Ian J. Collins

The moving party sought security for costs in relation to pending motions brought by the responding party in bankruptcy and related proceedings.

The court found that there were outstanding unpaid costs awards totaling over $41,000 against the responding party.

While declining to order security for costs, the court imposed a condition that the responding party must pay the outstanding costs awards by a specified deadline or face automatic dismissal of the motion.

The court found that the responding party's arguments deserved consideration on their merits and were not frivolous or vexatious.

The respondent brought a motion seeking recusal of the judge on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent alleged that the judge made derogatory comments about Indigenous peoples, made ad hominem attacks, directed an unfair motion structure, relied on outdated case law while ignoring a reversal by the same judge, predetermined a paramountcy issue, and intended to benefit the applicant through a solicitor's lien.

The judge dismissed the motion, finding that the allegations lacked merit, were raised well over a year after the impugned conduct, and appeared tactical in nature.

The judge awarded costs to the applicant.

The applicant sought security for costs in relation to a pending motion by the respondent seeking the judge's recusal based on apprehension of bias.

The respondent conceded he had insufficient assets to pay costs.

The court declined to order security on the ground that the recusal motion was frivolous and vexatious, as doing so would effectively prejudge the bias allegation.

However, the court ordered security for costs in the amount of unpaid costs awards previously made against the respondent, to be deposited into counsel's trust account prior to the hearing of the recusal motion.

The moving party, a lawyer, brought a motion for security for costs and security for judgment pending an appeal by his former client regarding unpaid legal fees.

The former client had previously successfully appealed a receivership order on the basis that his on-reserve assets were protected under the Indian Act.

The motions judge found that while the appeal was not frivolous, the former client's history of avoiding payment and lack of cooperation regarding off-reserve assets justified an order for security for costs.

The court ordered $115,026.90 to be paid into court for outstanding costs and appeal costs, but declined to order security for judgment.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from multiple motions and applications.

Andrew Clifford Miracle's applications (vexatious litigant, security for costs, bankruptcy motion) were dismissed.

Glenn Bogue's motions (solicitors' lien, summary judgment) were largely successful.

Rod Gram's summary judgment motion was dismissed, but his motion to dismiss Miracle's counterclaim was granted.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to Glenn Bogue for his successful motions and to the Receiver for an abandoned motion by Miracle.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding Miracle's conduct not egregious enough, and reserved costs between Gram and Miracle.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of s. 89 of the Indian Act and whether a court could place an on-reserve business into receivership at the instance of a non-Indian creditor.

The Superior Court had found a "commercial mainstream" exception to s. 89, allowing a receiver to recoup profits from the appellant's on-reserve businesses to satisfy a debt owed to a non-Indian lawyer.

The Court of Appeal overturned this, clarifying that the "commercial mainstream" exception applies only to s. 90(1) of the Indian Act (personal property deemed on-reserve) and not to s. 89, which protects all real and personal property of an Indian or band situated on a reserve from seizure by non-Indians, regardless of its commercial nature.

The appeal was allowed, holding that the receiver could not seize on-reserve business profits but could seize off-reserve assets.

The appellant, Andrew Clifford Miracle, appealed an order appointing a receiver over his assets, which was granted to the respondent, Glenn Bogue, to satisfy a debt arising from an arbitration award.

The arbitration concerned the joint ownership of a store on Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory.

Andrew alleged the application judge erred by lacking authority for a final receiver order, miscalculating contingency fees, and, crucially, that the order contravened sections 29 and 89 of the Indian Act, which prohibit enforcement by a non-status Indian against assets situated on a reserve.

The Court of Appeal identified the Indian Act issue as a threshold matter, noting it was not fully litigated or determined in the lower court.

Consequently, the court remitted the matter to the application judge for a determination on the effect of the Indian Act, adhering to the principle that new issues are generally not decided on appeal.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed impaired care or control and “over 80” care or control convictions from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that police breached his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by failing to facilitate contact with his named counsel after he requested a specific lawyer.

The trial judge found a breach but admitted the breath evidence under s. 24(2).

The summary conviction appeal court held that the police made no effort to facilitate contact with counsel of choice and that the breath technician’s later administration of the right to counsel could not cure the earlier breach.

The trial judge therefore erred in law in concluding the breach was saved, and the conviction could not stand.