre.

The City provided a copy of a cash receipt and stated no other responsive records existed.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the City's search for records was reasonable.

The Assistant Commissioner reviewed the City's representations and affidavits detailing the search efforts and concluded that the search was reasonable in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant submitted a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to the City of Oshawa for the name of the individual who filed a by-law complaint regarding the appellant's property.

The city denied access, citing the law enforcement exemption.

On appeal, the Assistant Commissioner upheld the city's decision, finding that the by-law enforcement process qualifies as law enforcement and that releasing the record would disclose the identity of a confidential source of information under section 8(1)(d) of the Act.

The appellant appealed a decision by the Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Board of Commissioners of Police to deny access to police records relating to an alleged offence.

The Commissioner found that the records contained personal information of both the appellant and affected persons.

The Commissioner upheld the police's decision to deny access under section 38(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, concluding that disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of the affected persons' personal privacy as the information was compiled as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law.

The appellant appealed a decision by the Metropolitan Toronto Police denying access to portions of a police report regarding alleged threats made by the appellant.

The Commissioner found that the severed information, except for the occurrence number, constituted personal information and its disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of the affected person's privacy under section 38(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The police were ordered to disclose only the occurrence number, as it did not qualify for exemption under sections 8(1)(e) or 8(2)(a).

The appellant requested a copy of an estimate of the cost to complete a subdivision agreement from the Township of Mara.

The Township denied access under section 7(1) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, claiming the record contained advice or recommendations.

The Commissioner found that the record, a preliminary estimate of costs prepared by an engineering firm, contained mere information and not a suggested course of action.

The Township was ordered to disclose the record.

The requester sought the home address of a hot dog vendor from the Metropolitan Licensing Commission in order to pursue a civil action for injuries allegedly caused by glass particles in a hot dog.

The Commission denied access under section 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner upheld the decision, finding that the address was personal information and its disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of privacy, as it was not required for the requester to proceed with a civil action.

The appellant, retained by an insurance company for a subrogated claim, requested the names and addresses of two nine-year-old children investigated by the police in relation to a fire.

The police denied access under section 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, claiming disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of privacy.

The appellant argued that since the children were under twelve, they could not be charged under the Young Offenders Act, meaning there was no 'possible violation of law' under section 14(3)(b).

The Commissioner rejected this narrow interpretation, finding the police conducted an investigation into a possible violation of law before deciding not to lay charges.

The Commissioner also found that while section 14(2)(d) (fair determination of rights) was a relevant consideration, it was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of an unjustified invasion of privacy.

The police's decision to deny access was upheld.

The appellant requested access to information relating to the classification of his position under the institution's proposed pay equity plan, specifically the points given for each category.

The institution denied access, claiming exemptions under sections 10(1)(a) and 11(c) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner found that the record, which included a job evaluation manual prepared by a consulting firm, did not meet the three-part test for exemption under section 10(1)(a) because it was not supplied in confidence and disclosure would not cause the specified harms, noting that disclosure under the Act does not infringe copyright.

The Commissioner also found that section 11(c) did not apply, as disclosure could not reasonably be expected to prejudice the institution's economic interests or competitive position.

The institution was ordered to disclose the records.

A requester sought access to City of Toronto files relating to storm sewer construction.

The City decided to release the records, but a third-party company appealed, arguing the records contained confidential commercial information, economic interests, and personal information of its representatives.

The Commissioner dismissed the appeal, finding that the information was not supplied in confidence, the company could not claim a discretionary exemption not raised by the City, and the names of corporate representatives did not constitute personal information.

The City was ordered to disclose the records.

The appellant requested access to the number of hours worked by three municipal office staff members during January 1991.

The township denied access under the personal privacy exemption of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner found that the records contained personal information and that, because the exact hourly wage of each employee was public knowledge by by-law, disclosing the hours worked would reveal their actual income.

This constituted a presumed unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 14(3)(f), which was not rebutted by any other factors.

The township's decision to deny access was upheld.

The appellant requested copies of work orders issued by the City of Kitchener against residential rental properties for non-compliance with property standards.

The city denied access under the law enforcement exemptions in sections 8(1)(a) and 8(2)(a) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner found that the Orders to Comply were not 'reports' under section 8(2)(a) and that the city failed to establish a reasonable expectation of interference with a law enforcement matter under section 8(1)(a).

The city was ordered to disclose the records with the names and addresses of the property owners severed.

The appellant submitted a freedom of information request to the Town of Penetanguishene asking what by-laws would apply to a specific hypothetical littering scenario.

The Town refused to provide an opinion, stating the Act does not require municipalities to supply opinions.

The appellant appealed, arguing the definition of 'record' includes information in an individual's mind.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner dismissed the appeal, holding that the Act does not require an institution to produce information from an individual's memory or knowledge, nor does it impose a duty to transcribe oral views or create a record.

The appellant sought access to the name of the original requester who had requested information about the appellant from the Midland Public Utilities Commission.

The institution denied access under section 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner found that while the name is personal information, its disclosure would not constitute an unjustified invasion of the original requester's personal privacy.

The Commissioner ordered the institution to disclose the name of the original requester to the appellant.

The appellant appealed the City of Oshawa's decision to deny access to the names of individuals who filed a by-law complaint regarding the appellant's property.

The institution relied on the law enforcement exemption under section 8(1)(d) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

Relying on previous orders involving the same institution and identical information, the Commissioner found that by-law enforcement qualifies as law enforcement and that disclosure would reveal a confidential source of information.

The head's decision to deny access was upheld.

The appellant requested the names of temporary and part-time employees hired by the City of Sudbury for a specific period.

The City denied access, claiming the names were personal information and their disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner found that while the names constituted personal information, section 14(4)(a) applied, meaning disclosure of the names of individuals who are or were employees of the institution does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

The City was ordered to disclose the names.